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INTRODUCTION
In 1951, a television station in Houston caused a public outcry when it
planned to air a bedding commercial showing a husband and wife in a double
bed.' Radio broadcasts of rock music during the 1950s led to such outrage
that the Everly Brothers' Wake Up, Little Susie was banned in Boston.2 The
phrase "let it all hang out" raised eyebrows at the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) during the 1960s and led to the dismissal of the South
Carolina disc jockey who uttered it on the air.3 In 1967, the Ed Sullivan Show
required the Rolling Stones to perform Let's Spend the Night Together as Let's
Spend Some Time Together.' And, in the early 1970s, the FCC succeeded in
eliminating a popular radio call-in format, known as "topless radio" for its
attention to sexual themes, by the simple expedient of having the agency's
chairman publicly denounce it as "a new breed of air pollution."5
1. J. FRED MACDONALD, ONE NATION UNDER TELEVISION: THE RISE AND DECLINE
OF NETWORK TV 105 (1990).
2. LINDA MARTIN & KERRY SEGRAVE, ANTI-RoCK: THE OPPOSITION TO ROCK 'N'
ROLL 22 (1988).
3. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 167
(1987); see Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 33 F.C.C. 250 (1962), aff'd sub nom. Robinson v. FCC,
334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 843 (1964).
4. PETER FORNATALE & JOSHUA E. MILLS, RADIO IN THE TELEVISION AGE 129 (1980).
5. FORNATALE & MILLS, supra note 4, at 84-85 (describing Dean Burch's speech to the
National Association of Broadcasters in 1973); Maria T. Regina, Broadcasting Obscene Lan-
guage: The Federal Communications Commission and Section 1464 Violations, 1974 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 457, 461-65 (same). Ever susceptible to such "regulation by lifted eyebrow," broadcasters
immediately toned down their talk shows and dispensed with the topless radio format.
FORNATALE & MILLS, supra note 4, at 84-85; see also infra text accompanying notes 87-90.
The origin of the now-famous reference to regulation by lifted or raised eyebrow is often attrib-
uted to Commissioner John Doerfer in his dissent in Miami Broadcasting Co. (WQAM), 14
Rad. Reg. 125 (1956).
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In the decades that followed, social discourse changed remarkably,
becoming increasingly liberalized in sexual content. To watch television or
listen to the radio today is to immerse oneself in a discourse permeated with
references to sex. "Before you dress, Caress," we are instructed by a soap
manufacturer, while television soap operas routinely depict couples lying sug-
gestively in bed.6 Late-night television is even more salacious, with a plethora
of new "relationship" shows whose contestants describe their dates - "He
spread his sauce thicker than Chef Boyardee" - and whose hosts muse out
loud over which of two men is "most likely to own mink-lined handcuff's[.]" 7
Mainstream pop radio features songs with barely disguised sexual metaphors,
celebrating men with "slow hands" and women with "sugar walls." Most
strikingly, morning radio personalities ask callers "what makes your favorite
hiney parts tingle?," 9 read tips from magazine articles on "how to spice up
lovemaking,"10 and describe "marathon spanking session[s]." Il The notorious
Howard stem, "shock jock" extraordinaire,12 warns us not to shake Pee Wee
Herman's hand (in light of his arrest for masturbating in a public theatre);13
says that "the closest [he] came to making love to a black woman was...
masturbat[ing] to a picture of Aunt Jemima;'" 4 and laments that "it's tragic
about Magic and this awful thing, why couldn't it have happened to Larry
King[?]"' 5 Typical of shock "humor" is the statement that the "best pick-up
line at a gay bar" is "[m]ay I push your stool in for you?" 6 Non-commercial
broadcasters as well have challenged the limits of traditional discourse. De-
spite considerable controversy, some non-commercial broadcasters have ad-
dressed sexuality in programs such as Tongues Untied, a documentary on the
6. See, e.g., Michael Logan, Why Soaps Are So Sexy, TV GUIDE, Apr. 4-10, 1992, at 12,
14, 16, 21; Anthony D'Amato, Harmful Speech and the Culture of Indeterminacy, 32 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 329, 344-45 (1991).
7. John J. O'Connor, For a Date (Wink) or a Tease (Smirk), Try Late-Night TV, N.Y.
TiIMEs, June 30, 1992, at B1.
8. POINTER SISTERS, Slow Hand, on GREATEST HrTS (BMG Music 1989); SHEENA EAS-
TON, Sugar Walls, on THE BEsT OF SHEENA EAsToN (EMI-USA 1989).
9. Rusk Corporation, Radio Station KLOL (FM), 5 F.C.C.R. 6332, 6333 (1990) (Stevens
and Pruett Show).
10. Claudia Puig, Radio in the Raw, L.A. TImiEs, Feb. 9, 1992, Calendar, at 7 (Mark &
Brian Show).
11. Id. (Howard Stern Show).
12. For discussions of shock radio and Howard Stem programming in particular, see, e.g.,
Steve Daley, Radio Raunch." Ratings Greed or Free Speech?, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 26, 1987, Zone C,
at 1; Patrick Goldstein, SHOCK RADIO: Is It Satire or Just Bad Taste?, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 22,
1987, Calendar, at 3; Dennis McDougal, FCC Versus Howard Stern; Agency's 'Indecency'Rul-
ing Hasn't Stopped N.Y. Deejay, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1987, Part 6, at 1; Mary B.W. Tabor,
Mining Solid Gold on the Radio, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 23, 1991, § 1, at 25; see also infra notes 58-
61 and accompanying text.
13. Greater Los Angeles Radio, Inc. (KLSX(FM)), 1992 FCC LEXIS 6082, 6144 (Oct.
27, 1992).
14. Id at 6147.
15. Id. at 6165.
16. Evergreen Media Corp. (WLUP(AM)), 6 F.C.C.R. 3708 (1989).
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many forms of discrimination experienced by gay African-American men;' 7
and Dr. Ruth Westheimer's instructional programming on sex is far from the
only example of the genre.
Against this background of growing liberty for sexual expression, the
FCC has quietly taken increasingly activist steps to control the sexual content
of broadcast speech in the past five years. After nearly a decade of applying a
narrow, formal rule prohibiting only the repeated broadcast of any one of
seven specific "dirty" words, the FCC radically reversed course in 1987 and
returned to the "generic" definition of indecency that it had articulated in the
early 1970s.1 With sweeping imprecision, the Commission made actionable
any sexual or excretory reference that the "average" broadcast viewer or lis-
tener would find "patently offensive," so long as the broadcast occurred at a
time during which persons under eighteen years of age might be in the
audience. 19
An aggressive enforcement policy has accompanied the FCC's change of
course. In the past five years, the Commission has levied fines for violations of
the new indecency rules on more than twice as many stations as were fined in
the previous seventy-odd years of broadcast history.2" In addition to the com-
paratively large number of stations affected, the enforcement effort stands out
for its increasing stringency. The Commission's imposition of an "unprece-
dented" $600,000 fine on the licensee of three radio stations that broadcast
Howard Stem material,21 just one month after it fined another station
$105,000 for broadcasts featuring Mr. Stem,22 conveys a harsh message
indeed.
The Commission has attempted to justify its stringent new indecency pol-
icy by reference to a governmental interest in the welfare of children and by
the implicit assurance that "contextual" application of the new policy will
properly balance norms of civility and constitutionally protected interests in
open discourse and individual autonomy. Yet the FCC's approach is troub-
ling. By relying on the rhetorical strategy of focusing on the protection of
children, and by cloaking its actions in standard references to administrative
expertise and discretionary decision making, the Commission has avoided con-
fronting the fundamental complexities, ambiguities, and contradictions im-
plicit in the kind of nuanced contextual analysis promised in its rhetoric.
Obviously, the meaning of "context" will vary dramatically depending on
who conducts the analysis. For instance, government agents often apply a
17. See infra notes 266, 350.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 194-98.
19. See infra text accompanying note 189.
20. See generally POWE, supra note 3 (describing history of indecency cases); Joe Flint &
Harry A. Jessell, Roaring in the Face of 'Red Lion', BROADCASTING, Oct. 19, 1992, at 46.
21. Largest FCC Fine Ever: Infinity Fined Record $600,000 for Stern Broadcasts Ruled
Indecent, COMM. DAILY, Dec. 21, 1992, at 2.
22. Greater Los Angeles Radio, Inc. (KLSX (FM)), 1992 FCC LEXIS 6082 (Oct. 27,
1992).
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version of contextualist analysis far different from the self-consciously perspec-
tival exploration of the social world envisioned by outsider scholars who seek
to expand the horizons of traditional legal discourse.' Each interpreter will
define the same context differently. The FCC's "context story" shows that
claims of sensitivity to context should begin the inquiry rather than conclude
it. The FCC's application of its contextual factors is analytically unpredict-
able, rather ad hoc, and not unlikely subject to tilt. In particular, the "contex-
tual" approach hides the extent to which the Commission's processes operate
in concert with the programmatic agendas of social conservative pressure
groups. Moreover, a reliance on contextual method cannot, in itself, justify
any particular decision in socially contested terrain. Even a subtle and de-
tailed exploration of an issue as hotly debated as indecency reveals more ambi-
guity and contradiction than certainty and resolution.
The lack of complexity and depth in the FCC's analysis is unsurprising.
The agency's intervention is taking place against the backdrop of a raging and
increasingly polarized public debate on matters relating to sexuality and the
proper role of the State in enforcing social morality. On one side are social
conservatives, often of a religious bent, who believe that stringent regulation of
sexual discourse is necessary for the integrity of the social fabric.24 The press
has devoted substantial coverage over the past several years to the contro-
versy, sparked by the deeply conservative Senator Jesse Helms, over the avail-
ability of public funding for sexually explicit expression.25 In a similar vein,
both Senator Helms and socially conservative religious groups have sought to
sweep the airwaves clean of sexualized expression in order to promote their
perception of general social welfare. These "pro-family" and "pro-decency"
groups have imposed pressure on Congress, the FCC, and product advertisers
23. Reliance on contextual approaches to legal problems marks an important new trend in
legal theory. Whether described as pragmatism, empathetic discourse, or narrative method,
much of contemporary legal theory is context-oriented and anti-foundationalist. See, ag.,
Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971 (1991) (discussing feminist
narrative methods); Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transfor-
mation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331 (1988) (applying
critical race theory to characterize the underlying racist nature of neutral rules); Lynne N.
Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574 (1987) (discussing the role of empa-
thy in legal discourse); Symposium on the Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal
Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1569 (1990) (featuring various articles on pragmatism and the role
of context in legal thought); Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073 (1989)
(including several articles on narrative).
24. For definitions of the terms I use to characterize participants in the debate over inde-
cency regulation (social conservatives, pluralists, libertarians, and progressives), see infra note
38.
25. See, eg., Owen M. Fiss, State Activism and State Censorship, 100 YALE L.J. 2087,
2088-89, 2092-96 (1991); Jesse Helms, Art, the First Amendment, and the NEA Controveiv:
Tax-Paid Obscenity, 14 NOVA L. REv. 317 (1990); Kim M. Shipley, The Politicization of Art:
The National Endowment for the Arts; the First Amendment, and Senator Helms, 40 E.%IoRY
L.J. 241 (1991); John Frohnmayer's Noisy Exit, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 25, 1992, at A22. Seegener-
ally KATHLEEN M. SULLiVAN, ART ON TRIAL: THE NEA & THE BATTLE FOR FREE EXPREs-
SION (W.W. Norton & Co., forthcoming 1993).
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to rid the airwaves of "garbage," "trash," and "filth." 2
On the other side of the debate, libertarians and pluralists decry the cen-
sorship they find inherent in the FCC policy on indecency. The ACLU speaks
out to protest the FCC's indecency standard and its imposition of hefty fines
for Howard Stem's shock programming;27 and broadcasters challenge the
FCC's standard on First Amendment grounds. Without focusing on the par-
ticulars of the sexual discourse currently permeating the airwaves, these pro-
ponents of free speech reject any governmental role in its suppression.
Pluralists who oppose governmental regulation of sexual speech base their
view on the notion that such speech is an affirmatively liberating and empow-
ering element of social life.28 This position rests on the assertedly liberating
subversiveness of sex talk, on its capacity to arouse the passion and desire
overly repressed by mainstream norms of rationality, and on the communica-
tive opportunities it provides for members of non-mainstream groups. Plural-
ists also decry government prohibition of sexually-referential speech on the
ground that such censorship undermines socially enriching diversity while
promoting a stultifying cultural homogeneity. 29 From this perspective, the
particular harm of "acute ethnocentric myopia ' 30 is that it falsely assumes a
culturally homogeneous audience offended by the same sorts of sexual refer-
ences and constitutes governmental adoption of a partisan and culturally bi-
ased position on value. Pluralists fear that the failure to recognize cultural
heterogeneity unfairly burdens the speech of minority groups whose cultures
tolerate more inclusive linguistic, conversational, and artistic norms.
Neither of the polar, absolutist positions on the regulation of indecency is
fully realistic or persuasive; each unduly simplifies a far more complex reality.
The socially conservative position is both unrealistic in seeking to put the ge-
nie back in the bottle, and oppressive in attempting to impose on society gen-
erally the dictates of a small, homogeneous group of people intolerant of
significant social diversity. Yet this does not mean that pluralist paeans to
broadcast sex talk are any more satisfactory. If the Commission really were to
engage in the kind of interpretive, contextual method it purports to have
adopted, its inquiry into indecency would reveal a contradictory, Janus-faced
social form rather than the conveniently optimistic pluralist view.
A look at the specifics and the social meanings of broadcast sex talk
26. 134 CONG. REC. S9913 (daily ed. July 26, 1988) (statement of Sen. Helms); Doug
Halonen, Court Hits FCC Over 'Indecency,' ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Aug. 1, 1988, at 1; see also
infra note 246.
27. Aleene MacMinn, Morning Report: Radio, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 18, 1992, at 2.
28. Many of the narrowly libertarian arguments against government regulation of indecent
broadcast content reflect market-oriented reactions to the popularity of sexually explicit speech
and are grounded in principles of individual autonomy. These arguments, although most com-
mon in the literature, do not figure largely in this Article which focuses on an examination of
the opposing points of view of social conservatives and pluralists.
29. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 775 (Brennan, J., dissenting), reh'g denied, 439
U.S. 883 (1978).
30. Id.
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reveals both a broader range and a greater multiplicity of messages than either
the prototypical pluralist or socially conservative characterizations would sug-
gest. Broadcast sex talk is not necessarily a danger to the republic; but, in
contrast to pluralist claims, it is equally unclear that the broadcast of sexual
discourse per se necessarily functions as a challenge to power, especially in
light of the extensive mainstream appropriation of sexual imagery. The use of
sex to sell consumer goods casts doubt on the extent to which sexualized dis-
course either fundamentally subverts standardizing, mainstream values or fa-
cilitates the development of the liberated self. Similarly, as the concrete
examples in this Introduction themselves should suggest, sexual discourse can
affirm misogyny, racism, and other oppressive stereotypes while being charac-
terized as liberating and empowering. Just as a focus on the culturally em-
powering and expressive character of rap music can distract from the
misogyny and homophobia of some of its lyrics, Howard Stem can cloak his
insulting and demeaning images of women, African Americans, and gays by
using the FCC's actions against his programming to transform himself into a
modem anti-hero.3'
In addition, the classic pluralist celebration of diversity and cultural mul-
tiplicity does not tell us how to deal with the problem of groups whose self-
definitions are intolerant and anti-pluralistic; how to understand the contra-
dictory character of discourses that are simultaneously affirming and dis-
empowering; how to resolve conflicts between different disempowered groups;
or even how to define the concept of minority viewpoints in light of their cul-
tural appropriation and transformation by the mainstream over time. Con-
cepts such as diversity and pluralism are in themselves too abstract and
incomplete to deal with many of the concrete oppositions and contradictions
in social life.
It is by no means clear what ideally should be done about broadcast sexu-
alized discourse. In constitutional law, the free speech precedent is not dispos-
itive: although vagueness and overbreadth claims are reflexively invoked to
resolve the indecency issue, both depend on prior normative decisions about
what should be constitutionally protected. Analogies to hate speech are simi-
larly problematic, in no mean part because of the complex and equivocal na-
ture of broadcast sex talk itself. Doctrinal answers are equally scarce in
administrative law; litigants' challenges both to the FCC's procedures and to
the reasonableness of its change in policy are subject to criticism as simply
restating the uncertainties invoked by the indecency standard.
The broadcast of indecency presents a truly difficult problem. We could
reclaim doctrine and argue that, because of the social complexity of sex talk,
the inherent ambiguity and vagueness of the matter should compel an un-
troubled call for government to stay out of the fray. Yet, precisely because the
social meanings of sexually explicit discourse are more ambiguous and contra-
31. See, eg., HOWARD STERN, CRUCIFIED BY THE FCC (1991); see infra text accompany-
ing note 92.
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dictory than the abstract arguments of either pluralists or social conservatives
would suggest, neither regulatory intervention nor deregulation is, as a cate-
gorical solution, wholly satisfying. The double bind 32 suggests that any regu-
latory position will be imperfect. In turn, this places us in the position of
grappling with problems of prescription in a non-ideal world in which partial
answers will have to do. In that spirit, and provisionally, this Article proposes
a deregulatory approach. It does so not because of the affirmative virtues of
deregulation, but as the lesser of two evils, given the institutional realities and
dangers of the Commission's crackdown on indecent speech.
The regulatory net as currently constituted may well snare more impor-
tant and potentially liberating versions of sexual expression than would be
socially desirable. In the end, deregulation might allow for transformations in
technology, in the aesthetic forms most subject to the indecency critique, or in
the particular ambiguities posed by sex talk in our culture today. Even though
we cannot count on such affirmative results with deregulation, the context of
the FCC's most recent approach to indecency itself suggests the reason for a
change.
The full irony of the FCC's imposition of a ban on indecency can be
appreciated only by comparing it with the extraordinarily deregulatory char-
acter of the rest of the FCC's agenda in the last decade. 33 Since the first Rea-
gan administration, the FCC has taken a decidedly deregulatory approach to
broadcast issues, reasoning that the private sector is a better judge of the pub-
lic interest than either career civil servants or political appointees. Given the
otherwise deregulatory bent of the Reagan-era Commissions, the competitive
character of the modem communications landscape, 34 and the increasing frag-
mentation of broadcast programming,35 the Commission's attempts to rein in
popular discourse over the airwaves cannot be understood fully without refer-
32. I owe this terminology to Professor Margaret Jane Radin. See, e.g., Margaret Jane
Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1699-1704 (1990).
33. See, ag., JONATHAN W. EMORD, FREEDOM, TECHNOLOGY AND THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT 233-34 (1991). See generally ROBERT B. HORwiTz, THE IRONY OF REGULATORY RE-
FORM: THE DEREGULATION OF AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS (1989). The deregulatory
bent has led the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or the Commission) to revisit
regulations ranging from the structural prescriptions of the multiple ownership rules to the
content-based intrusions of the fairness doctrine. See, e.g., In re Revision of Radio Rules and
Policies, 71 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 227 (1992) (adopting new national ownership limits for radio);
Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019
(1990) (affirming FCC decision to cease enforcement of fairness doctrine); In re Amendment of
Section 73.3555 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and
Television Broadcast Stations, 100 F.C.C.2d 74 (1985) (amending national ownership limits for
radio and television); Jonathan W. Emord, The First Amendment Invalidity of FCC Content
Regulations, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 93, 171-90 (1992) (describing FCC's
deregulatory approach to broadcast content).
34. See, e.g., In re Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, 7 F.C.C.R. 2755, 2756-61 (1992),
modified on reconsideration, 71 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 227 (1992) (resting relaxation of national
ownership limitations for radio on the increasingly competitive communications marketplace);
Richard Zoglin, The Big Boys' Blues, TIME, Oct. 17, 1988, at 56.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 365-66.
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ence to the political pressure exerted by social conservatives. The deployment
of FCC processes by such organized groups has resulted in pressure on broad-
casters by what amounts to a semi-private governmental process.36 The acces-
sion to power of a Democratic administration should not make us too
sanguine about the matter.
Part I explores the broadcast indecency problem, first situating it in the
larger social debate and then laying out the double-edged character of sexual-
ized discourse over the airwaves. Part II describes the doctrinal aspects of the
FCC's current approach to indecency and their historical antecedents,
sketches the political background of the new policy, and provides a thematic
overview of its application. The Part then turns a critical lens on the FCC's
assertedly contextual inquiry, questioning the extent to which the agency's
articulated definition of indecency is predictable and consistent in application
and noting the potentially conservative regulatory tilt of the Commission's
decisional factors. Part III addresses the doctrinal arguments, based on con-
stitutional and administrative law, that have been made in response to the
agency's indecency actions. It ultimately concludes that these arguments can
be deployed most usefully in light of and by reference to the socially situated
ambiguity and complexity of broadcast indecency suggested in Part I. Finally,
asserting that there is no single, unalterable, and unproblematic response to
indecent expression, the conclusion contingently proposes a deregulatory
policy.
I
THE UNDERLYING DILEMMA: THE AMBIGUOUS SOCIAL
MEANING OF BROADCAST SEX TALK
37
Broadcast sex talk is part of a larger current debate on a number of social
issues revolving around diversity, privacy, sexuality, and reproduction. Talk
about sex is a social reality and often a popular aspect of entertainment in
today's society, yet there is no social consensus on the extent, if any, to which
public sex talk is appropriate. The debate might be viewed merely as a stand-
off between liberals and conservatives, respectively opposing and supporting
governmental regulation.38 Much of the popular discourse in fact tends to
36. For an account of the political background of the Commission's adoption of its inde-
cency policy in 1987, see John Crigler & William J. Byrnes, Decency Redux The Curious His-
tory of the New FCC Broadcast Indecency Policy, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 329, 359, 361-63 (1989);
see also Lili Levi, The History and Politics of Broadcast Indecency Regulation (forthcoming)
(offering a detailed study of the history and development of such a quasi-public, quasi-private
administrative process affecting public discourse but occurring outside its purview).
37. I use the phrase "sex talk" as a convenient catch-phrase for the kind of expression
targeted by the FCC's current indecency standard: the broadcast, whether on radio or
television, of depictions or descriptions of sexual or excretory organs or activities. See, eg., In
re Pacifica Found., Inc. (KPFK-FM), 2 F.CC.R. 2698, 2699 (1987).
38. This reference to liberals and conservatives is intended to capture the rough distinction
often drawn in popular discourse. In the rest of this discussion, I use the terms libertarian,
pluralist, social conservative, and progressive as category markers. By "libertarian," I mean
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assume a bipolar character, pitting social conservatives like Jesse Helms, who
decry the assault of smut on the family, against absolutist civil libertarians,
who warn against the dangers of governmental intervention into speech. This
depiction is in keeping with some social observers' characterization of modem
American society as a polity poised on the horns of a dilemma, divided be-
tween conflicting progressivist and orthodox moral visions.3 9 However, such
simple antinomies - conservatives versus liberals or progressivists versus the
orthodox - understate the complexity of the arguments made and alliances
forged in connection with the morality debates. Both conservative and pro-
gressive rationales can be used to justify either regulatory or deregulatory
outcomes in the context of broadcast indecency. For example, concerns about
promoting equality and protecting subordinated groups can ally political
progressives with morality-seeking social conservatives in support of govern-
mental regulation of broadcast sex talk.' Similarly, libertarians who con-
demn regulation in the name of individual autonomy find good company both
in market-oriented economic conservatives and in pluralists who tout the ben-
efits of social diversity and self-realization afforded by free expression. What
viewpoints concerned with ensuring a minimally interventionist state and protecting individual
autonomy. Socially libertarian viewpoints are consistent with economically conservative, free
market approaches designed to reduce governmental intervention into individual consumption
choices. By "pluralist," I mean those who would discourage governmental regulation in the
indecency context not because of principles of individual choice per se, but because of the view
that broadcast sex talk has affirmative social benefits in a culturally heterogeneous society. For
discussions of pluralism as grounded in the social benefits of diversity and tolerance, see, e.g.,
Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in
Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1188-89 (1990); Robert C. Post, Cultural Hetero-
geneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy and the First Amendment, 76 CAL. L. REV. 297, 301-
05 (1988) [hereinafter Post, Cultural Heterogeneity]. The term social conservatives refers to
those who encourage governmental regulation of all sex talk for substantive reasons ranging
from a desire to reinstate "family values" and eliminate the approving public discussion of
homosexuality to a more general view that public sex talk breaches the civilized distinctions
between public and private. I sometimes label such social conservatives as "fundamentalists,"
referring generally to holders of orthodox (and primarily Christian) religious viewpoints rather
than to particular doctrinal strands of Christianity. Finally, by "progressive," I mean those
who favor governmental regulation in the area because of the view that broadcast sex talk is, in
large part, disempowering and demeaning to women and other oppressed groups.
39. In fact, some suggest that disagreements about sex-related matters rest on fundamental
and apparently intractable oppositions in America today with respect to the bases of moral
discourse. See generally JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DE-
FINE AMERICA (1991) (positing a new breakdown in the assertedly traditional moral consensus
in America, succeeded by intractably opposed progressivist and orthodox viewpoints). On this
view, people hewing to progressivist moral visions look with favor upon norms of tolerance,
cultural pluralism, and social diversity while an ever-growing cadre of conservative, religious
groups seeks to reform decaying social life and unify society around some orthodox Christian
tenets. See also STEVEN SEIDMAN, EMBATTLED EROS: SEXUAL POLITICS AND ETHICS IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (1992) (describing an "impasse" between "libertarians" and "ro-
manticists" on sexuality issues).
40. We have seen this kind of alliance before in the debate on pornography, in which
feminists and social conservatives took similar regulatory positions, albeit for radically different
reasons. See, e.g., DONALD ALEXANDER DOWNS, THE NEW POLITICS OF PORNOGRAPHY 26-
32 (1989).
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joins all these boundary-crossing positions is that they conveniently character-
ize the phenomenon of broadcast indecency in unidimensional terms.
In contrast, a close look at the social role of sex talk reveals its equivocal
nature. The paradoxical character of broadcast sex talk consists of its ambigu-
ous message: it is both liberating and oppressive in ways not recognized in the
traditional debate on the subject. In contrast to the arid and oversimplified
dichotomies invoked in the current debate, a rich description of the current
social context of indecent broadcast speech uncovers much ambiguity and
contradiction in the social meaning of talk about sex. Having transformed the
way in which to think of broadcast indecency, we then are left with the far
more difficult question of which institutional regime can deal most satisfacto-
rily with the paradoxical and contrary character of sex talk in our current
cultural conditions. As to that, it is this Article's contention that a reassuring
single answer would not be true to the realities of sex talk today.
In the parallel context of the legal treatment of outrageous speech, Pro-
fessor Robert Post has insightfully characterized public discourse as paradoxi-
cal, torn by conflicting demands of tolerance and civility. The "paradox of
public discourse," according to Professor Post, rests on the fact that the criti-
cal and free interaction required for fruitful public discourse by our cultural
heterogeneity at some point must be bounded by community-based civility
norms, lest untrammeled diversity render impossible the rational deliberation
for which we rely on public discourse in the first place.41 Professor Post criti-
cizes contemporary First Amendment doctrine, not because it does not pro-
pose a tenable solution to the paradox of public discourse, but because it does
not clearly enough admit and articulate the conflicting claims of democratic
self-governance and community values that are at stake in defining public dis-
course. He wisely reminds us that all boundaries to the domain of public dis-
course are ideologically determined and subject to the push and pull of claims
both of democracy and of community life. The context of sex talk is a particu-
larly useful one in which to see how such conflicting claims play out.
A. On the Liberating Character of Sexualized Discourse
At one extreme of opinion on the propriety of public talk about sex are
those who see sexual expression as both a personal and social good because of
its liberating and empowering character. 42 At the opposite extreme are those
41. Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARv. L. REv. 601, 642-44,
682-83 (1990) [hereinafter Post, The Constitutional Concept]. The paradox of public discourse
is that, "[tlo the extent that a constitutional commitment to critical interaction prevents the law
from articulating and sustaining a common respect for the civility rules that make possible the
ideal of rational deliberation, public discourse corrodes the basis of its own existence." Id. at
643.
42. Characterizations of this view have surfaced most frequently in the legal academic
literature in the context of the debate over pornography. See, eg., Eric Hoffman, Feminism,
Pornography, and Law, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 497, 506 (1985); William K. Layman, Violent Por-
nography and the Obscenity Doctrine The Road Not Taken, 75 GEo. L-. 1475, 1485, 1505-06
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who see the public penchant for sexually-oriented speech as a fundamental
social evil, evidencing the disintegration of moral values in our society. As the
following discussion demonstrates, neither pole in this debate captures the full
complexity of the context of broadcast indecency.
1. Sex Talk as a Challenge to Power: Subversion; Sexual Liberation;
Communication
One of the arguments against sweeping "indecency" regulation is that
such censorship inappropriately inhibits and represses people. Holders of this
position believe that talk about sex is fundamentally unshackling and empow-
ering: by subverting social control over the individual (through challenging
governmental power, shocking settled expectations, and undermining tradi-
tional views of civilized public discourse), arousing sexual desire, and commu-
nicating the stories of disempowered groups to the mainstream, sex talk can
assertedly allow people to define, constitute, and fulfill themselves.
First, sex talk can be liberating and empowering through its very subver-
sive and taboo-smashing character.43 This argument, in its broadest form,
posits that an individual transgresses the strictures of power anytime she says
something forbidden. Under this view, if the FCC's rules precluded broad-
casters from airing much talk about sex on the radio but broadcasters man-
aged to circumvent the rules by innuendo or double entendre, their
circumvention would constitute a challenge to the State's power." Indeed,
Howard Stem's broadcast challenge to the FCC - in the form of the state-
ment: "Hey, F.C.C.: Penis" - is an explicit version of such anti-
authoritarianism.4"
(1987); David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Towards a Moral Theory of the
First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 81 (1974); Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitu-
tional Law (With Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 19 (1992) (hereinafter Sunstein, Neutrality). The equation of sexuality with freedom is
also commonly found - whether implicitly or explicitly - both in popular sex manuals like
THE JOY OF SEX and other celebratory literature for the mass market and in more sophisticated
works on sexology and history. See, e.g., PAUL ROBINSON, THE MODERNIZATION OF SEX:
HAVELOCK ELLIS, ALFRED KINSEY, WILLIAM MASTERS AND VIRGINIA JOHNSON (1976);
SEIDMAN, supra note 39, at 5.
43. Cf SIMON GAUNT, TROUBADOURS AND IRONY 52, 59 (1989) (exploring the thrill of
transgressing accepted rules by ironic sexual metaphors and the way in which such euphemisms
both respect and violate society's restrictions on sexual references); Steven G. Gey, The Apolo-
getics of Suppression: The Regulation of Pornography as Act and Idea, 86 MIcH. L. REV. 1564,
1626-33 (1988) (adopting a moral skepticism model for the First Amendment and challenging
the suppression of pornography by arguing for the subversive and socially deviant character of
the form).
44. The modem incidence of indecent broadcast speech cannot be fully understood except
against its regulatory background and a history of FCC investigations and sanctions for far
milder speech. See POWE, supra note 3, at 162-90. In light of the presence of the anti-inde-
cency rule on the statute books as at least a sleeping threat since before the Federal Communi-
cations Act of 1934, even non-explicit broadcast talk about sex in these circumstances
necessarily must be construed as challenging to power.
45. Jon Pareles, Shock Jocks Shake Up Uncle Sam, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1992, § 2, at 32,
col. 4.
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Such subversive effects can be achieved in two ways. First, using sex
words for their form and not their meaning can challenge mainstream mores.
"Dirty" words are often used not for their substantive sense but for their use-
fulness as place markers or grammatical signs.4" By using sexual words in
ways divorced from their literal meanings, people liberate themselves from
traditional conceptions of polite discourse, make the political point that there
is no reason not to use such language, and publicly recognize the increasing
infiltration of such language into public life.
Second, sexual references can be thought to challenge power when they
are made to shock the listener or viewer - in other words, when they are
made self-consciously and substantively. For example, expletives are often
used for their emotive character, as emphases or ways of expressing depth of
feeling.47 Indeed, the use of expletives is sometimes self-consciously political.
As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent in Federal Communications Commis-
sion v. Pacifica Foundation" and Justice Harlan recognized in Cohen v. Cali-
fornia,4 9 ideological messages often are inseparable from the shocking words
used to express them.5 0 The critical factor is that the challenge works only
when the object under attack is viewed as somehow sacred by at least some
significant part of the social community.
51
Shocking effects are also achieved through the use of explicit or coded
sexual references in humor.5 2 Humor can be subversive in a variety of ways. 3
46. See; eg., In re WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d 408, 409 (1970) (imposing a fine on Philadel-
phia's non-profit, alternative Eastern Education Radio for the broadcast of an interview with
Jerry Garcia of the Grateful Dead in which Garcia peppered his comments (about matters
ranging from the environment to philosophy) with expletives used as adjectives, as introductory
emphases, or instead of "et cetera").
47. See id
48. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 775-76 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (ad-
dressing the FCC's authority to limit the broadcast of comedian George Carlin's expletive-
riddled monologue "Filthy Words"); see infra notes 188-93 and accompanying text (discussing
Pacifica).
49. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). In Cohen, the Court held unconstitutional the defendant's convic-
tion for wearing, in a courthouse corridor, a jacket displaying the words 'Tuck the draft." Id. at
16.
50. Iad at 25-26; Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 773-74 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Fiss, supra
note 25 (discussing the self-consciously political character of Robert Mapplethorpe's explicit
photographs, designed to shock conventional sensibilities). Neither "fuck the draft," in Cohen,
nor its more modem bumper sticker counterpart, "fuq iraq," use the expletive literally.
51. Extolling a post-modem celebration of the subversive character of artistic expression,
Professor Nahmod recently has argued that First Amendment protection hinges excessively on
the political character of expression, to the improper exclusion of matters aesthetic. Sheldon
Nahmod, Artistic Expression and Aesthetic Theory" The Beautiful, the Sublime and the First
Amendment, 1987 WIs. L. REv. 221, 249-53. Indeed, one of the defining characteristics of art
in the modem world is the perception that it pushes both the boundaries of respectability and
prior conceptions of artistic merit. See infra note 387.
52. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (discussing the complex social role of
humor).
53. See, eg., LANCE OLsEN, CIRCUS OF THE MIND IN MOTION: POSTMODERNISM AND
THE COMIC VISION 15-35 (1990) (examining the power-structure-subverting character of
postmodern humor). Codes and innuendo are subversive because they cannot be understood by
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Puns and word plays emphasize the multiplicity and uncertain character of
language, thereby testing its powers,5 4 and allow for the building of esprit de
corps among those who understand them.5" They can be directly subversive if
they are political and indirectly so if they are sexual.5 6
The argument in this subsection focuses only on the subversive effect of
humor that relies on shocking mainstream expectations by its frankness about
matters sexual.57 For instance, the 1980s saw the development of free-wheel-
ing talk and music formats that have come to be commonly known as "shock
radio" and "morning zoo" or "personality" programs.5 8 Such programs came
to be known generically as "shock" radio because announcers tried to generate
controversy by shocking and offending their audiences and mentioning the
previously unmentionable on the air. When pressed on their often-abusive ap-
proach, these announcers generally justified themselves by claiming that they
reflected what people were feeling; that they were irreverent, humorous, and
not to be taken seriously; that it was necessary for people to make fun of
themselves; and that they were equally offensive to all groups (thereby alleg-
edly removing the sting of their controversial comments).,9 Accordingly,
much of the attempted humor in shock radio is intended to provoke nervous
laughter and give vent to people's anti-social, aggressive impulses.60 It is no
surprise that this type of shock radio show is generally scheduled during
morning drive time when people are alone, dealing with the vagaries and frus-
trations of rush-hour traffic, on their way to stressful and often unsatisfying
all listeners and have different meanings in different cultures. Even innuendo, which is often
penetrable, allows people to talk about what has been forbidden. See, e.g., WALTER REDFERN,
PUNS 30, 91, 180 (1984) (discussing puns and double entendres as means of circumventing
taboos with apparent innocence: "[t]he pun seems funny or shocking because it challenges a
taboo which ordinarily forbids us to recognize that the sound pattern is ambiguous"). It may be
that the very existence of the FCC's rules preventing open talk about sex leads to the develop-
ment of innuendo and coded references.
54. REDFERN, supra note 53, at 14 (discussing puns as "agents of disorder" which "can
ruin lazy expectations, subvert the inertia of language and thought").
55. Id. at 30, 180.
56. Id. at 171.
57. See, e.g., DAVID MARC, COMIC VISIONS: TV COMEDY AND AMERICAN CULTURE 24-
25 (1989) (discussing the extent to which stand-up comedy depends on taboo violation by frank
and intimate accounts of sex and "toilet" talk).
58. See, e.g., Paul D. Colford, This Is Radio Crass, NEWSDAY (Nassau & Suffolk ed.), Jan.
9, 1991, at 52; Radio Special Report; Chicago, BROADCASTING, Sept. 10, 1990, at 40, 46
(describing WLUP's "irreverent" personality-driven rock programs); Special Report; Radio:
The Sound of Music andMore, BROADCASTING, June 12, 1989, at 35, 35-38 (describing narrow-
casting in radio and the various different formats). Shock radio became the top-rated program-
ming in many markets during its time slots. See, e.g., Julia Reed, In the Fight for Ratings, Filth
Leads the Charts; Raunch 'n'Roll Radio is Here to Stay, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., May 4,
1987, at 52.
59. Colford, supra note 58.
60. Shock radio can be seen as a very Freudian interpretation of humor in which the re-
lease of aggression plays a central role in the sexual and excretory references. See generally
SIGMUND FREUD, JOKES AND THEIR RELATION TO THE UNCONSCIOUS 98-100 (James
Strachey trans., W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. 1960) (1905).
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jobs. 61
Sexualized speech also can be thought to be substantively liberating
through its arousing and exciting effects on sexual desire. Akin to this view is
the criticism, often leveled against the suppression of pornographic speech,
that sexualized discourse is liberating in affirming an area of private space in
which individuals can fulfill themselves outside the purview of the State. Ac-
cording to this view, such aroused desire releases people from their excessive
and rationalist repressions, replacing the deliberative process of citizens in
their social selves with the instinctual responses of their natural, pre-social
beings.62 It thus challenges the rationalist ideal of social life and undermines
the authority of the State.63 Many who see passion as liberating agree that
some level of repression of "natural" impulses might be necessary to civilized
society, but they do not view the enhancement of a sexually open discourse,
untrammeled by the State, as incompatible with that principle. Indeed, even
supporters of sexual restraint might argue that the self-control required of so-
cial actors is premised on overcoming, and not avoiding, temptation.
Finally, sex talk can liberate and empower by pointing out gender ine-
quality and representing the sexualities of gay men and lesbians." The "mak-
61. The success of a format based on "saying the unmentionable," challenging pious be-
liefs, and shocking hearers through humor provides evidence of the hostility and alienation in
our society. See Daley, supra note 12 (quoting views of shock radio as an "outlet" and "%oyeur-
ism" for people who "have a lot of restraint built into their own lives"). Such aggressive humor
is part of a significant comedic ancestry. The nihilistic, hostile, iconoclastic humor epitomized
by the "sick" comedians of the 1950s - such as Lenny Bruce and Mort Sahl - constitutes the
underlying pedigree of today's shock radio. Commentators opine that the 1950s version of the
genre resulted from the difficulty of making sense of the decades after World War IL Sarah
Blacher Cohen, Introduction: The Variety of Humors in CoMIc REaI: HuMOR IN CONTEM-
PORARY AMERICAN LrrETRE 3 (Sarah Blacher Cohen ed., 1978). Comedians such as
Lenny Bruce, "who gleefully mentioned the unmentionable - the drug abuse, sexual perver-
sion, bigotry and gratuitous violence of respectable folks," served as "the lunatic commentators
on our collective lunacy." Id. Their use of scatological and sexual language was both cynical
and "deflationary." Id In turn, these taboo-breaking comedians became the comedic back-
ground against which producers such as Norman Lear could create television shows in the
1960s and 1970s to showcase grossly caricatured characters who could say socially unaccept-
able things about race, sex, and politics, assertedly without implicating the viewer (and even,
perhaps, promoting the audience's self-irony). See, ag., ROaERT SKLAR, PRImE-TIME
AMERICA: LIFE ON AND BEHIND THE TELEVISION SCREEN 6-7 (1980).
62. See e.g., Sunstein, Neutrality, supra note 42, at 19 & n.76 (describing this viewpoint in
connection with the pornography question).
63. It is precisely because of its non-deliberative, affective character that theorists such as
Frederick Schauer have taken the position that pornography should not be treated as speech for
constitutional purposes. See e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL
ENQUIRY 180-88 (1982). For an important critique of the First Amendment as embodying a
reason-based civic deliberation model, see Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons Free-
dom of Expression and the Subordination of Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 95.
64. This is not to say that graphic descriptions of sex involving gays is in any way neces-
sary to communication of gay identity; I am only suggesting that such sexualized presentations
affect the more general discourse by at least requiring that they be addressed. For a critique of
essentialist views that equate the totality of being gay with particular sexual conduct, see Mare
A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together?: Storytellin& Gender-role Stereoty'pe and
Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAmi L. REV. 511 (1992).
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ing public" of such matters has a number of effects, both short- and long-term.
First, the public naming of homosexuality and gender oppression requires that
they be addressed in public discourse, rather than simply being swept under
the social rug.65 This does not mean that the depictions must be approved,
only that they cease to be ignored and thereby spark a change in public dis-
course. Second, and in a related vein, such talk can challenge distastes born of
unfamiliarity, ignorance, and perceptions of essential difference." Members
of the religious right, who are ideologically opposed to homosexuality, will
probably not change their minds about gay relationships when public dis-
course is opened up to include sexually explicit gay voices; nor will they be
likely to moderate their positions through the process of articulating their
views against the background of a more liberal or permissive culture. Never-
theless, the communication of non-mainstream views to the mainstream might
well affect the perspectives of the ideologically "non-aligned" and, in any
event, is in itself liberating and self-affirming for the speakers. Accordingly,
opening public discourse to non-mainstream sex and gender issues at least en-
hances social diversity and the likelihood of state neutrality as between diver-
gent conceptions of morality.
2. Sex Talk as Impermissibly Corrupting
In stark contrast to those who argue for the social benefits of sexually
unrepressed discourse, a growing cadre of social conservatives challenges the
value of public sexual expression on any level. These people argue for govern-
mental control of sexually-oriented speech, whether in news or entertainment,
because public speech about sexuality is immoral, reflects a disintegrating so-
cial fabric, and injects "garbage" into public discourse.' Some holders of this
view base their concerns on the harm that commercialized sexual discourse
poses to the sacredness and purity of sex within marriage.6" Others focus on
the social approval generated by such sex talk for what they consider to be
65. It was not very long ago that homosexuality was referred to as "the love that dare not
speak its name." On the invisibility and concealment of gay life in non-gay society, see id. at
584-91 and sources cited therein. Arguing for the importance of the visibility of their sexual
identities to gay men and lesbians, see Karst, supra note 63, at 117-22.
66. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 63, at 116-17; Steve Weinstein, Back into the Closet, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 1991, at 5. Cf. Post, The Constitutional Concept, supra note 41, at 636-37 (posit-
ing that diversity in a public discourse not tilted toward any one community norm can lead to
clashes of opinion and resulting modification and moderation).
67. A reference to any of the public speeches of Senator Helms on the issue makes this
point. See, e.g., supra note 26 and infra note 246. For conservative academic arguments in
support of the suppression of obscenity, see, e.g., WALTER BERNS, FREEDOM, VIRTUE AND
THE FIRsT AMENDMENT (1965). For conservative arguments on indecency before the FCC,
see, e.g., In re The Regents of the University of California (KCSB-FM), 2 F.C.C.R. 2703(1987), reconsideration denied, 3 F.C.C.R. 930, 931 (1987) for the comments of Morality in
Media in the FCC's first reconsideration of its 1987 indecency rulings.
68. See, eg., SEIDMAN, supra note 39, at 64-65; Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status
of Marriage, Kinship and Sexual Privacy - Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81
MICH. L. REV. 463 (1983); Sunstein, Neutrality, supra note 42, and sources cited therein; Karst,
supra note 63, at 106-07.
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"perverted" lifestyles.6 9 Social conservatives agree that the broad public dis-
semination of sexually explicit speech undermines their traditional views of
social civility, decency, and community.
Taking the position that the larger community must be saved from the
undisciplined desires and self-indulgence of atomistic individuals running
amok in a far-too-permissive marketplace, these social conservatives seek a
return to homogeneous values and distinct boundaries between private and
public life. Just as libertarians argue for the benefits of public sex talk because
of its asserted power to liberate, subvert, and communicate, social conserva-
tives justify the elimination of broadcast sexuality on the very same grounds.
In contrast to libertarians who support an open and unregulated marketplace
in broadcast sex talk, fundamentalist conservatives have no difficulty enlisting
the aid of the government in their attempts to reshape social conceptions of
the acceptable.
3. An Alternative Account
A searching look at the specific context of sexual speech over the air-
waves reveals a more complex story than that advanced either in the Com-
stockian resistance of conservative moralists to sexual frankness on the air or
by pluralists in their Dionysian paean to sex as liberation and sex talk as em-
powerment. Social conservatives' desire to return to a mythic notion of a ho-
mogeneous and unified Christian America is unrealistic, anti-democratic, and
profoundly oppressive.70 Few would dispute the fact that sexuality is, for
most people, an important matter relating both to personal identity and social
life. Sex talk and sexual depictions are common and popular. They can serve
to liberate and empower.
The reality of public talk about sex is multi-faceted. Pluralist naivet6
about the benefits of sex talk should be tempered: by attention to the poten-
tially enmeshing character of commercially sexualized consumer culture; by
recognition of the misogyny of much of the sex talk pervading both the society
and the airwaves; and by a refusal to foreclose scrutiny of challenged material
simply because it can be characterized as subversive humor.7'
a. Sexuality and the Mainstream
Some social observers argue that a focus on sexuality through sexualized
discourse, far from challenging mainstream mores and liberating the individ-
69. Both Jesse Helms and various social conservatives have faulted the Commission for
allowing the broadcast of sexually explicit speech that approvingly depicts homosexuality. See
SARA DIAMOND, SPIRITUAL WARFARE: THE POLITICS OF THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT (1989) (dis-
cussing the homophobia of many religious social conservatives); SEIDMAN, supra note 39.
70. HUNTER, supra note 39, at 312 ("Authority imposed from the top down without re-
gard for the sensitivities of those dominated is... a recipe for oppression and, in turn, wide-
spread popular discontent.").
71. Of course, subversiveness is not necessarily a good in itselfand must at least be argued
for in context.
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ual, serves as a palliative forestalling any real resistance to existing power con-
ditions.72 In a version of the classic "bread and circuses" argument, these
observers would suggest that the increasingly sexualized character of public
and broadcast discourse plays directly into the hands of the politically power-
ful by promoting a shift from political and collective action to the realm of the
personal.73
Under this view, a focus on the personal reinforces, and is in turn rein-
forced by, the connection between sexuality, desire, and the consumption of
products.74 The dominant consumer culture is said to be based in large part
on a separation between work and leisure, with the latter serving as the arena
for freedom, self-expression, and individual pleasure.75 At the same time,
however, much of consumer culture operates by selling a particular, pre-pack-
aged idea of a "lifestyle." '76 Sexuality plays a key role in fostering this realm of
pleasure and consumption. 7 Thus, far from distinguishing the individual and
72. See, eg., HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 73-78 (1964) (referring to
"repressive desublimation").
73. See generally PATRICK BRANTLINGER, BREAD & CIRCUSES: THEORIES OF MASS CUL-
TURE AS SOCIAL DECAY 19, 22 (1983) (characterizing "bread and circuses" as an allusion to
Juvenal, appropriated as a modem metaphor for the ways in which mass culture assertedly has
served as the opiate of today's masses); RICHARD SENNETr, THE FALL OF PUBLIC MAN: ON
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF CAPITALISM 337-40 (1974) (making the argument in the context
of intimacy in general rather than sexual discourse per se); see also MAX HORKHEIMER &
THEODOR ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT 120-67 (1944) (characterizing the cul-
ture industry as eliminating impulses to emancipation).
74. On the linkage between modem "imaginative hedonism," consumer culture, and their
roots in the Romantic movement, see generally COLIN CAMPBELL, THE ROMANTIC ETHIC
AND THE RISE OF MODERN CONSUMERISM (1987).
75. See, eg., STEWART EWEN, ALL CONSUMING IMAGES: THE POLITICS OF STYLE IN
CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 57-108, 196 (1988); Alan Tomlinson, Introduction: Consumer Cul-
ture and the Aura of the Commodity, in CONSUMPTION, IDENTITY & STYLE: MARKETING,
MEANINGS, AND THE PACKAGING OF PLEASURE 6-12 (1990); see also Stephen J. Schnably,
Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin's Theory of Property and Personhood, 45 STAN L.
REV. 347, 385-89 (1993) and works cited therein.
76. See EWEN, supra note 75; Schnably, supra note 75, at 388-89; Tomlinson, supra note
75, at 12-13. But see DAVID HOROWITz, THE MORALITY OF SPENDING: ATTITUDES TO-
WARD THE CONSUMER SOCIETY IN AMERICA, 1875-1940 (1985) (calling for a "more recipro-
cal" model of the interaction between goods and consumers than the one held by either
traditional or modem moralists); Schnably, supra note 75, at 392-94 (describing resistance to
commodification).
77. Legal commentators have noted the "increasingly explicit use of sex to sell books,
magazines, movies, perfumes, cars and jeans." Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitu-
tion, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 961 n.19 (1984) (questioning the claim that such discourse is
liberating); see also WOLFGANG FRITZ HAUG, CRITIQUE OF COMMODITY AESTHETICS: AP-
PEARANCE, SEXUALITY AND ADVERTISING IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY 55 (1986); Schnably,
supra note 75, at 391. Examples of such "eroticized" advertising are legion, from Calvin Klein
jeans to Harley Davidson motorcycles and mythical Swedish bikini teams touting beer. Susan
Sward, Sex in Ads - Defining the Limits, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 30, 1992, at Al; Ronald K.L.
Collins, Perspective on Advertising, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1991, at B7. Such advertising is based
on the very assumptions about the centrality of sexuality that have come to be associated with
pluralist views about the liberating character of sex. Moreover, much of the sexual referential-
ity in product advertising is sexist and directed at male consumption. The Swedish bikini team
ad, for example, adopted a strictly male vantage point, celebrating the exclusive use of female
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challenging the status quo, the predominant sexual discourse of consumer cul-
ture serves to promote the development of cookie-cutter identities.78
In addition, social observers might well point to the difficulty of deter-
mining when sexualized discourse is in fact "authentically" subversive and
when it is a "co-opted" part of a manufactured message. The history of rock
'n' roll puts this issue into bold relief. In its inception, rock shocked main-
stream culture and promised to liberate the young with its raw sexuality; how-
ever, much of it quickly was rendered non-threatening by sanitized cover
versions and American Bandstand. Rock was transformed from a society-
subverting musical form to one manufactured and controlled by the insiders in
the music industry.79 Certain aspects of the current idiom of rap raise similar
issues about subversiveness, at least in light of their increasing appeal to white
suburban listeners."0
Much of the rhetoric underlying the belief that sex talk is liberating relies
on a notion of sexuality as pre-social, natural, and fundamental to identity.81
sexuality to service men's needs. So clear was this message that some employees of the manu-
facturer filed a lawsuit based on the ad, claiming that it created a hostile work environment for
them. Meryl Davids, Trouble Brewing With Beer Ads, WORKING WOMAN, Mar. 1992, at 17.
The connection between desire, sexuality, and consumption extends beyond using sex to
sell products. Whether for men or women, the images of consumer culture are said to promote
a commodification of the body. See Schnably, supra note 75, at 391 ("[S]elf-image becomes
enmeshed in the larger system of commodifieation... not because we buy and sell our bodies,
but because we come to view them in the same terms of display and competition that we apply
to the goods and services through which we are constantly invited to recreate ourselves."). This
commodified body has to live up to the particular visions of desirability and sexuality offered in
connection with product and style marketing. See ROSALIND COWARD, FEMALE DESIRES:
How THEY ARE SOUGHT, BOUGHT AND PACKAGED (1985).
78. Theorists have challenged the suggestion that consumer culture is a monolithic phe-
nomenon which simply constructs unresistant victims into a single image. See, eg.,
HoRowITz, supra note 76; Schnably, supra note 75, at 392-94; Tomlinson, supra note 75, at 17-
35. Similarly, some students of mass media reject a "hypodermic" model of media influence (in
which the media are thought simply to inject material and attitudes into unresisting, uncritical
viewers), in favor of interpretations that attribute more power to viewers to construct and resist
the media texts. For an approach focusing on the empowering characteristics of mass culture
and popular resistance to the purported messages of mass media, see JOHN FISKE, TELEvISIoN
CULTURE 38-41, 45-47, 314-19 (1987).
79. See, eg., FORNATALE & MILLS, supra note 4, at 38, 40-42; MARTIN & SEGRAVE,
supra note 2, at 9-11, 13-26; ARNOLD SHAW, BLACK POPULAR MUSIC IN AMERICA: FROM
THE SPIRITUALS, MINSTRELS, AND RAGTIME TO SouL, DISCO, AND Hip-Hop 197-203 (1986).
Even though parents and decency leagues complained about the sexual character of the music,
the form of rock n' roll popular from the mid-'50s to the early '60s - the sanitized version of
the music broadcast over American Bandstand - in fact was not too threatening. For charges
that the most widely disseminated rock 'n' roll was a manufactured phenomenon cynically
crafted by the record companies in order to capture a growing teenage market, see, e g., SHAW,
supra this note, at 200-01. On the denaturing commercialization of rock, see generally SIMON
FRITH, MUSIC FOR PLEASURE: ESSAYS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF POP (1988); Simon Frith, The
Industrialization of Popular Music, in POPULAR MUSIC AND COMMUNICATIoN 53 (James Lull
ed., 1987).
80. David Samuels, The Rap on Rap: the 'black music' that isn't either, NEwv REPUBLIC,
Nov. 11, 1991, at 24-25, 29; see also discussion infra at text accompanying notes 161-64.
81. See Sunstein, Neutrality, supra note 42, at 19 for a recognition of this aspect ofthe view
opposing governmental regulation of pornography.
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Indeed, the FCC's imposition of tighter restraints on sexual expression is itself
likely to give heightened force to the sense that sexuality is pre-social and
necessarily challenging to power. Yet this "naturalistic" notion of sexuality
has come under increasing challenge from social theorists in recent years.8 2
While it is beyond the scope of this Article to address such challenges substan-
tively, it at least can be said that they serve to force a more searching examina-
tion of assumptions about the generally empowering consequences of
eliminating governmental intervention into sex talk.
b. The Underside of Humor
The characterization of at least some humorous discourses as iconoclastic
and subversive does not mean that these discourses are uniformly liberating.
While humor may challenge the social norms out of which it arises, it simulta-
neously reflects them. 3 Since sexual humor contains and reflects the underly-
ing attitudes of the society in which it develops, the gendered and
discriminatory character of much sexually explicit and "dirty" humor repli-
cates and spreads such attitudes. Demeaning but humorous references to sex-
uality might be even worse, as a social matter, than serious references because
the notion that they should not be taken literally or seriously undermines
resistance to the spread of such ideas. A classic and silencing critique of femi-
nists is that we have no sense of humor.84 This is particularly problematic in
light of the extraordinary prevalence of sexual harassment in the workplace
and the difficulty of distinguishing between forms of sexual humor in that
context."-
82. For a currently popular and influential challenge to the notion of sexuality as "natu-
ral" and naturally fundamental to one's personality, see MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY VOLUME I: AN INTRODUCTION (1978) (arguing against the "repressive hypothe-
sis"). Such challenges have influenced recent law review literature on issues relating to sexual-
ity and privacy. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schnably, Beyond Griswold: Foucauldian and Republican
Approaches to Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REv. 861 (1991).
83. Commentators on American humor have noted a close connection between humor and
the social context in which it operates. See, e.g., Sarah Blacher Cohen, Introduction: The Vari-
ety of Humors, in COMIC RELIEF, supra note 61, at 1.
84. See, e.g., MICHAEL MULKAY, ON HUMOR: ITS NATURE AND ITS PLACE IN MODERN
SOCIETY 137, 152 (1988). As Mulkay argues, women are discouraged from criticizing sexist
remarks when they are presented in the guise of "mere" jokes. We are thus in the classic double
bind - either we make a big "to-do" about the sexist underpinnings or assumptions of the joke,
at which point we are stigmatized as humorless harpies, or we simply laugh along with the joke,
which preserves the appearance of a jointly held sense of humor but which makes us complicit
in the perpetuation of sexist and demeaning ideas about women. The following line I once read
sums it up rather well: "I find jokes about you funny. Why don't you find jokes about you
funny?" See also MAHADEV L. APTE, HUMOR AND LAUGHTER: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL AP-
PROACH 67-81 (1989).
85. Of course, this set of objections has very little to do with notions of keeping sex private.
Whether sexual humor shocks or titillates, traditionalist conservatives might object to it on the
ground that sexuality is an important, serious, and perhaps even sacred subject which is appro-
priately left to the meaningful and private contemplation of married couples. In contrast, some
feminist approaches object to sexualized discourse primarily because of its demeaning and dis-
empowering effects on women. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIsT
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c. Sex Talk and Misogyny
Characterizing sex as naturally fundamental to the self and sex talk as
necessarily in tension with power makes it easy to ignore anti-feminist stereo-
types in broadcast sex talk. The mainstream adoption of leering sexual refer-
ences in shock radio is often right-wing and sexist.86 The anti-hero status that
"censorship" by government confers on misogynistic shock jocks distracts
from a recognition of the sexist character of sexual speech currently on the air.
The troublingly sexist aspects of such broadcast discourse have historical
antecedents. The early 1970s saw the development - and FCC-prompted de-
mise - of "topless radio," in which women called in to talk about their sex
lives on mainstream commercial radio stations. 7 The format illustrated the
dual nature of public talk about sexuality. At that time, topless radio was the
only broadcast forum in which women could talk about their sexuality. It
provided them with an opportunity to legitimate sexual activity beyond the
missionary position, acquainted them with non-mainstream ideas about sex,
and might well have assisted female pleasure.88 However, the ability to sexu-
alize and objectify oneself is far from evidence that one has achieved any of the
feminist goals of empowerment for women. Liberation is not simply a matter
of women choosing to engage in sexually exploitative discourse.89 Topless ra-
dio's "pandering and titillating" references to sexuality are suspect from this
point of view.9" Today's "relationships shows," with their male hosts and
their coy attempts to extract sexual revelations to the point of humiliation,
usually from women, represent the passing of topless radio's baton.9 '
Despite the demeaning aspects of some broadcast sex talk, the very fact of
FCC intervention transforms the matter into an example of censorial govern-
THEORY OF THE STATE 195-214 (1989); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT
OF WORKING WOMEN 51-52 (1979).
86. See ,g., Pareles, supra note 45.
87. Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 41 F.C.C.2d 777 (1973), aff'd sub nom. Illinois Citi-
zens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The "topless radio"
format was inaugurated in 1971 by Bill Ballance of KGBS, Los Angeles, a Storer Broadcasting
station. His call-in show, called Feminine Forum, was extremely popular and syndicated to 30
markets. FORNATALE & MILLS, supra note 4, at 84-85; POWE, supra note 3, at 182-83; see also
supra note 5.
88. See FISKE, supra note 78, at 184-92 (on interpretations of soap opera sexuality as em-
powering) and at 232-33 (on Madonna).
89. Indeed, Professor MacKinnon has taken the position that women's e.xperience of sex-
ual pleasure or intimacy with men cannot be liberating in the context of the extensive gender
inequality against which sexuality is currently constructed. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DIscouRsEs ON LIFE AND LAw 218 (1987).
90. For one thing, the programs censored by the FCC involved women advising others on
how to minimize their own "hangups" about fellatio, indicating a focus on their male partners!
satisfaction. See HAL HIMMELSTEIN, TELEVISION MYTH AND THE AMERICAN MIND 296
(1984) (criticizing topless radio as "disingenuous[ly] ... prey[ing] upon the insecurities of these
women who wanted so much to hear themselves talking"). In addition, the format always
involved male hosts interviewing the callers, often subjected callers to abuse for their sexual
confessions, and exploited women's sexual experiences for commercial gain. Id. at 294.
91. See O'Connor, supra note 7, at BI.
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mental intrusion, seen as problematic regardless of the substantive content of
the censored broadcasts. The successful marketing of a tape of Howard
Stem's censored radio shows - under the self-aggrandizing title Crucified by
the FCC - demonstrates the sanitizing recharacterization of a forum for sex-
ism into a free speech cause cilebre.92 Similarly, those stations (such as college
stations) that seek to challenge the status quo by playing sexually explicit rap
are often providing a forum for highly misogynistic fare.93 The more they
perceive themselves as challenging power by referring to sex, the less likely
they are to question the extent to which much sex talk and many sexual inter-
actions implicate fundamentally unequal power relations between men and
women. The context of a conservative FCC's vigilance against sexually ex-
plicit material does not provide a propitious atmosphere in which to try to get
the audiences of either a sexist shock jock or a misogynistic rap group to see
how their attitudes are marked by disrespect for women.
B. On Sex Talk Diversity, and Cultural Pluralism
Parallel to the debate about the empowering character of publicly explicit
sexual references is an argument about the relationship between sexually ex-
plicit speech, diversity, and cultural pluralism. Pluralists object to govern-
ment censorship of sex talk on the grounds that it improperly implicates
government in the role of selecting among diverse, competing values and that
it unfairly burdens the speech of minorities and the disempowered. The so-
cially conservative view challenges both the value of diversity per se and the
notion that the desire to empower minorities should lead the government to
permit the public broadcast of immorality. Neither vision is adequately
rooted in the reality of modem sexual discourse. While the conservative posi-
tion is unacceptably rigid and exclusionary, the pluralist celebration of diver-
sity does not take sufficient account of the difficult problems raised by casual
references to cultural pluralism.
L Censorship and Governmental "Ethnocentric Myopia"
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Pacifica, in which the Court up-
held the FCC's decision to ban Pacifica Station WBAI-FM from broadcasting
a George Carlin monologue during hours when children would likely be in the
audience,94 asserts that because "in our land of cultural pluralism, there are
many who think, act, and talk differently" from the members of the Supreme
Court (and, presumably, the FCC), approval of regulations on the broadcast
of indecency constitutes nothing more than "acute ethnocentric myopia."9
In the pluralist perspective, the danger of discretionary standards such as the
92. See supra note 3 1.
93. See infra text accompanying notes 157-60.
94. In re Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975), reh g granted, 59 F.C.C.2d 892 (1976),
rev'd, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726
(1978).
95. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 775 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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indecency definition is that they can easily be used by government officials (or
by government with the aid of conservative citizen groups) to silence dissent-
ing voices, undermine diversity, and impose upon society particular orthodox-
ies about normal and desirable behavior. 96
At the very least, this result is inconsistent with one of the central meta-
phors of the First Amendment: the "marketplace of ideas," with its diverse
and antagonistic voices undisturbed by the governmental selection of value,
viewpoint, or expression.97 What makes such homogeneity most troubling,
according to this view, is that it excludes the voices of the "innumerable sub-
cultures that compose this Nation," and falls particularly heavily on "low-
brow" and minority speech.98 Thus, what makes governmental interventions
such as the indecency standard problematic is not so much that an excerpt of
Ulysses or other recognized and elite works will be lost to the broadcast audi-
ence, but that the standard will have an exclusionary impact on under-
represented voices that add to social diversity. For evidence of governmental
bias, holders of this pluralist view refer to the historically chilling effect of the
FCC's indecency enforcement on non-mainstream, politically challenging, and
minority speech.99
96. As Justice Brennan eloquently observed in Pacifica: "In this context [of a predictable
chilling effect on those who flout majoritarian conventions], the Court's decision may be seen
for what, in the broader perspective, it really is: another of the dominant culture's inevitable
efforts to force those groups who do not share its mores to conform to its way of thinking,
acting, and speaking." Id at 777. If Justice Brennan could make this argument about the
FCC's narrow prohibition on George Carlin's seven dirty words, he surely would find it even
more powerful in the context of today's far more diffuse and broad indecency enforcement
standard.
97. For the first statement of the marketplace metaphor in Frst Amendment jurispru-
dence, see Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
"[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come
to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the mar-
ket, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried
out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. .... "
See also THOMAS EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AmENDMENT 7-8
(1966); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMEN'T
82-89 (1948). Of course, the marketplace metaphor as the ground of the First Amendment has
been subject to searching critique. See, eg., C. EDWIN BAKER, HuMAN LIBERTY AND FREE-
DOM OF SPEECH 17-24 (1989); Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press - A New First Amend-
ment Right, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1641 (1967); Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L RE.
781 (1987); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DuWE LJ. 1.
For accounts of the role of the marketplace metaphor in the development of First Amendment
jurisprudence and the ways in which its modern meaning differs from its claimed origin in the
free speech metaphors of Milton's Areopagitica, see David Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative Mis-
readings in the First Amendment Tradition, 95 YALE L.J. 857, 876, 886 (1986); Steven L Win-
ter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1105, 1188-89 (1989).
98. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 776 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
99. See, e.g., PowE, supra note 3, at 162-90 (characterizing FCC indecency enforcement as
nothing more than "cultural reactionism" and an attempt to maintain white, middle-class mo-
rality over the airwaves). Of course, proponents of the pluralist or even the libertarian view
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
1992-93]
REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE
a. The Multivalent Character of Sex Talk
In arguing for the recognition of diversity as implicated in sex talk, plu-
ralists contend that language must be understood as part of lived experience.
As Justice Holmes once said: "[a] word is not a crystal, transparent and un-
changed, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and
content according to the circumstances and time in which it is used."'° What
language means - and whether it is offensive - depends on its larger social
context.' 0 ' Communicative activity, including watching television and listen-
ing to the radio, is an interactive process through which the audience partici-
pates in the construction of meaning.10 2 Thus, the ways in which people use
and understand language are dependent on cultural conventions and commu-
nity understandings.1"3
This is easiest to see in the context of words that have generally recog-
nized multiple meanings both in their slang and official, dictionary forms. The
double entendre is a particularly apt case in point. George Carlin's infamous
Filthy Words monologue, for example, derives much of its humor from the
multiple meanings of words. 'I The context of a word's use provides cues for
would not suggest that every indecency enforcement by the Commission has been a crude at-
tempt by the government to quell dissenting voices. The salient fact is that the enforcement of
the FCC's standards in fact has the effect of censoring some non-mainstream and minority
voices. Cf FISKE, supra note 78, at 227 (suggesting that the traditional critiques of television
rely both on morality and aesthetics "in order to displace their origins in class-based social
power").
100. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918), quoted in FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 723, 776 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
101. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2566 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Cf. Post, The Constitutional Concept, supra note 41, at 623-26, 646-47 (characterizing outra-
geous expression as community-based assessment).
102. Whether or not we consign authorial intention to complete irrelevance, it surely re-
mains the case that meaning is constructed to a large extent in the interplay between audience
and text and that audience understandings of texts are grounded in cultural content and, conse-
quently, vary across audiences. For this point in connection with television viewing, see, e.g.,
Mary Ellen Brown, Introduction: Feminist Cultural Television Criticism - Culture, Theory and
Practice, in TELEVISION AND WOMEN'S CULTURE: THE POLITICS OF THE POPULAR 15 (Mary
Ellen Brown ed., 1990); Caren J. Deming, For Television-Centered Television Criticism: Lessons
From Feminism, in TELEVISION AND WOMEN'S CULTURE 45-46, 49.
103. See, e.g., JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING (1984) (dis-
cussing the interpenetrations and interdependence of language and culture/community); FIsKE,
supra note 78, at 78 (on the community-based character of oral culture). With regard to this
point in the context of humor, see Gary Alan Fine, Sociological Approaches to the Study of
Humor, in HANDBOOK OF HUMOR RESEARCH 164 (Paul E. McGhee & Jeffrey H. Goldstein
eds., 1983) ("Humor, like all interpersonal behavior, is socially situated. That is, it is embedded
in a particular social environment. For humor to work - that is, to be funny - it must be
responsive to the immediate situation and to [sic] be appropriate to the normative properties of
the more general social circumstances. Participants must define these behaviors or speech
events as humorous, and this evaluation is socially constructed (or negotiated) in context.").
104. This monologue, which served as the basis for the Supreme Court's decision in FCC
v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978), is remembered for the seven "words you couldn't say
on the public airwaves." As a satirical look at "dirty" words, the monologue made liberal use
of the double entendre. For example, Carlin mused on the different meanings of the word
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understanding its meaning, and shared cultural referents enable people to in-
terpret such contextual cues.
Similarly clear is the importance of shared cultural context to an under-
standing of group-specific coded languages. Particularly in non-mainstream
or oppressed subcultures, communication often operates by the use of codes or
signs that are shared within the culture but resistant to outside understand-
ing."O5 The use of coded words allows for private communication within the
code-sharing group and fosters the sense of liberation that comes from speak-
ing one's own language, especially in a hostile environment. For instance,
coded language consistently has found a home in African-American music -
presumably in part to promote intra-group communication while thwarting
understanding by the oppressive larger society.'0 6 Much of the blues is said to
consist of coded references to otherwise taboo subjects. Similarly, those who
have written about rap or hip hop have focused on the forms' contextual ori-
gins and culturally-determined meanings.107 One can also find in-group codes
within the American gay community. Just as gay men developed coded forms
of self-reference,108 gay communities transformed the meanings of conven-
tional images and references into codes.1°9 Slang, commonly used by youth,
also serves such coding functions. The "generation gap" exists in part because
teenagers develop whole series of idiomatic expressions that are not easily un-
derstood by their parents.110
"prick" when used in the phrase "pricking your finger" by contrast to the phrase "fingering
your prick."
105. The need to speak in codes depends in part on social status. See, e.g., FtsKE, supra
note 78, at 192 (describing theorists' claims that "women in patriarchy necessarily learn to use
double-voiced discourse").
106. See, e.g., JOHN BAUGH, BLACK STREET SPEECH 27 (1983) ('[S]avery... created a
climate where it was necessary to devise communication strategies that allowed blacks to pre-
serve their self-respect while not offending the whites interacting with them"); MARY ELLISON,
LYRICAL PROTEST: BLACK MUSIC's STRUGGLE AGAINST DIsCRIMINATION 106 (1989); THE
SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF EARLY NEGRO MUSIC IN THE UNITED STATES: WITH OVER 150
OF THE SONGS MANY OF THEM WITH THEIR MUSIC XV-XVi (Bernard Katz ed., 1969); BOOKER
T. WASHINGTON, UP FROM SLAVERY 19-20 (1901).
107. See, eg., DAVID Toop, THE RAP ATTACK: AFRICAN JIVE TO NEv YORK HiP HOP
(1984); Henry Louis Gates, Jr., 2 Live Cre, Decoded, N.Y. TIMEs, June 19, 1990, at A23;
Tricia Rose, Orality and Technology: Rap Music and Afro-American Cultural Resistance, POPU-
LAR MusIc & Soc'y, Winter 1989, at 35, 37, 39-40; see also NELSON GEORGE, THE DEATH OF
RHYTHM & BLUES 188-94 (1988) (positing that rap is today's authentic Black music).
108. Calling oneself and other gay men "friends of Dorothy" was one common (and
coded) identifying reference. See ALLAN BERUBE, COMING OUT UNDER FIRE: THE HISTORY
OF GAY MEN AND WOMEN IN WORLD WAR Two 86-87 (1990) (discussing camp slang, includ-
ing references to gay men in jail as "sisters in distress" and sailors as "seafood"); MICHAEL
BRONSKI, CULTURE CLASH: THE MAKING OF GAY SENSIBILITY 43 (1984) (discussing the
camouflage effect of "camp talk," including gay men's references to one another with women's
names).
109. See, e.g., FISKE, supra note 78, at 71 (discussing the transformation of Dynasty into a
cult show among some American gays, with the show's characters coming to represent more
than the literal images).
110. Adults cannot keep up with the development of teenage slang because it constantly
changes. See, eg., Yo Dude, Teachers Say Your Slang Can Be Real Cool, CHI. TRiB., Mar. 17,
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Culture even influences audiences' interpretations of whole texts that
otherwise seem uncoded and unidimensional in meaning. Those who reflect
on mass culture, for example, have observed that television programming has
an extremely polysemic character, with video images and texts "read" differ-
ently depending on the viewer's culture. 11'
How does all this apply to sexually expressive speech? First, an analogy
to close dances like the merengu6 suggests that context often determines
whether things are even perceived as sexually expressive or explicit. The ritu-
alized steps of ballroom dances are publicly acceptable when accompanied by
music but are potentially intimate and erotic when performed without musical
accompaniment. 112
Second, and more importantly, both the level of sexual expressiveness
that is considered publicly acceptable and the meaning of sexual references in
different expressive forms often vary by culture. As Justice Brennan recog-
nized in his Pacifica dissent, the expletives condemned by the Court and the
FCC in that case "may be the stuff of everyday conversation" in some Ameri-
can cultures.11 3 The acontextual and extra-cultural readings of sexual refer-
ences may therefore silence significant elements of minority expression and
serve to privilege mainstream understandings of meaning and offensiveness
without explanation. In Pacifica itself, Justice Brennan referred to studies
suggesting the presence and acceptability of expletives in many contexts in
Black speech.' 14 More recently, Professor Henry Gates' testimony as an ex-
1991, at 24. We date ourselves by our use of slang: a Valley Girl who used the term "tubular"
in 1985 would understand neither my reference to feeling "groovy" nor her younger brother's
assessment of something wonderful as "sick" or "killer."
111. See generally FISKE, supra note 78, and sources cited supra in note 102. As Fiske
puts it: "one program can stimulate the production of many texts according to the social condi-
tions of its reception." Id. at 14; see also id. at 71-72, 206 (characterizing the differences in the
ways in which Dallas is understood as a text in different cultures and describing the different
cultural readings of the images of gold chains on "The A-Team").
112. Indeed, close dancing has become popular again as a "yuppie" pastime. See, e.g.,
Sandy Coleman, Ballroom Dancing Bows Back into Vogue in Suburbs, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 3,
1989, at 10; Kelly P. Kissel, Couples Take Step Back to Romance, L.A. TIMES, May 6, 1990, at
E2.
Admittedly, the high level of acceptance of certain ballroom dancing forms is a relatively
new phenomenon. Ministers and other respectable folk inveighed against the "indecency" of
the waltz and polka in the 1830s, see RICHARD G. KRAUS, HISTORY OF THE DANCE IN ART
AND EDUCATION 109, 117 (1969), and the Charleston in the 1920s, see ARNOLD SHAW, THE
JAZZ AGE: POPULAR MUSIC IN THE 1920s 3-10 (1987), and the daughters of the pre-Castro
Cuban haute bourgeoisie apparently were not allowed to merengue at all. Time, too, has an
effect on social perceptions. The foxtrot was considered an improvement over the Black Bottom
in the 1920s, and the lambada is far more controversial today than is the lindy hop. On the
sexual underpinnings of dancing, see, e.g., KRAUS, supra this note, at 11 (characterizing some
dancing as expressive of sexual drive in the context of courtship rituals).
113. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 776 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also
Frederick F. Schauer, Language, Truth, and the First Amendment: An Essay in Memory of
Harry Canter, 64 VA. L. REV. 263, 282-85 (1978) (arguing that freedom of speech requires wide
latitude for choice of language).
114. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 777 (citing various studies of Black English and African Ameri-
can oral poetry).
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pert in the obscenity trial of the rap group 2 Live Crew suggested that the
group's lyrics should be understood in light of their debt to African-American
narrative traditions of boasting, toasts, and other storytelling forms resting on
exaggeration, humor, and braggadoccio.115 Without such a culturally
anchored view, the controlling white society might hear and understand the
group's highly sexual and explicit lyrics in very different (and perhaps far
more literal) ways than would its intended audience of African-American
youth."1 6 A related argument, that the meaning and offensiveness of sexual
discourse must be assessed culturally and in context, was made by Professor
Orlando Patterson in connection with Professor Anita Hill's testimony in the
Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings.'
17
b. The Exclusion of Blues, Rap, and Punk
A good indication of the culturally-skewing character of overly prudish
approaches to sex talk is the extent to which blues, rap, and punk rock have
been absent from mainstream broadcasting in light of their often sexually ref-
erential content. The virtual exclusion of the sexually frank forms of this mu-
sic from mainstream listening has led, in effect, to class- and race-based
censorship. The blues' and rap are two of the most significant forms of Afri-
115. See Gates, supra note 107, and other sources cited therein; Jon Pareles, An Album is
Judged Obscene" Rap: Slick, Violent, Nasty, and Maybe Hopeful, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1990,
§ 4, at 1. The cultural background of rap includes narrative poems, called toasts, which are
often "[violent, scatological, obscene, misogynist [and] ... used for decades to while away time
in situations of enforced boredom." Toop, supra note 107, at 29.
116. See, eg., Charles-Edward Anderson, 2 Live Crew Acquitted, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1990, at
29 ("[Professor Henry Gates] testified that the music of 2 Live Crew is a 'genius' artistic parody
on the lifestyle of young American black males.").
117. Orlando Patterson, Race, Gender and Liberal Fallacies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1991,
Week in Review, at 15. In assessing (and criticizing) Professor Hill's charges of sexual harass-
ment against now-Justice Thomas, Patterson made a culture-specific and contextual argument,
suggesting that while feminists and cynical politicians disapprove of obscenities per se, "to eve-
ryone else... an obscene expression, whether in Chaucerian Britain or the American South,
has to be understood in context." Id Such an allegedly contextual approach led Professor
Patterson to conclude that because Professor Hill "perfectly understood the psycho-cultural
context in which Judge Thomas allegedly regaled her with his Rabelaisian humor (possibly as a
way of affirming their common origins)," her raising the issue of harassment was "disingenuous
because she has lifted a verbal style that carries only minor sanction in one subcultural context
and thrown it in the overheated cultural arena of mainstream, neo-Puritan America, where it
incurs professional extinction." Id Of course, apart from the obvious feminist objections to
this account, I would also note that Professor Patterson himself makes the potentially inaccu-
rate assumption that Professor Hill and Justice Thomas share a cultural and linguistic context.
118. Any number of scholarly and popular studies have addressed the phenomenon of the
blues and its meaning in the lives of African-Americans. See, e.g., IMAMu AMIRI BARAKA,
BLUES PEOPLE: NEGRO Music IN WHITE AMERICA (1963); JAMES H. CONE, THE SPIRrru-
ALS AND THE BLUES: AN INTERPRETATION (1972); GARY GIDDINS, RIDING ON A BLUE
NOTE: JAZZ AND AMERICAN POP (1981); MICHAEL HARALAMBOS, RIGHT ON: FROM BLUES
TO SOUL IN BLACK AMERICA (1974); DAPHNE DUVAL HARRISON, BLACK PEARLS: BLUES
QUEENS OF THE 1920s (1988); PAUL OLIVER, SCREENING THE BLUES: ASPECTS OF THE
BLUES TRADITION (1968) [hereinafter OLIVER, SCREENING THE BLUES]; PAUL OLIVER,
BLUES FELL THIS MORNING: MEANING IN THE BLUES (1990) [hereinafter OLIVER, BLUES
FELL THIS MORNING]; ROBERT PALMER, DEEP BLUES (1981). In this Article, I will focus on
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can-American musical expression. 1 9 The blues, historically considered
"devil's music, ' 11° was not the music of the middle class African-American
culture; rather, it was the music to which rural and working class African
Americans danced in juke joints.' 2 Blues lyrics, habitually dealing with every
day topics such as personal stories of love and loss, often revolved around
earthy themes.122 Indeed, there is a history of lightly veiled sexual references
in the blues,1 23 in contexts ranging from male boasting about sexual prow-
ess 124 to flirtatious female vocals about what it would take to satisfy the
singer.1
25
The blues, as well as its successor, rhythm & blues, consistently has been
the nature of sexual references in blues lyrics without trying to make any generalizations about
the particular role of the blues in African-American culture.
119. See discussion infra at text accompanying notes 137-42.
120. See, e.g., CONE, supra note 118, at 110-11 (suggesting, however, that in fact there was
little disjunction between spirituals and blues in the Black experience); OLIVER, SCREENING
THE BLUES, supra note 118, at 23.
121. See JOACHIM BERENDT, THE JAZZ BOOK: FROM NEW ORLEANS To ROCK AND
FREE JAZZ 140 (1975) (describing the blues as the music of the proletariat); HARRISON, supra
note 118, at 99 (suggesting that blues erotica reflected the more relaxed attitudes toward sex in
the Black working class community); OLIVER, SCREENING THE BLUES, supra note 118, at 3,
12. As Harrison and others indicate, some of the sexually explicit blues was performed in
brothels and other like locales. See HARRISON, supra note 118, at 109 (explaining that raunchy
blues usually was performed only at "parties, midnight rambles, bawdy houses, or clubs"). This
was in part because the performers of blues and jazz music could more easily find work for
better pay and more creative freedom in such places than elsewhere. See KATHY J. OGREN,
THE JAzz REVOLUTION: TWENTIE AMERICA AND THE MEANING OF JAZZ 33-35, 56-86
(1989). The famous W.C. Handy and Jelly Roll Morton were both "sporting house" pianists in
their day. OLIVER, SCREENING THE BLUES, supra note 118, at 169; PALMER, supra note 118,
at 18.
122. See, eg., CONE, supra note 118, at 108-11, 120-21, 128-32.
123. The veiled references usually consisted of metaphors and symbols whose sexual
meanings were not difficult to decipher. See, e.g., ELLISON, supra note 106, at 113-14 (referring
to Bessie Smith's Nobody in Town Can Bake a Sweet Jelly Roll Like Mine, Kitchen Man, Susie
Edwards' I Want a Hot Dog for My Roll, Victoria Spivey's Black Snake Blues); GIDDINS, supra
note 118, at 5-9; OLIVER, SCREENING THE BLUES, supra note 118, at 24-25 (referring, for
example, to the following song titles from blues of the 1920s and 30s: Whip it to a Jelly, What's
That Smells Like Gravy?, Somebody's Been Using that Thing, Let Me Play With Your Poodle,
Shake it Down, Hair Parted in the Middle, Let Me Squeeze Your Lemon, Jackass for Sale);
PALMER, supra note 118, at 110. Some of the early blues were far more explicit in their sexual
references. Faye Barnes' Do It a Long Time, Papa, and Ida Cox's One Hour Mama are only
two examples of a large body of quite explicit sexual lyrics in the blues. See, e.g., ELLISON,
supra note 106, at 113-14. For a recently released compilation of previously unissued blues
songs, see RAUNCHY BUSINESS: HOT NUTS & LOLLIPOPS (Sony Music Entertainment, Inc.
1991).
124. See, e.g., OLIVER, BLUES FELL THIS MORNING, supra note 118, at 103-05; PALMER,
supra note 118, at 115-16, 125.
125. As Bessie Smith sang: "I need a little sugar in my bowl, I need a little hot dog be-
tween my roll." HARRISON, supra note 118, at 106; see, e.g., ELLISON, supra note 106, at 113-
14; HARRISON, supra note 118 at 99-100 (setting out the lyrics of My Man-of-War); OLIVER,
SCREENING THE BLUES, supra note 118, at 23-24, 164-261. Unlike much other popular music,
the blues allowed women to talk of themselves and their expectations in ribald and highly
charged, sexual ways. See ELLISON, supra note 106, at 111-14 (writing on the sexually explicit
music of Black women singers as reflecting their independence); HARRISON, supra note 118, at
100, 103-11 (same). Indeed, "[w]omen also employed the bragging, signifying language of
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
[Vol. XX:49
BROADCAST INDECENCY
the subject of censorship of various kinds. Some scholars have charged that
we do not have an accurate picture of the original blues because collectors
exercised censorship in eliminating the more obviously sexual music of the
time.1 26 The blues did lead to opposition in the Black community, particularly
because of its lower-class performance contexts and "unrefined" lyrics.12 7 The
"dirtiness" of blues lyrics was not generally considered a problem by main-
stream white society, however, so long as the music was available only on
"race" records I28 and African-American radio stations.12 9 Indeed, vernacular
jazz and the smuttier blues songs were "cleaned up" before they were made
available to a mainstream white audience.1 30 Once blues and rhythm & blues
males to boast of fine physical attributes and high-powered sexual ability." HARRISON, supra
note 118, at 106.
126. See, eg., OLIVER, SCREENING THE BLUES, supra note 118, at 24, 164-66, 181-82.
Oliver contends that a comparison of recorded blues and unissued or privately recorded blues
songs indicates that a wealth of traditional, sexually explicit blues have been withheld from the
public for reasons of morality. Such songs include Sweet Patunia, Shave 'Em Dry, Dirty Mother
Fuyer, and The Dirty Dozens. Id at 24; see also THE SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF EARLY NEGRO
Music IN THE UNITED STATES: WrTH OVER 150 OF THE SONGS, MANY OF THE.M WITH
THEIR Music xi-xii (Bernard Katz ed., 1969) (suggesting similarly that the early collectors of
Black music did not hear or catalogue many profane or vulgar songs or songs of secular social
comment during the last years of slavery and the subsequent years of Reconstruction.) Cf
VANCE RANDOLPH, ROLL ME IN YOUR ARMS: "UNPRINTABLE" OZARK FOLKSONGS AND
FOLKLORE (Legman ed., 1992).
127. See, e.g., HARRISON, supra note 118, at 106 (describing the existence of community
activities within the Black community in the 1920s seeking to ban blues with prurient lyrics and
specifically charging that "black newspapers waged the battle against performers who included
them in their repertoire and accused them of using lewd lyrics as a substitute for talent");
OGREN, supra note 121, at 111; PALMER, supra note 118, at 18. Ogren points out the character-
ization of jazz and blues as devil's music because of the "shady" places in which they were
performed. OGREN, supra note 121, at 113. This is not to say, however, that the sexual associa-
tions of this music were the only - or even the main - reasons for some of the Black commu-
nities' objections to it. Id at 114-38 (describing other reasons). Indeed, Ogren specifically
points to the generally class-based reasons for objections to jazz and blues in the Black commu-
nity. Id at 115.
128. The term refers to the label imposed by the record companies on their releases by
Black artists designed to appeal to the Black public. See BERENDT, supra note 121, at 143;
OGREN, supra note 121, at 91; PALMER, supra note 118, at 98; SHAW, supra note 79, at 165.
Led by the June 25, 1949 issue of BILLBOARD magazine, the reference was dropped by the
industry in the 1950s in favor of the term "rhythm & blues." SHAW, supra note 79, at 165.
Paul Oliver reads the relatively sparse historical evidence to indicate that sexually explicit
blues music was primarily made available to the Black market in strictly segregated record
catalogues in the 1920s and 1930s. Moreover, he posits that suggestive material was probably
always a part of blues songs, but that it was effectively censored by the record companies until
the economic pressures of the Depression forced them to try to revive flagging record sales and
to broaden their markets by issuing more blues of the raunchy, metaphor-filled variety. OLI-
VER, SCREENING THE BLUES, supra note 118, at 181.
129. While there were historically few Black-owned radio stations, some stations, under
white ownership, nevertheless played music that was thought primarily to appeal to the Black
audience. See FORNATALE & MILLS, supra note 4, at 69.
130. OGREN, supra note 121, at 87; DAVID P. SZATMARY, ROCKIN' IN TIME: A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF ROCK AND ROLL 25 (1987) (discussing the fact that mainstream "cover" versions
of rhythm & blues songs were often "cleaned up").
In a debate paralleling discussions of blues (and its progeny, rhythm & blues), the develop-
ment ofjazz sparked controversy in the 1920s in the white community. OGREN, supra note 121,
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became popular in record stores in white neighborhoods and began receiving
airplay on stations with wider audiences, they caused a furor and led to the
public ire of the decency leagues.13 1 The expanding white audience for such
African-American-influenced music thus led to a racist protective response.
Racial discrimination and the fear of "race mixing" clearly underlay many of
the complaints about the sexual content of rhythm & blues and its successor
form, rock 'n' roll. 132 The broadcast industry responded by increasing its level
of self-regulation on the "morals" front. Variety decried rock 'n' roll's "leer-
ics, '' 133 an official of the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Pub-
lishers (ASCAP) characterized the music as obscene,1 4 and radio stations
proclaimed that they would screen objectionable rock 'n' roll.' 3s Even many
of the African-American stations - not to mention African-American record
companies - refused to carry the more controversial and earthy blues and
rhythm & blues music in response to the rise of modem Comstockery on the
at 139-61. The basis of at least some of the white community's disapproval of the jazz form was
the concern that it would lead to "uncontrolled" behavior. Id. Nevertheless, the strength of the
morality-based objections to jazz had decreased significantly by the 1930s when "[t]he growth
of recordings and radio broadcasts made jazz performance a household commodity rather than
an adventurous foray into an exotic world." Id. at 162-63.
131. Indeed, given that many of the most powerful radio stations refused to play records
by African-American artists, it may have been the practice of white artists "covering" Black
rhythm and blues songs - and setting the stage for the development and eventual mainstream
acceptance of rock 'n roll - that led to the increasing attention of the decency leagues. See
SHAW, supra note 79, at 192-96; SZATMARY, supra note 130, at 25 (discussing the practice of
covering records in the 1950s). On the developing white audience for rhythm & blues in the
early to mid-1950s, see id. at 19; MARTIN & SEGRAVE, supra note 2, at 15-26.
Analysis suggesting that social problems arise from the interpenetration of ideas between
otherwise separate groups is reminiscent of Walter Kendrick's approach to the derivation of
what we now call pornography. Kendrick suggests that sexually explicit material came to rep-
resent the modem problem of pornography when it escaped the elite and secret museums of
aristocratic men to become available to the masses. See generally WALTER KENDRICK, THE
SECRET MUSEUM (1987). The fact that the spread of blues lyrics hinged on the escape of
"dirty" lyrics from lower class Blacks to upper class whites at first seems to be inconsistent with
(indeed, contradictory to) the Kendrickian explanatory approach; however, closer inspection
suggests a parallel concern about the spread into the white middle class of material thought
acceptable only for the white aristocracy and the Black working class.
132. See SZATMARY, supra note 130, at 22-24; see also FORNATALE & MILLS, supra note
4, at 42-43 (quoting religious leaders' likening of rock to "jungle tom toms" which would "in-
flame and excite youth," the choice of words making clear the racist objections to rock n' roll
(and, presumably, to its Black predecessor, rhythm & blues)).
133. FORNATALE & MILLS, supra note 4, at 43.
134. It has been posited that the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publish-
ers' (ASCAP) objections to rock n' roll were motivated largely by a desire to cause economic
harm to Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), ASCAP's only competitor and the license holder of most
of the rock and blues repertoire. See FORNATALE & MILLS, supra note 4, at 47-49; MARTIN &
SEGRAVE, supra note 2, at 12, 20; DAVID SEAY & MARY NEELY, STAIRWAY TO HEAVEN 116-
17 (1986).
135. FORNATALE & MILLS, supra note 4, at 43; ED WARD, GEOFFREY STOKES & KEN
TUCKER, ROCK OF AGES: THE ROLLING STONE HISTORY OF ROCK & ROLL 129, 183 (1986);
see also SZATMARY, supra note 130, at 47 (discussing disc jockeys who refused to play Elvis
records because of the offensive character of the music).
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subject. 136
Some who have decried what they see as the resulting co-optation and
mainstreaming of rhythm & blues recently have pinned their hopes on rap as
the musical form to fill a perceived void in African-American music. 3 Rap,
whose popularity has steadily increased, is currently a highly sexually explicit
form of music. 138 While practitioners of a virtually mainstream version of the
genre, like the popular Hammer, seem to avoid open sexual references, sexual-
ity is a common thread running from party groups like 2 Live Crew to hard
core "gangsta" rap. One common explanation for the explicit character of rap
is that the music simply represents reality, that it is a tableau of African-
American ghetto life and reflects the anger and frustration of urban African-
American youths.13 9 According to this view, rap is raw and realistic. It does
not try to sugar-coat reality or pretend to middle-class, traditional standards
of style."4 Rap's use of "nasty" language and talk about sex is simply an
attribute of its truth: because people use such language, it would distort and
misrepresent reality for rap not to do so as well. The mirror metaphor has
been used to characterize rap as a mere reflector of what exists in the African-
American community.141 Many rap artists have interpreted this mirroring
function as self-consciously political, meant as both a liberating message to the
African-American underclass and a threat to the oppressive white regime.14
Despite this political aspect and the form's current social prominence, rap in
its sexually explicit form has found little fertile soil in commercial radio.
143
136. See, ag., MARTIN & SEGRAVE, supra note 2, at 15-18, 20; MARK NEWMAN, ENTRE-
PRENEURS OF PROFIT AND PRIDE: FROM BLACK-APPEAL TO RADIO SOUL 115 (1988). In
addition, indirect pressure was brought to bear on rock 'n' roll by the exposure of payola scan-
dals and subsequent Congressional hearings sparked by disclosures that disc jockeys extorted
money from record companies in return for air play. Some observers of the scene suggest that
the payola scandals were a convenient way to contain rock 'n' roll in the late 1950s. See, eg.,
FORNATALE & MILLS, supra note 4, at 47-53; SEAY & NEALY, supra note 134, at 117-18.
137. See, eg., GEORGE, supra note 107, at 188-94 (1988).
138. A quick scan of many popular rap albums will reveal some sexually explicit material.
The controversial As NASTY As THEY WANNA BE by 2 Live Crew, found obscene at the trial
court level, represents only one example of a form that, on the whole, does not eschew sexually
explicit references. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Fla. 1990),
rev'd sub nom. Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134 (1 Ith Cir. 1992). This generalizing
characterization of rap's sexual content is not meant to suggest that the form is definable in a
monolithic manner. Reviews in the recent BRING THE NOISE suggest variations in style and
subject preferred by modem rappers. See generally HAVELOCK NELSON & MICHAEL A. GoN-
ZALEZ, BRING THE NOISE: A GUIDE TO RAP MUSIC AND HIp-HoP CULTURE 108 (1991).
139. See, eg., Gil Griffin, Strong Words from Ice-T and N. W.A., WASH. POST, June 12,
1991, at F7.
140. NELSON & GONZALEZ, supra note 138, at 81; Harry Allen, Hip Hop Madness Rap
Music is Our Music, ESSENCE, Apr. 1989, at 78 [hereinafter Allen, Hip Hop Madness].
141. Allen, Hip Hop Madness, supra note 140, at 114.
142. See eg., ELLISON, supra note 106, at 5-6, 31-32, 71-73 (1989) (discussing the political
character of rap as well as the subversive, protest-oriented lyrics of other African-American
music); NELSON & GONZALEZ, supra note 138, at 107-09, 178-84 (describing the work of
politicized rappers Ice Cube, N.W.A., and Public Enemy).
143. See, e-g., Phyllis Stark, Modern Rockers Ponder Absence of Black Acts, BILLBOARD,
Jan. 12, 1991, at 132; see also Dick Hebdige, What is Soul?, in VIDEO ICONS AND VALUES 121-
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Social and governmental censorship have a tendency to suppress not only
the expressions of minority groups per se but also the avant garde speech of
those who consider themselves iconoclasts. Punk rock, for example, was a
musical form designed to shock existing sensibilities and challenge the require-
ment of musical expertise for public performance. It reached its apogee in the
late 1970s and served as the anthem of alienated youth.'" Punk was the mu-
sic of nihilism and despair with which young people turned their backs on the
rock elite.' 45 Although punk songs typically were screamed at the audience
without any attempt to assure comprehension, their lyrics often referred ex-
plicitly to sexual matters. In part because of such lyrics, commercial Ameri-
can radio virtually boycotted punk, and many of the punk songs were never
played in their original form on the mainstream band.146
c. The Social Benefits of Diversity
The fact that dissenting, subversive expression and minority speech such
as blues and rap are repressed by government censorship and mainstream cul-
tural norms does not alone explain what is wrong with limiting the voices of
disempowered groups when those voices are offensive to mainstream culture.
The pluralist response to this question posits a two-fold harm in restricting
such expression. First, the regulatory process enlists government in reducing
or eliminating the possibility of intra-group communication over the airwaves
without a principled justification. Second, it minimizes the possibility of
cross-cultural exchange for those people who wish to expand their horizons.
After all, it is easy to argue that whatever one thinks of the "marketplace of
ideas," it must rationally entail a marketplace of culture as well. While plural-
ists would not force people to listen to material they might find objectionable,
the pluralist focus on tolerance and the social benefit of reducing parochial
world-views would support an ethnically and culturally inclusive governmen-
tal speech policy. 47 At the very least, pluralists might consider the dissemina-
33 (Alan Olson, Christopher Parr & Debra Parr eds., 1991) (discussing the absence of African-
American rap from MTV in the 1980s).
144. See, eg., JOHN STREET, REBEL ROCK: THE POLITICS OF POPULAR MUSIC 174-76(1986) (describing the politics of punk as the politics of anarchy). In Britain, punk became the
music of the young, white working class.
145. JOE STUESSY, ROCK AND ROLL: ITS HISTORY AND STYLISTIC DEVELOPMENT 312-
13 (1990); SZATMARY, supra note 130, at 175 (1987).
146. Some rock historians dismiss the history of punk after the 1970s, suggesting that it
became co-opted as a style or fad after that decade. See, e.g., SZATMARY, supra note 130, at
191-94, 198. Punk has been succeeded by a number of different permutations of rock, including
heavy metal. Currently, heavy metal is a musical form in which the shock factor has become
integral, with overt references to sex, drugs, violence, and satanism. See STUESSY, supra note
145, at 375-78.
147. The revival - and reinterpretation - of civic republicanism stresses the development
of dialogic social relations in which interlocutors' perceptions will be challenged by different
points of view. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1531 (1988);
Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 48-85 (1985).
(Professor Sunstein would exempt pornography from the dialogue, however. See Sunsteln, Neu-
trality, supra note 42.)
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tion of offensive material socially desirable not for itself, but for the possibility
that it allows society to develop and practice the virtue of tolerance.14s
2. The Conservative Challenge to Diversity and Multi-Culturalism
Social conservatives entirely reject the pluralists' view of cultural and sex-
ual diversity as a social good.149 Hewing to an often-religious moral absolu-
tism, they see a fundamental social evil in the moral relativism entailed by
pluralism. 50 They also reject pluralism on utilitarian grounds, believing that
a certain level of social cohesion is necessary in order to maintain stability and
social order. They further assert that the problems in our disintegrating
American society suggest that the level of diversity tolerated today is
destabilizing.
With regard to sexuality, these social conservatives completely deny any
value to public portrayals of sex and think they should be banned outright.
They are particularly troubled by presentations of sexualized expression re-
garding groups, such as homosexuals, whose members' affectional preferences
they deem immoral. They accordingly challenge the value of social diversity,
at least to the extent that it entails an acceptance of such "immoral" expres-
sion. Those who believe in such orthodox conservatism see no reason to privi-
lege speech simply because it is unrepresented in the mainstream - on the
contrary, they are interested in cleaning up and maintaining mainstream ex-
pression. For members of the far right, tolerance of the public flaunting of
sexuality itself is intolerable.
3. An Alternative Account
As in the discussion of the relationship between sex talk and power,151 the
way in which sexualized discourse is implicated in questions of diversity and
pluralism is more complex than either polar position would have it. Contrary
to the oppressive, exclusionary, and unrealistic stance of the extreme right, it
is safe to say that most Americans see diversity as desirable. Consistent with
that assumption, some level of pluralism historically has been a mainstay of
our constitutional interpretation, especially in the area of the First Amend-
ment. 152 At least in theory, our conception of democracy includes counter-
majoritarian safeguards for the protection of minority groups. Our system
might even be said to place affirmative value on minority voices for the benefit
148. See generally LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH
AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986) (arguing that the virtue of tolerance can be pro-
moted by protecting freedom of expression).
149. HUNTER, supra note 39, at 311.
150. Cf David M. Smolin, Regulating Religious and Cultural Conflict in Postmodern
America: A Response to Professor Perry, 76 IOWA L. REv. 1067 (1991) (criticizing, from a fun-
damentalist point of view, Perry's suggestion that what he calls ecumenical political dialogue
must be grounded on principles of fallibilism and pluralism).
151. See discussion supra at § I.A.3.
152. See Post, Cultural Heterogeneity, supra note 38, at 297, 299-305 (1988) (discussing
the existence of assimilationist, pluralist, and individualist strains in the American legal order).
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of society in general. However, references to the desirability of pluralism and
diversity per se have come under attack on the ground that neither concept is
adequate to resolve the concrete problems raised by multi-cultural societies
retaining legacies of oppression.
The FCC's much-touted commitment to norms of diversity has not al-
ways withstood conflicts with other perceived values under the agency's en-
abling statute.153 Even when the Commission has acted to protect diversity,
its chosen methods have not always passed judicial scrutiny. 15 4 First, progres-
sive thinkers have recently argued that diversity and pluralism, rather than
requiring government to remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas (particu-
larly in connection with sexual expression), in fact support affirmative restric-
tions on certain sorts of expression.1 55
Second, there are a number of communities whose norms, values, and
languages the Commission could choose to endorse and promote in the name
of diversity and multi-culturalism. Some of them, such as the ultra-conserva-
tive critics, of modem society's permissiveness, embrace values that sanctify
intolerance and exclusion. The abstract reference to pluralism alone does not
provide a workable standard by which to decide which communities we
should be prepared to recognize and how we should deal with exclusionary
voices. Furthermore, the recognition that some communities attach different
meanings to language and expression - particularly of a sexual nature -
does not necessarily define the extent to which those meanings should be pro-
moted by government. 56
Third, a superficial agreement as to the social benefits of diversity in the
abstract does not answer the question of how to deal with conflicts between
different disempowered groups in society. For example, what should we make
153. Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 35, 151-55, 201-21, 301-29, 401-41, 501-05, 601-09 (1988)). For example, the Commission's
deregulatory moves in connection with structural regulations (such as the multiple ownership
rules) and content regulations (such as the fairness doctrine), and the lack of rights of access on
broadcast stations, are all subject to criticism for potentially undermining diversity. See, e.g.,
Stanley Ingber, The First Amendment in Modern Garb: Retaining System Legitimacy - A Re-
view Essay of Lucas Powe's American Broadcasting and the First Amendment, 56 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 187, 211-12 (1987). See generally Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 110 HARV. L. REv.
781, 786-90 (1987) (calling for an affirmative role for the State in the First Amendment arena to
respond to market distortions); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L.
REV. 1405 (1986) (suggesting that libertarian free speech tradition can skew public debate in
modem conditions).
154. See, e.g., Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (upholding an equal
protection challenge to the Commission's policy of awarding an extra, diversity-based credit to
female applicants for broadcast licenses).
155. The feminist attack on pornography represents one instance in which progressive wo-
men were aligned with the fundamentalist right to decry exploitative and subordinating sexual
depictions. See DOWNS, supra note 40, at 25-143 (1989); see also Ehrenreich, supra note 38.
156. See Post, Cultural Heterogeneity, supra note 38, at 314 (discussing the ways in which
efforts to establish pluralism often shade into assimilationism), 332 (describing Zachariah
Chafee's view that the evolving character of group identity in America does not provide "natu-
ral brakes" for claims of group protection).
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of the sexist character of many rap lyrics, with their images of violence and
disrespect toward women?157 On the one hand, their often-virulent misogyny
further marginalizes an already-silenced group. 15 On the other hand, should
their sexism, shared as it is by other musical forms, be considered sufficient
justification for indecency regulations that would ban the material from the
airwaves? Or is it enough that oppositional voices by Black women have been
raised, challenging some rap's overt misogyny?159 The facile argument that
misogynistic gangsta rap lyrics merely reflect the brutal realities of life for
young Black men in the ghettos does not, as a result, immunize the music
either from perpetrating harms on women - themselves oppressed - or from
157. Much has been said about the misogyny and homophobia in rap lyrics. For an ex-
tremely thoughtful approach to the issues raised by rap misogyny, see Kimbearl Crenshaw,
Beyond Racism and Misogyny: Black Feminism and 2 Live Crew, BOSTON REV., Dec. 1991, at
6, 30 [hereinafter Crenshaw, Beyond Racism].
Some rap groups are quite explicit in their sexist attitudes and connect their graphic discus-
sions of sex with images of violence or disrespect toward women. See NE.SON & GONZALE ,
supra note 138, at xxi (recognizing "the vein of misogyny that runs like a fat gold chain through
some artists' work"); Tony Van Der Meer, Introduction, in Toop, supra note 107, at 5 (describ-
ing the sexist and homophobic attributes of some hip hop music). This seems particularly prev-
alent in the lyrics of what has come to be called "gangsta" rap (in reference to Los Angeles
youth gangs.) Id. at 81, 112, 184. For example, one of the raps from an N.W.A. album contains
the following representative lyrics:
This is the bitch that did the whole crew. She did it so much we made bets on who the
ho would love to go through .... And she lets you videotape her. And if you got a
gang of niggers the bitch'll let you rape her.
Jay Cocks, A Nasty Jolt for the Top Pops, TiME, July 1, 1991, at 78 (quoting the lyrics of
EFiL4ZAGGIN).
The debasement of women in the lyrics of some of these songs takes many forms. It does
not merely rest in the repeated references to women as "bitches" or "hos" who enjoy rape and
objectified sexual activity in which they are said to service the singers. It also legitimates the use
of violence against women and, more subtly, suggests that women are manipulative, money-
hungry seductresses who deserve to be mistrusted and controlled.
Of course, these visions of the castrating, all-powerful woman are neither new nor limited
to a community of Black teenagers. Any music video channel-flipping will demonstrate the
prevalence of such images (and sadistic male responses to them) in non-rap rock music. Indeed,
such images have a long ancestry, appearing in contexts ranging from medieval church doctrine
to the fears of the nineteenth century bourgeois. PETER GAY, I THE BOURGEOIS EXPERiENCE
VICTORIA TO FREUD: EDUCATION OF THE SENSES 169-71, 192, 200-07 (1984); Jeanne L.
Schroeder, Feminism Historicized: Medieval Misogynist Stereotypes in Contemporary Feminist
Jurisprudence, 75 IoWA L. REv. 1135, 1155, 1191-93 (1990). Thus, while sexist rap lyrics find
themselves in good company, and while selecting a rap group as the subject of an obscenity
prosecution (and not targeting any of the other potential offenders in pop culture) does smack of
racism, the harmful content of misogynistic and homophobic rap is no less troubling as a result,
as Professor Crenshaw observes. Crenshaw, Beyond Racism, supra this note, at 30.
158. Id.
159. Female rappers have responded to the misogynistic male rap, favoring two different
approaches to the issue. Some, such as Bytches With Problems and Hoes Wit' Attitude, have
simply turned the tables on the male rappers' sexism, challenging them on their ovm terms and
being equally sexual, explicit, and derisive. Dennis Hunt, 10 Questions, Queen Latifah, L. A.
TiMEs, Sept. 8, 1991, at 54. Other women rappers, such as Queen Latifah, have taken the high
road, airing views empowering to women with far less sexually hostile expressions about men.
See, e.g., Hunt, supra this note, at 54; John Pareles, Record Brief- Yo-Yo: Make Way for the
Motherlode, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 14, 1991, at H30.
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"glamorizing a social tragedy for profit.""l
Fourth, the culturally determined meanings of language necessarily un-
dergo transformations when the original cultural forms in which they appear
are exported to other contexts. 16 1 What happens to the meaning of rap, for
example, when it is incorporated into the mainstream musical and commercial
idiom or when it becomes a form used by white singers like Vanilla Ice? Such
transformations in turn raise questions about the continuing validity of claims
of cultural "authenticity" and diversity on behalf of the expression. In this
connection, it should be noted that the more violent and sexist elements of rap
have increasingly found a home in mainstream listening by young, white, sub-
urban males. 16 2 The nature of this appeal is unclear. Some suggest that these
listeners identify with the rage and rebelliousness of the music - that they are
"rebels without a clue." 163 This would suggest that they like the form and
affect of the music rather than specifically understanding or identifying with
its ghetto themes. Others suggest that the appeal of groups like N.W.A. to
young white males is "danger at a safe distance."' 16 Either way, the white
audience can convert the minority perspective into something completely dif-
ferent. Indeed, given the changing character of the rap audience, it might be
argued that even its producers can come to produce it not as any kind of
"authentic" discourse but, cynically, simply to satisfy perceived market needs.
Consequently, the meaning of a rap lyric will be different in the inner city, in
middle-class Black homes and in the suburban white teenage realm in which it
has become popular. This makes the analysis of how to conceive its message
much more complicated than might at first appear.
One possible approach to resolving these diversity-related issues would be
to require the FCC or courts to make contextual distinctions between the em-
powering and the oppressive elements of relevant cultures. If, for example,
one could argue that certain cultural norms are not in any way necessary or
indigenous to a particular culture but, rather, are only defensive and respon-
sive to external, oppressive conditions, then one might suggest that they do
not have a high value in the diversity calculus. In fact, simply recognizing and
legitimating cultural norms that are forged out of oppression leaves intact the
underlying oppressive conditions giving rise to the norms in the first place.
160. See Leonard Pitts, Too-slick rappers sell rage, despair for profit, MIAMI HERALD, June
27, 1991, at IF.
161. See Joe Brown, The Rap on Vanilla Ice, NEWSDAY, Feb. 6, 1991, at 56; Perry Lang,
Music and Race: Rap Giving Up its Rootsfor Riches, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 4, 1991, at Al; David
Mills, It's a White Thing; Is it Serious Hip-Hop or a Pale Imitation, WASH. POST, July 14, 1991,
at GI; Van Der Meer, supra note 157, at 4-5 ("The expression of Black people is transformed
when it is repackaged without any evidence remaining of the Black historical experience.").
162. Samuels, supra note 80, at 24-25, 29; see also Cocks, supra note 157, at 78. N.W.A.'s
EFIL4ZAGGIN soared to number one on the pop charts in the summer of 1991 without any of
the usual promotional aids such as MTV videos, extensive radio airplay, or a hit single. Id.
This account suggests that a major factor in the album's success is its unexpected appeal to
white, middle-class teenage males. Id.
163. Id. (quoting a record store manager).
164. Id. (quoting Billboard magazine editor).
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However, even apart from objections to the notion of leaving these judgements
about cultural authenticity to judges or administrative agencies, this exercise
seems fundamentally misconceived because it relies on the premise that there
is something "natural," indigenous, non-reactive, and ahistorical about cul-
ture. At the very least, such essentialist cultural approaches create the danger
of further promoting those disempowering stereotypes already in circulation
in the dominant culture.165 In sum, then, a closer look at the realities of sex
talk in our culture today, unaligned with either pole of the pluralist/conserva-
tive debate, suggests a multi-layered role and set of meanings. 16
II
THE FCC's TROUBLED REGULATION OF BROADCAST
INDECENCY
The prevalence of broadcast sex talk today, whether in PBS specials on
gay life or in the locker-room humor of shock jocks, has not gone unnoticed
by the FCC. Under color of 18 U.S.C. § 1464,167 which prohibits the utter-
165. Some scholars of the blues, for example, have celebrated the music and its sexual
references for its affirmance of "the authenticity of sex as the bodily expression of black soul."
CONE, supra note 118, at 132; see also OLIVER, SCREENING THE BLUES, supra note 118, at 176-
80 (describing and contesting arguments contrasting the "frank" and "direct" sexuality of ex-
plicit blues with the "slick" and "shallow" metaphors of the blues that appealed to the "hidden
prurience" of white society). These sorts of claims fit right into the context of the sexualized
character of racism in this country. See generally CALVIN C. HERNTON, SEX AND RACtSM IN
AMERICA (1965).
166. Although this Article has focused on the pluralist/conservative axis of the debate
about sex talk, I would suggest that absolute versions of the arguments either for or against
regulation of broadcast sex talk are all unsatisfactory. The progressive position in favor of
regulation, although not intended to be oppressive in the same way as the social conservative
rationale for controlling public sex talk, is nevertheless also problematic. It establishes a sub-
stantive government orthodoxy and would engage administrative officials in the kinds of refined
distinctions about expressive content that can undervalue the popular will and the liberating
characteristics of broadcast sex talk, and that present the likelihood of misapplication in prac-
tice. "That's what happens when you try to change culture before power in a greatly unequal
world." Kathleen M. Sullivan, The First Amendment Wars, THE NEW REPUBuC, Sept. 28,
1992, at 35.
On the deregulatory side, the extreme libertarian position against regulation relies on audi-
ence preferences and market determinations of acceptability. It therefore unduly discounts the
likely social harms caused by the proliferation of some broadcast sex talk. This posture also
conflates descriptive and normative characterizations: it turns an "is" - the proliferation of
sex talk - into an "ought" -justifying deregulation. For instance, governmental crackdowns
on talk about sex can be said to constitute unrealistic and hypocritical attempts to deny the
reality and pervasiveness of sexualized social discourse; yet a descriptive statement about the
existence of such material does not necessarily entail a normative conclusion as to its desirabil-
ity. It might well be argued both by social conservatives and progressives, for example, that the
popularity of sexually explicit talk in some segments of society and its consequent persistence as
a social fact do not in and of themselves justify its broad dissemination with governmental
imprimatur.
167. Initially, § 1464's prohibition against indecent speech was enacted as part of § 29 of
the Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1172-73 (1927). It was subsequently included as part of§ 326 of
the Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1934). The FCC also had the
power to suspend licenses under § 303(m)(4) and to revoke them under § 312 as punishment for
indecent broadcasting. The ban on the use of obscene or indecent speech in broadcasting was
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ance of any "obscene, indecent or profane language by means of radio commu-
nication," the Commission has embarked on a stringent campaign to clean up
the airwaves. In keeping with the history of its regulation in the indecency
area, the FCC's approach seeks to have large-scale effects on sexual content in
broadcasting without any analysis of the complex and ambiguous character of
the material at issue in the debate between moralists and pluralists.
A. The FCC's Approaches to Regulation
The FCC's most recent foray into the regulation of indecency com-
menced in 1987, yet an assessment of the agency's current approach to the
subject is most fruitfully undertaken against the backdrop of its history.
L The Pre-1987 Standard
Doctrinally, the Commission's approach to indecency prior to 1987 can
be broken down into four eras. 168 The first, best characterized as the era of
sweeping rhetoric and little enforcement, began before 1920 and lasted until
the 1950s. During this period, the FCC did not articulate any specific defini-
tion of actionable indecency and imposed virtually no sanctions for the broad-
cast of indecent material. 169 Nevertheless, its asserted goal of "insur[ing]"
against programs of such character "as may be offensive to the great mass of
right-thinking, clean-minded American citizens" 170 suggests a capacious inter-
pretation of the concept of indecency on the Commission's part. 171 Whether
because of their fears of conservative FCC attitudes or their own perceptions
of economic self-interest, radio stations during this period apparently did not
moved from the Communications Act to the general federal criminal law in 1948. The FCC is
now empowered by § 503 of the amended Communications Act of 1934 to impose sanctions on
stations for violations of § 1464.
168. For a fuller description of the history of the FCC's approach to indecency, see Levi,
supra note 36.
169. By reference to the FCC here, I mean to include as well its predecessor, the Federal
Radio Commission (FRC), during the relevant time frame. In the few instances in which the
agency did impose sanctions, the material at issue apparently consisted of profanity rather than
sexually explicit speech. See, e.g., Duncan v. United States, 48 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1931), cert.
denied, 283 U.S. 863 (1931); see also WILLIAM RAY, FCC: THE UPS AND DOWNS OF RADIO-
TV REGULATION 70 (1990); HARRY P. WARNER, RADIO AND TELEVISION LAW § 34a (1948)
for a description of indecency enforcement in the early years.
170. WARNER, supra note 169, at 338-39 n.14 (quoting January 14, 1938 letter from FCC
Chairman to NBC in connection with Mae West broadcast); see, e.g., id. at 336-39; GIRAUD
CHESTER, GARNET R. GARRISON & EDGAR E. WILLIS, TELEVISION AND RADIO 33 (3d ed.
1963); J. FRED MACDONALD, DON'T TOUCH THAT DIAL! RADIO PROGRAMMING IN AMERI-
CAN LIFE, 1920-1960 106-07 (1979); ARTHUR FRANK WERTHEIM, RADIO COMEDY 363-66
(1979); Stephen E. Louis, Broadcasting Offensive Programming Under a New Communications
Act, 15 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 427, 442-43 (1980); Laurence H. Winer, The Signal Cable
Sends, Part II - Interference from the Indecency Cases?, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 465 n.24
(1987); Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., Inc. (WMCA), 2 F.C.C. 76, 77 (1935).
171. See, e.g., CHESTER, GARRISON & WILLIS, supra note 170, at 33; MACDONALD, supra
note 170, at 106-07; WARNER, supra note 169, at 336-39; WERTHEIM, supra note 170, at 363-
66; Louis, supra note 170, at 442-43; Winer, supra note 170, at 465 n. 24; Knickerbocker Broad-
casting Co. 2 F.C.C. at 77 (1935).
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test the Commission with much sex-referential programming."7 2
In response to developments in both the broadcast and music industries
that led to more innuendo-laden material on the air, the 1950s and 1960s her-
alded a second era in the FCC's approach to broadcast indecency. Although
the Commission still avoided articulating any definitions of indecency during
this time, it imposed sanctions on a few radio stations that broadcast sugges-
tive material. In the most dramatic of such actions, the Commission denied a
license renewal to WDKD, Kingstree, South Carolina, for the broadcast of a
radio show whose disc jockey's patter it considered "coarse, vulgar, sugges-
tive, and of indecent double meaning."1 73 Another station was only spared a
license revocation in connection with its broadcast of "off color" language in
1959 because, although the Commission found the broadcasts of "utmost con-
cern," it was mollified by the station owner's admission of the "inexcusable"
nature of the material, his abject apologies and assurances that he had fired the
offending announcer, his "pledge" to devote more personal attention to pro-
gramming, and his offer to forgo any appeals. 74
The 1960s also saw the beginning of a series of challenges to non-profit,
alternative stations.1 75 Although, for example, the agency decided in 1964
that a Pacifica station's broadcasts of avant-garde drama, poetry, and a discus-
sion of homosexuality would not justify the ultimate sanction of non-renewal
lest the airwaves become entirely "bland,"" 6 it nevertheless granted only a
172. See, eg., MAcDoNALD, supra note 170, at 105 ("[Tlhere was a general understanding
within the broadcast industry that sex appeal would not be used to sell a program. Attractive
men and women certainly appeared on radio, and reference was usually made to their beauty;
but sexual innuendo was avoided, and explicitness was prohibited."); WERTHEIM, supra note
170, at 6-7, 14-15 ("From its inception, radio was considered family home entertainment, so
lewd jokes and double entendres were taboo.").
173. Palmetto Broadcasting, 33 F.C.C. 250, 257 (1962), aff'd sub nom. Robinson v. FCC,
334 F.2d 534 (D.C.Cir. 1964). The suggestive and coarse material on the Charlie Walker Show
included puns on the names of neighboring towns (like "Ann's Drawers" instead of "An-
drews") and phrases such as "let it all hang out." PoWE, supra note 3, at 167.
174. In re Revocation of License of Mile High Stations, Inc., for KIIN 28 F.C.C 795
(1960); see also PowE, supra note 3, at 166 (1987); RAY, supra note 169, at 71-72. The targeted
programming was a show in which the disc jockey often accompanied his remarks with the
sound of a toilet flushing and engaged in mild innuendo, like responding to a listener's assur-
ances that she always took the station with her everywhere she went with the quip: "I wonder
where she puts KIMN radio when she takes a bath - I may peek - watch yourself, Char-
lotte." Mile High Stations, Inc, 28 FCC at 798. See Morality and the Broadcast Media: A
ConstitutionalAnalysis ofFCC Regulatory Standards, 84 HARV. L. REV. 664, 667 (1971) [here-
inafter Morality and the Broadcast Media]. Even though the Commission consented to the
more lenient sanction of a cease and desist order rather than a revocation on the basis of the
licensee's representations, this leniency was contested by the Broadcast Bureau and the then-
Chairman himself.
175. Most of those challenges involved stations operated by the Pacifica Foundation, a
resource for left-wing, pacifist, and controversial programming. PovE, supra note 3, at 169; In
re Pacifica Found., Inc. (KPFK), 36 F.C.C. 147 (1964); In re Pacifica Found., Inc. (WBAI-
FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975); In re Pacifica Found., Inc. (WPFWV), 95 F.C.C.2d 750 (1983); In
re Pacifica Found., Inc. (KPFK), 2 F.C.C.R. 2698 (1987). See FORNATALE & MILLS, supra
note 4, at 171-73 for a history of the Pacifica-owned radio stations.
176. 36 F.C.C. 147 (1964).
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"short-term," one-year renewal to Pacifica's West Coast stations one year
later.177 Similarly, in 1970, the Commission granted a short-term renewal to
an alternative, listener-supported station that had broadcast three unspecified
four-letter words several times during a lengthy reading of a novel. 178
Although the Commission obviously focused on "indecent" language, this sec-
ond stage of indecency regulation can be characterized as the era of alternative
regulatory rationales. The Commission did not impose its sanctions under the
umbrella of its early sweeping statements about indecency and public morals,
but rather rested its decisions on more traditionally administrative rationales
under its public interest mandate. It cast the indecent broadcasts not as prob-
lematic per se, but as symptomatic of inadequate supervision and lack of can-
dor with the Commission. I79
The third era of the FCC's approach to indecency began with the explicit
adoption of a broad definition of indecency in 1970. The Commission fined
Philadelphia's non-commercial, progressive radio station WUHY for broad-
casting an interview with the Grateful Dead's Jerry Garcia. 1s0 The agency
suggested that the Garcia broadcast, in which expletives were used for rhythm
and emphasis rather than for their sexual meanings,18' ran afoul of section
1464 because its language was "patently offensive by contemporary commu-
nity standards and wholly without redeeming social value." ' 2 This test paral-
177. Pacifica Foundation, 2 F.C.C.2d 1066 (1965); see also JOHN DOWNING, RADICAL
MEDIA: THE POLITICAL EXPERIENCE OF ALTERNATIVE COMMUNICATION 35-54, 74-95
(1984) (discussing the FCC and the right's attempts to suppress radical media and stations like
KPFA); Morality and the Broadcast Media, supra note 174, at 668.
178. KRAB, a non-commercial Seattle station, aired portions of a taped autobiographical
novel by Reverend Paul Sawyer of the Lake Forest Park Unitarian church. Jack Straw Memo-
rial Found., 21 F.C.C.2d 833 (1970) and 24 F.C.C.2d 266 (1970). See FORNATALE & MILLS,
supra note 4, at 173-74 (providing a description of KRAB, on air in 1962, as one of the new
movement of "alternative radio" or "community radio" stations operated by Lorenzo Milam.).
179. The cease and desist order issued in the KIMN case rested on the Commission's
finding that the broadcasts were outside the public interest, convenience, or necessity and re-
vealed laxness in supervision. In re Revocation of License of Mile High Stations, Inc. for
KIMN, 28 F.C.C. 795, 797 (1960). In WDKD, the Commission justified its refusal to renew on
the grounds that the station owner had abdicated control of programming and lied in his testi-
mony before the Commission. Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 33 F.C.C. 250, 252-55 (1962), afid,
334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 843 (1964).
Consistent with this approach, the Commission assertedly based its regulatory crackdown
on the Pacifica stations on the fact that their broadcasts had violated Pacifica's own program-
ming standards, although they had done so only in isolated instances. See POWE, supra note 3,
at 171. Because the Commission ostensibly rested its decision on the ground of inadequate
supervision in the KRAB case, it did not specify which substantive language would trigger a
censorial response from the Commission. Accordingly, broadcasters simply knew that some -
although not which - four-letter words would be considered unacceptable by the Commission.
Jack Straw, 21 F.C.C.2d at 834 (Cox, dissenting).
180. In re WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d 408, 416 (1970); see also PowE, supra note 3, at 174-
75.
181. The FCC's notice of liability for forfeiture focused, inter alia, on the following state-
ments: "Shit, man;" "I must answer the phone 900 fuckin' times a day, man;" and "[p]olitical
change is so fucking slow." WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d at 410; see also supra note 46.
182. Id. at 412.
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leled the then-current definition of obscenity announced by the Supreme Court
in Roth v. United States1 3 and refined in Memoirs v. Massachusetts.' 4 More-
over, for the first time, the Commission made a distinction between form and
content by suggesting that since the expletives were unnecessary and "gratui-
tous," they did not advance the public interest.1  85 As then-Commissioner
Nicholas Johnson strongly put it in dissent:
What this Commission condemns today are not words, but a culture
- a lifestyle it fears because it does not understand.... What the
Commission decides, after all, is that the swear words of the lily
white middle class may be broadcast, but those of the young, the
poor, or the blacks may not.18 6
At first, the Commission used this new indecency definition to target rela-
tively powerless non-commercial stations and alternative, counter-cultural
programming. It subsequently moved to eliminate the highly popular com-
mercial format of "topless radio."187
The most publicized indecency crackdown of the 1970s was the FCC's
ban on the daytime broadcast of George Carlin's Filthy Words monologue in
which the comedian took a highly satirical look at the conventional taboos on
the seven "words you couldn't say on the public... airwaves."'38 The FCC
found the broadcast indecent in violation of section 1464, reformulating its
definition of indecency as "language that describes, in terms patently offensive
as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast me-
183. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
184. 383 U.S. 413 (1966); see Winer, supra note 170, at 469, 473-74. The parallel between
the Commission's indecency standard and the Court's test for obscenity was pointed out in the
Pacifica case discussed infra at note 189 and text accompanying note 190. Citizen's Complaint
Against Pacifica Foundation Station WBAI(FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975), rey'd, 556 F.2d 9
(D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
185. 24 F.C.C.2d at 415 ("[R]obust, wide-open debate... does not require that persons
being interviewed or station employees on talk programs have the right to begin their speech
with, "s-t, man ... " or use "f-g," or "mother f- g" as gratuitous adjectives throughout
their speech. This fosters no debate, serves no social purpose, and would drastically curtail the
usefulness of radio for millions of people.").
186. Id at 422-23 (1970) (Johnson, dissenting).
187. See discussion supra at notes 5, 87-90; FORNATALE & MILLS, supra note 4, at 75-76;
see also In re Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 41 F.C.C.2d 777 (1973), aff d sub nom. Illinois
Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (imposing sanc-
tions on WGLD-FM for references to oral sex during "Femme Forum" programs). Although
no specific "dirty words" were used in this case, the Commission found the broadcast obscene
as well as indecent. Accordingly, the agency did not use the occasion to articulate further its
definition of indecency or to explain precisely the manner in which the programs were indecent.
The show at issue in Sonderling was the top-rated radio program for its time slot in the Chicago
market. Lucas Powe, Consistency Over Time: The FCC's Indecency Rerun, 10 HAs-INGS
COMM. & Er. LJ. 571, 577 (1988).
188. In re Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 96 (1975) (quoting Pacifica's comments on
complaint). The seven "words you couldn't say on the public, ah, airwaves" were "shit, piss,
fluck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits. Those are the ones that will curve your spine,
grow hair on your hands and... maybe, even bring us, God help us, peace without honor...
Id at 100.
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dium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of the day when there
is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience."' 81 9
Having noted that there had been no definitive interpretation of the
meaning of indecency in section 1464 and that in light of changes in the
Supreme Court's definition of obscenity itself, the Commission's obscenity-
driven definition in WUHY was suspect, the FCC decided Pacifica as a test
case.1 90 The D.C. Circuit reversed the Commission's decision, with each
judge in the three-person panel writing separately. 91 In the famous Pacifica
case in 1978, a divided Supreme Court affirmed the FCC's authority to chan-
nel the Carlin broadcast to late-night hours.'92
Although the Supreme Court's Pacifica decision at first caused much anx-
iety and uncertainty in the broadcaster ranks, what in fact emerged from the
case was a bright-line test that simply prohibited repeated use of Carlin's im-
189. 56 F.C.C.2d at 98. It may well have been because the Supreme Court had changed its
Roth- and Memoirs-based definition of obscenity in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) that
the Commission felt the need to develop the revised definition of indecency it suggested in
Pacifica. See 56 F.C.C.2d at 94. The majority distinguished this reformulated indecency stan-
dard from the obscenity standard by suggesting that language may be indecent even if it lacks
obscenity's appeal to the prurient interest, and that it is unredeemed by claims of merit when
broadcast at times in which children might be in the audience. Id. at 98.
190. The Commission was quite split in its reasoning in Pacifica, even though all Commis-
sioners concurred in the result. Two members would have opted for a 24-hour ban on inde-
cency; two others concurred with reluctance, emphasizing their agreement with the narrowness
of the intervention suggested by the decision. The Chairman concurred in the result but did not
issue an opinion himself. The Commission did not impose any direct sanctions on the licensee
for having broadcast the program. Instead, it simply "associated" its order with the station's
license file and took the case as an opportunity to issue a declaratory ruling to clarify its own
indecency standards and to allow aggrieved parties to seek reconsideration and judicial review.
Id. at 99.
While the original Pacifica opinion cryptically suggested that a different, more lenient stan-
dard might be used when the number of children in the audience was at a minimum, it did not
define children or provide broadcasters with a clearly circumscribed safe harbor. Id. at 99-100.
Pursuant to a petition for further clarification of its order, the Commission stated that indecent
material could be broadcast in a newscast, a public affairs program, or live coverage of public
events. Such material also might be broadcast in other programming if the number of children
were at a minimum at broadcast time, if unconsenting adults were warned of the nature of the
material, and if the language in context had serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
In re Pacifica Found., 59 F.C.C.2d 892, 893 (1976).
191. Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Judge Tamm held that the
Commission's definition of indecency constituted prohibited censorship under § 326 of the
Communications Act and, in any event, was overbroad and vague. Id. at 18. Relying on evi-
dence that numerous children can be found in the late-night broadcast audience in many mar-
kets, Judge Tamm challenged the FCC's attempt to characterize its effective prohibition as mere
channeling of indecent material to hours with a minimal number of children in the audience.
While Chief Judge Bazelon was of the opinion that § 326 was bounded by § 1464, he concluded
that the First Amendment required a narrow reading of § 1464 to cover only language deemed
obscene or otherwise unprotected by the Constitution. Judge Leventhal dissented, stating that
the only issue at hand was whether the language was indecent "as broadcast," and that the
Commission had properly found the material indecent in light of the interest in preventing
children's exposure not only to the subject matter itself, but also to the suggestion that such
language has official approval. Id. at 31, 37 n.18 (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
192. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); see also discussion infra at text accom-
panying notes 418-23.
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mortalized seven dirty words before 10:00 p.m. 193 The fourth stage - that of
regulatory retreat - thus consisted of a new decade of agency non-enforce-
ment of the broad indecency standard developed in the Commission's original
decision in Pacifica. Because broadcasters largely avoided the seven "dirty"
words and the Commission held to its narrow interpretation of the indecency
standard, the prohibition on indecency nearly fell into desuetude during this
period. Ironically, the result of the Commission's attempt to crack the whip
was a broadcast landscape with significant room for station experimentation
with sex-related expression, so long as broadcasters did not venture into the
narrow and clearly-defined area of the impermissible.
2. The Post-1987 Standard
In 1987, the FCC unexpectedly reversed course. It did so using three
warnings issued to specific broadcasters as the occasion to announce "new
standards to clarify its enforcement authority over [indecent] broadcasts in the
future." '194 It simultaneously released a Public Notice in order to describe
those actions for broadcasters generally and to "clarify" when it would exer-
cise its enforcement authority. 195 Explicitly retreating from its narrow en-
forcement approach of the previous near-decade, the Commission warned that
it would thenceforth enforce the "generic definition of indecency" 196 initially
adopted in the Commission's Pacifica case and later abandoned. The generic
approach defined indecency as "language or material that depicts or describes,
in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community stan-
dards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities or organs."'197
Concluding that the post-Pacifica limitation of enforcement to the seven dirty
words arbitrarily excluded whole categories of offensive speech, the Commis-
193. In re Application of WGBH Educational Found., 69 F.C.C.2d 1250, 1254-55 (1978).
The Commission subsequently used the WGBH case to deny a number of complaints of inde-
cency, even when they involved the occasional use of one of Carlin's forbidden words. In re
Rahall Broadcasting of Indiana, Inc., 94 F.C.C.2d 1162 (1983); In re Application of Pacifica
Found., 95 F.C.C.2d 750 (1983); In re Service Broadcasting Corp., 46 R.R.2d 413 (1979).
194. FCC Press Release 2823, Apr. 16, 1987; see also In re Pacifica Found., Inc. (KPFK-
FM), 2 F.C.C.R. 2698 (1987); In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp. (WYSP-FM), 2 F.C.C.R. 2705
(1987); In re The Regents of the University of California (KCSB-FM), 2 F.C.C.R. 2703 (1987),
reconsideration denied, 3 F.C.C.R. 930 (1987) [hereinafter Reconsideration Order]. The new
standards were adopted in connection with three broadcast cases and one amateur radio deci-
sion but were announced as indications of a general change in the Commission's regulatory
philosophy about indecency. The particular adjudications ended in warnings rather than fines
because of the lack of prior notice that the Commission was about to institute a drastic change
in its enforcement philosophy. Public Notice, New Indecency Enforcement Standards to be
Applied to All Broadcast and Amateur Radio Licensees, 2 F.C.C.R. 2726 (1987) [hereinafter
Public Notice].
195. IdL
196. See Public Notice, supra note 194, at 2726.
197. The distinctions between this definition of indecency and the Supreme Court's current
definition of obscenity are, inter alia, that (1) speech can be regulated as indecent even if it does
not appeal to the prurient interest, and (2) a work's serious literary, artistic, political, or scien-
tific value is not a threshold criterion that would preclude a finding of indecency. See Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973).
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sion opted for a contextual, encompassing approach in its intended future
enforcement. 1 98
The second prong of the Commission's 1987 actions about indecency re-
lated to time "channeling." Harking to the language of its position in Pacifica,
the Commission ruled that material covered by the definition of indecency
would be "actionable if broadcast or retransmitted at a time of day when there
is a 'reasonable risk that children may be in the audience.' ,199 Although the
time period after 10:00 p.m. previously had been considered a "safe harbor"
for potential indecency, the agency opined for the first time that "this bench-
mark is not susceptible to a uniform standard." 2" Having looked at the evi-
dence of children's viewing patterns in the specific markets at issue in the cases
before it, the Commission concluded that "there were in fact children in the
broadcast audience at later hours" than 10:00 p.m. 20 1 Thus, the Commission
grounded its regulatory policy on its desire to protect children, rather than
relying on the traditional argument for regulation based on notions of spec-
trum scarcity.2 °2 It characterized time channeling as the only "practicable"
way to separate children and adults in the broadcast audience in a manner
analogous to the child-protective spatial separations permitted in other expres-
198. In re The Regents of the University of California (KCSB-FM), 2 F.C.C.R. 2703
(1987).
199. Public Notice, supra note 194, at 2726.
200. Id.
201. Id. As will be discussed below, however, the assumptions of a childless late-night
audience were always known to be false. In the Pacifica case itself, an amicus brief demon-
strated that there were children in the broadcast audience even at 1:30 a.m. Brief of Amicus
Curiae Committee for Open Media at 17, Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). While this was not thought relevant to the Supreme Court's ap-
proval of the channeling notion in Pacifica, the FCC in 1987 proceeded as if the Court's ap-
proval of channeling in that case were premised on the complete absence of children from the
late-night viewing and listening audience. Despite its desire to eschew bright line rules in this
area, the Commission did subsequently suggest, in a footnote in its reconsideration of the origi-
nal 1987 order, that broadcasters should think of midnight as the starting point of the indecency
safe harbor. Reconsideration Order, 3 F.C.C.R. 930, 937 n.46 (1987).
202. See, e.g., MATTHEW L. SPITZER, SEVEN DIRTY WORDS AND SIX OTHER STORIES 9-
18 (1986). Although the Supreme Court relied solely on the pervasiveness and invasiveness of
the broadcast medium to justify upholding time channeling of indecency in Pacifica, broadcast
content regulations have traditionally been justified on the ground that the scarcity of the
broadcast spectrum justifies regulatory interventions that would be constitutionally precluded
for the print medium. See, eg., Red Lion v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). Critics have attacked
the scarcity rationale for regulation, contending, inter alia, that the broadcast spectrum is no
more scarce than any other commodity. Thus, these critics argue, the scarcity rationale does
not properly serve either to distinguish broadcasting or to justify governmental incursions into
broadcast speech. See, e.g., SPITZER, supra this note; R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications
Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959); Mark Fowler & Daniel Brenner, A Marketplace Ap-
proach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REv. 207 (1982); Matthew Spitzer, The Constitu-
tionality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 990 (1989). The challenge to scarcity
was successful in the late 1980s in persuading the Commission to eliminate the fairness doctrine
in Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019
(1990). See also Arkansas AFL-CIO v. FCC, 980 F.2d 1190 (8th Cir. 1992) (affirming FCC's
discretion to abolish fairness doctrine).
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sive contexts such as film theaters and bookstores.2 °3
On appeal of the Commission's ruling, in Action for Children's Television
v. FCC (ACTI), the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected conventional con-
stitutional challenges based on overbreadth and vagueness, suggesting that
vagueness was inherent in any attempt to define indecency and asserting, in
any event, that the generic indecency standard had implicitly run the gauntlet
of Supreme Court constitutional review in FCC v. Paciflca.2° Yet, calling the
Commission's temporal findings for time channeling "more ritual than real,"
the court remanded the matter to the Commission with instructions to develop
a better record justifying the decision to change the hours of the day in which
indecent material could properly be channeled."°5
Congressional attention to the matter pre-empted that inquiry, however.
At the urging of Senator Jesse Helms, Congress passed and President Bush
signed into law an appropriations bill requiring the Commission to adopt reg-
ulations enforcing the provisions of section 1464 "on a 24 hour per day ba-
sis."' 20 6 Denying any administrative discretion, the FCC adopted such a total
ban of indecent material. 7 It could have interpreted the statutory mandate
narrowly, simply returning to a brighter-line definition if it felt constrained by
the Congressional action. Nevertheless, the agency applied the total ban to all
material subsumed under its new, generic definition of indecency - even
though it had earlier opined that a total ban would probably be
unconstitutional. 2°
203. Reconsideration Order, 3 F.C.C.R. at 930, 937 n.47.
204. As the court put it,
In our view the Supreme Court's disposition of Pacifica stops "what the constitution
calls an 'inferior court' " from addressing this question on the merits .... [I]f accept-
ance of the FCC's generic definition of "indecent" as capable of surviving a vagueness
challenge is not implicit in Pacifica, we have misunderstood Higher Authority and
welcome correction.
Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1338-39 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (ACT1) (As
is further detailed in text, ACT I was followed by the FCCs adoption of a total ban on inde-
cency, a subsequent stay and remand by the D.C. Circuit (ACTIf), another pass at a total ban
by the agency, yet another reversal and remand by the D.C. Circuit (ACT II), the adoption by
the FCC of a new, narrow safe harbor for indecency, and a stay of the new rules by the D.C.
Circuit (ACTIP) in the context of a pending substantive appeal.)
205. Idk at 1340-44.
206. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504, 1507 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (ACT
III), cerL denied, 112 S. Ct. 1281 (1992) (quoting Pub. L. No. 100-459, § 608, 102 Stat. 2228
(1988)).
207. In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Obscenity and Indecency 18
U.S.C. § 1464, 4 F.C.C.R. 457 (1988) (Order) (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (1990)).
208. Id at 458; ACTI, 852 F.2d at 1343 n.18. In the first Public Notice announcing the
new indecency standards, and thereafter in the Reconsideration Order, the Commission made
amply clear its view that a total ban on indecent material would be constitutionally suspect.
While Commissioner Dennis expressed her "serious doubts" about whether a total ban would
be upheld on judicial review, the Commission adopted such a rule in response to the Congres-
sional mandate. Enforcement of Prohibitions, 4 F.C.C.R. at 457-58 (Order). For a critique of
this decision, see Guy A. Reiss, New F. C Standards on Indecency on the Air and the First
Amendment" Offensive Obscenity or Profound Profanity?, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L & ARTS 221-22,
238, 248-51 (1989).
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In Action for Children's Television v. FCC (ACT I1),209 the D.C. Circuit
stayed the 24-hour ban, suggesting that the statute and its attendant regulation
were in conflict with the channeling rationale espoused in ACT I. It did not
rule on the constitutionality of the total ban, however, because the Commis-
sion asked the court to remand the case once again,210 in light of the Supreme
Court's just-issued decision in Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, which
struck down a total ban on indecent dial-a-porn telephone services. 21
Having read Sable to suggest that total bans on indecent material could
be affirmed if no alternative means of protecting minors were in fact available,
the Commission issued a Notice of Inquiry in order to create a factual record
in support of a total ban.212 On the basis of the record compiled in response to
its Notice, the Commission issued a Report and Order justifying adoption of a
24-hour-a-day ban on indecent broadcasts as the only adequate response to the
problem of broadcast indecency. 213 Again, the Order characterized the Com-
mission's approach as designed primarily for the protection of children. 1 4
Having designated the category of "children" to include youths seventeen
years old and under,215 the Commission relied on data that indicated the pres-
ence of children so defined in the late night broadcast audience.216 The Com-
mission also mounted a "reality-based" argument, suggesting that a 24-hour
ban was the most narrowly tailored means of addressing the compelling gov-
ernmental interests both in parental supervision and in "protecting the well-
being of youth" 217 in an era when many parents cannot adequately control the
209. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, No. 88-1916 (ACTI1) (D.C. Cir. Jan. 23,
1989) (Stay Order).
210. Act II, No. 88-1916 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 13, 1989) (Remand Order).
211. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
212. Enforcement of Prohibitions, 4 F.C.C.R. 8358 (1989) (Notice of Inquiry); see also
ACTIII, 932 F.2d 1504, 1507 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1281 (1992).
213. Enforcement of Prohibitions, 5 F.C.C.R. 5297 (1990) (Total Ban Report).
214. Id. at 5297, 5301.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 5302-06.
217. Id. at 5297, 5299-5300.
In Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989), the Court articulated the
following standard of review: "The government may... regulate the content of constitutionally
protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive
means to further the articulated interest." In its Total Ban Report, the FCC suggested that it
had applied the stringent First Amendment standard of review entailed by Sable. It also relied
on the concurring opinion of Justice Scalia in Sable, in which he suggested a broader regulatory
scope for indecency to accompany the apparent constriction of the current definition of obscen-
ity. Id. at 132 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The more narrow the understanding of what is "ob-
scene," and hence the more pornographic what is embraced within the residual category of
"indecency," the more reasonable it becomes to insist upon greater assurance of insulation from
minors."). The Commission specifically noted that the "broad range" of sexually-oriented ma-
terial that would not fit into the stringent definition of obscenity while still potentially being
indecent "heighten[ed] our concern of preventing harm to children." Enforcement of Prohibi-
tions, 5 F.C.C.R. at 5300 (Total Ban Report).
In addition to the child-protective rationale, the Commission noted that there is also a
governmental interest in protecting "the public's right to be free from indecent material in the
privacy of their own homes." Id. This argument, which had been a linchpin of the Supreme
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viewing and listening habits of their children.218
Predictably, the D.C. Circuit struck down the 24-hour ban as unconstitu-
tional in Action for Children's Television v. FCC (ACT II).219 Relying on its
earlier decision in ACTI, the court again off-handedly rejected vagueness and
overbreadth challenges to the generic indecency standard. 0 But it held that
such material must be channeled rather than subjected to a 24-hour-a-day ban.
Even in the broadcast context, the court held, a total ban on indecency would
not satisfy the strict level of constitutional scrutiny required both by Sable and
ACTI. While accepting as "compelling" the asserted governmental interest in
"safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor," the court
found that the 24-hour-per-day ban was not sufficiently carefully and narrowly
tailored to protect that interest constitutionally. Without reiterating any sub-
stantive arguments in support of this proposition, the court simply found that
ACT Is requirement that the FCC identify a safe harbor "necessarily means
that the Commission may not ban such broadcasts entirely."1221 That the
Commission had acted pursuant to a Congressional directive did not ensure
the constitutionality of the total ban. Thus, the court remanded the matter to
the Commission once again to "redetermine" the appropriate safe harbor for
indecent material "after a full and fair hearing."' - The Supreme Court de-
nied the government's petition for certiorari seeking to overturn ACT III and
reinstate a 24-hour ban on indecency.n3 Pending action on the remand, the
FCC continued to enforce its indecency policy only between 6:00 a.m. and
8:00 p.m., on the assumption that the presence of large numbers of children in
the broadcast audience during that time frame was incontestable.2 4
Despite judicial setbacks, the issue of broadcast indecency continued to
be at the legislative forefront. Last fall, President Bush signed the Public Tele-
communications Act of 1992, reauthorizing the Corporation for Public Broad-
casting and prohibiting the broadcast of indecent material on both public and
Court's decision in Pacifica, took a secondary seat in the Commission's reasoning on indecency.
See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978). The Com-
mission also did not rely on the traditional argument that adults who flip channels might un-
knowingly come upon offensive material and feel assaulted by it.
218. Enforcement of Prohibitions, 5 F.C.C.R. at 5300 (Total Ban Report).
219. ACTIII, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1281 (1992).
220. IdM at 1508. ("We have already considered and rejected a vagueness challenge to the
Commission's definition of indecency... In our view, the Supreme Court's decision in Pacifica
dispelled any vagueness concerns attending the definition.").
221. Id at 1509.
222. Id at 1509-10. On remand, the court suggested - without explanation - that the
Commission investigate three matters in connection with its "redermination": the definitions of
"children" and "reasonable risk; .... the paucity of station or program.specific audience data
expressed as a percentage of the relevant age group population;" and "the scope of the govern-
ment's interest in regulating indecent broadcasts." Ia at 1510.
223. FCC v. Action for Children's Television, 112 S. Ct. 1281 (1992).
224. See In re Zapis Communications Corp. (WZAK), 7 F.C.C.tL 3888 n.2 (1992) (noting
limitation of FCC's enforcement authority from 6:00 am. to 8:00 p.m.); In re Goodrich Broad-
casting, Inc. (WVIC-FM), 6 F.C.C.R. 7484 (1991) (rejecting claim that FCC had no daytime
jurisdiction after its total ban was struck down as unconstitutional).
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private television and radio stations before midnight.225 Apparently joining
his Republican colleague Jesse Helms's crusade against indecency and immo-
rality, Democratic Senator Robert Byrd had authored the indecency limita-
tion in an amendment to the Senate's reauthorization bill. 226 Senator Byrd, in
a floor statement, deplored the "smutty language" and "lack of morality" in
television programs, characterized much television programming as "nothing
more than packaged corruption for the soul" and "mental junk food," and
called for Congress to step in "before the salacious, prurient imaginings of
irresponsible scriptwriters of today become the norms of conversation and be-
havior a decade or two from now. '2 27
In light of the ACT III remand and the Congressional enactment of the
Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, the Commission commenced a No-
tice of Proposed Rulemaking on October 5, 1992, to establish a record for a
new, midnight-to-6:00 a.m. safe harbor 22 and adopted such a safe-harbor rule
to be effective on February 24, 1993.229 The Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit stayed effectiveness of the new safe harbor, at least until oral argument
is scheduled in the fall on the merits of a multi-party appeal from the Commis-
sion's regulatory decision.230 The FCC accordingly has returned to enforcing
its policy of banning indecent broadcasts from 6:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. 23 1
In the meantime, the pending ACT appeal is not the only judicial chal-
lenge to the FCC's rules. Although most broadcasters swept into the FCC's
indecency net paid their fines and adjusted their programming, one licensee
225. Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-356, § 16, 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat. 954) (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 303); Bush Signs Public TV Bill,
N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 29, 1992, at 44.
226. See S. 1054, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); Senate Votes to Extend 'Indecent'Program.
ming Ban, 20 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 4 (June 16, 1992).
227. 138 CONG. REc. S7308-09 (daily ed. June 2, 1992) (statement of Sen. Byrd).
As part of its cable reform legislation of last fall, Congress also authorized the FCC to
enact indecency regulations for cable. The agency is currently in the midst of a Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking on the subject. In re Implementation of § 10 of the Cable Consumer Protec-
tion and Competition Act of 1992 Indecent Programming and Other Types of Materialism on
Cable Access Channels, 1992 FCC LEXIS 6343 (Nov. 5, 1992).
228. In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464,
7 F.C.C.R. 6464 (1992).
229. In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464,
71 Rad. Reg.2d 1116 (1993).
230. John Carmody, The TV Column, WASH. PosT, Feb. 25, 1993, at D6. A coalition of
twenty-one media and public interest groups, again under the umbrella of Action for Children's
Television, recently challenged the FCC's indecency policy. ABC, CBS and NBC Aren't Parties:
Coalition of2l Groups Asks Court to Enjoin FCC on Indecency, COMM. DAILY, Feb. 25, 1993, at
3; FCC's Indecency Rules Taken to Court, BROADCASTING, Feb. 1, 1993, at 64. The court's
original stay of the FCC's planned midnight-to-6:00 a.m. safe harbor for indecency was granted
on February 23, 1993. On March 8th, the court issued a Stay Order clarifying its earlier ruling
and indicating that the FCC was enjoined only from enforcing its new safe harbor time frame
rather than any other aspects of its indecency policy. Action for Children's Television v. FCC,
No. 93-1092 (ACT IT); COMM. DAILY, Mar. 11, 1993, at 7.
231. Carmody, supra note 230.
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has refused to pay its forfeiture in order to trigger a court challengeP2 to the
definition of indecency on the grounds that it is "unconstitutionally vague and
unworkable."' 21 3 Infinity, the licensee whose broadcasts of Howard Stem ma-
terial have left it facing the largest forfeiture ever imposed for a violation of
indecency rules, has also expressed its intention to fight the fine.234 The issue
is again ripe for review.
3. The Influence of Interest Groups
The Commission's newly-strengthened commitment to a broad definition
of indecency cannot fully be appreciated in the abstract, divorced from the
political background against which it has occurred and the peculiar character-
istics of FCC procedure. Paralleling the changes in popular culture and the
increasingly risqu6 content of broadcast programming in the 1980s, a vocal
and organized movement of socially conservative, predominantly religious,"'5
groups dedicated to pressuring government, broadcasters, and advertisers into
removing "filth" and anti-Christian matter from the airwaves 6 have begun to
232. A trial de novo is available if the subject of an FCC forfeiture refuses to pay the fine
and is brought to court by the government in an action to collect. See 47 U.S.C. § 504 (1992).
233. Evergreen Media, the licensee of a station that was the subject of a forfeiture order for
the broadcast of indecency, refused to pay the Commission's order, seeking court review of the
finding of indecency. Joe Flint, Evergreen to Fight Indecency Charge, BROADCASTING, Jan. 13,
1992, at 91; see also Just Say No Thank You, BROADCASTING, Jan. 13, 1992, at 130 (agreeing
with Evergreen's position that the FCC's vague policies have a chilling effect on innovative and
sometimes controversial public interest programming). The Commission sent the matter to the
Department of Justice, which recently commenced a civil action for collection of the forfeiture.
See General Action; Commission Asks Justice Department to Initiate Civil Enforcement Pro-
ceedings Against WLUP(AM Chicago, IL, Report No. GH-90, 1992 FCC LEXIS 693 (Feb. 5,
1992); Joe Flint, WLUP (AM) Goes to Court, BROADCASTING, Aug. 24, 1992, at 10, Harry A.
Jessell, FCC Picks Up Pace on Indecency Enforcement, BROADCASTING, Aug. 31, 1992, at 25.
Evergreen recently has been fined another $33,750 for two additional broadcasts found indecent
by the FCC. W/LUP(AM) Chicago, 1993 FCC LEXIS 832 (Feb. 19, 1993).
234. Joe Flint, FCC Fines Stern $600K; OK's Deal, BROADCASTING, Dec. 21, 1992, at 5;
see also Joe Flint, Hounding Howard FCC's $100K Fine, BROADCASTING, Oct. 26, 1992, at 8
(describing similar decision by licensee of KLSX(FM)); supra text accompanying note 21.
235. The most prominent of the current groups are CLEAR TV, the Reverend Donald
Wildnion's National Federation for Decency, and Wildmon and Rev. Jerry Falwell's Coalition
for Better Television. TODD GITLIN, INSIDE PRIME TIME 250-52 (1983); Bruce Seicraig, Rev-
erend Wildmon's War on the Arts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 22; Steve
Weinstein, Back Into the Closet, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 7, 1991, at 5; see also PowE, supra note 3, at
572-73 (discussing the efforts of the National Decency Forum). In addition, Terry Rakoltas
Americans for Responsible TV, Morality in Media, Concerned Women of America, and the
American Family Association have become active on the indecency enforcement issue. See
Remarks of Commissioner James H. Quello Before the Arizona Broadcasters Association's
40th Annual Convention, 1992 FCC LEXIS 6242 (Nov. 6, 1992).
There is a history of anti-vice crusades in America during the nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries. See generally JOHN D'EMuio & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS:
A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 202-21 (1988); ROBERT W. HANEY, COMWOCKERY
IN AMERICA 84-96, 109-31 (1974); DAvID 3. PIVAR, PURITY CRUSADE: SEXUAL MORALITY
AND SOCIAL CONTROL, 1868-1900 (1973). Such crusades of moral order have often been asso-
ciated with religious groups. GITLIN, supra this note, at 250.
236. See GnrLIN, supra note 235, at 247-63; KATHRYN C. MONTGomEY, TARGET:
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use the Commission's processes in an effort to reform broadcast content. They
have pledged to monitor broadcast content for indecency2 37 and have sought
to drum up grass-roots support by using inflammatory newsletters to inform
concerned parents and other like-minded people about how to contact Con-
gressmen, the FCC, and broadcasters themselves in order to complain about
material they find inappropriate. 38
The FCC's ordinary processes reflect one clear effect of this interest
group activity. The FCC's indecency enforcement routine is driven by com-
plaints registered by private citizens. If a complaint about a station's broad-
cast is specific and substantiated with a transcript or tape of the allegedly
offending material, and if the Commission's enforcement staff believes that the
broadcast might trigger the Commission's indecency policy, the staff will send
a letter of inquiry to the broadcaster. If the Commission personnel are satis-
fied with the licensee's explanation, they typically will write a letter to the
complainant denying the complaint and explaining their rationale for doing
so. If, on the other hand, the staff finds merit in the complaint and there is no
justifying explanation from the broadcaster, the Commission will issue a No-
tice of Apparent Liability imposing a forfeiture on the broadcaster.239 The
broadcaster then has the opportunity to respond by demonstrating the inap-
propriateness or excessiveness of the forfeiture. 240 Thereupon, an order reduc-
PRIME TIME: ADVOCACY GROUPS AND THE STRUGGLE OVER ENTERTAINMENT TELEVISION
(1989); Weinstein, supra note 66, at 5.
237. See, eg., GrrLIN, supra note 235, at 251 (discussing Falwell and Wildmon's an-
nouncement of a campaign to scrutinize the network prime time schedule for "skin scenes,"
"sexual innuendo," "implied sexual intercourse," "profanity," and "violence"); Weinstein,
supra note 66, at 5.
238. In addition, one of their most common public tactics has been to threaten, organize,
and stage public boycotts of the products of advertisers associated with programming they find
offensive. GITLIN, supra note 235, at 250-52; C. Edwin Baker, Advertising and a Democratic
Press, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 2097, 2158-59 (1992) and sources cited therein. Recently Mennen,
Clorox, and Burger King have been targets of such boycotts. Weinstein, supra note 66, at 5.
The precise effects of such boycotts are difficult to measure, in large part because neither the
advertisers nor the broadcasters wish to admit that they have been pressured by the boycott to
change the content of programming. However, there is at least some evidence that these con-
servative groups' complaints are being taken seriously by the media and its advertisers. See,
eg., Mike Freeman, Ad Pullouts Making Agencies More Gun Shy, BROADCASTING, Sept. 2,
1991, at 32; Ronald Paul Hill & Andrea L. Beaver, Advocacy Groups and Television Advertisers,
J. OF ADVERTISING (1981); Kate Oberlander, Network Group Hits Boycotts, ELECTRONIC ME-
DIA, Aug. 5, 1991, at 4; Weinstein, supra note 66, at 5. But see Bill Carter, Advertisers Less
Skittish About Explicit Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1992, at Dl.
239. Under the Commission's rules, the Mass Media Bureau (MMB) has the authority to
investigate complaints and administer the Commission's established policies, 47 C.F.R.
§ 0.61(g) (1991), and, when delegated, the authority to order the imposition of sanctions, 47
U.S.C. § 155(c)(1) (1988). Such sanctions include the imposition of a monetary forfeiture. 47
C.F.R. § 1.80 (a)(4) (1991). The first step in the imposition of such a sanction is the issuance of
a Notice of Apparent Liability (NAL). 47 C.F.R. § 1.80(d), (f) (1991). For a popular descrip-
tion of the process, see How Indecency Process Works at FCC, BROADCASTING, Aug. 31, 1992,
at 24 (suggesting that the Commissioners themselves make the ultimate decisions in this area).
240. Upon receipt of such a NAL, the broadcaster must be given a reasonable time in
which to explain why the forfeiture is inappropriate or excessive. 47 C.F.R. § 1.80(d), (0(3)
(1991).
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ing or reaffirming the penalty and requiring payment may be issued pursuant
to Commission rules.24
Because the administrative process is triggered by complaints from
outside the Commission and the agency's own discretion is exercised only with
respect to its decision whether or not to investigate such complaints, those
who initiate grievances about broadcasters can reform broadcast content and,
if sufficiently organized and powerful, can use the Commission's own
processes to affect the shape and direction of the FCC's enforcement pro-
gram.242 - Opportunities abound for influence on the administrative process by
politically motivated, well-orchestrated groups or individuals who seek to
reshape what is broadcast over the airwaves according to their particular
moral visions.243
In addition to filing complaints through these official, public channels, 2"
decency groups have also sought to exert pressure on the FCC by picketing,
sending letters of protest,24 5 and engaging Congressional interest.246 While a
241. 47 C.F.R. § 1.80(0(4) (1991). In the meantime, any party aggrieved by the imposi-
tion of sanctions can apply to the Commission for review. The order does not become final until
the Commission affirms it. 47 U.S.C. § 155(c)(4) (1988). At that point, the broadcaster faces
several choices. One option is simply to pay the fine. Another possibility is to refuse to pay the
fine and force the government to commence a collection action in court, subjecting the whole
matter to a trial de novo. See discussion supra note 232.
242. While evidence suggests that conservative decency groups have helped the FCC steer
the anti-indecency bandwagon, competition may have spurred some broadcasters themselves to
join the decency campaign. Prior FCC indecency cases suggest that complaints about indecent
programming have sometimes been initiated not by citizen or morality groups, but by competi-
tive stations. After all, getting a licensee in trouble with the FCC can result in the imposition of
an onerous fine on the station, cutting into its economic prospects; can get the station to temper
its programming, thereby causing it to lose the audience it attracted; and can even cause the
station to lose its license in favor of a "purer" candidate. In line with these scenarios, the owner
of one of the most recent subjects of the FCC's indecency investigations has suggested that a
rival station orchestrated the FCC complaint and a letter to the station's advertisers. Harry A.
Jessell, FCC Puts Broadcasters On Notice for Indecency, BROADCASTING, Mar. 2, 1992, at 29.
243. The programmatic character of such reform efforts has been evident since Pacifica
itself. After all, Pacifica was prompted by a single complaint, made by a planning board mem-
ber of Morality in Media, a conservative media watchdog group. PoW.E, supra note 3, at 186
(suggesting that the complainant, as a resident of Florida, may not have heard the program).
The complaint arguably was part of an orchestrated attempt by the conservative group to si-
lence Pacifica for political reasons, rather than simply the personal "gut" reaction of an of-
fended parent.
244. See discussion infra at text accompanying notes 263-65.
245. For example, the Southern Baptist Convention this summer condemned "the moral
breakdown in our society," targeted the networks for promoting premarital sex, adultery, ho-
mosexuality, rape, and violence, and "encourage[d] all Christians to register their outrage and
opposition to this misuse of the public airways and cable access." Baptists See Moral Decay in
TV, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1992, at A13.
246. Congressional pressure on the FCC has been spearheaded by the ultra-conservative
Jesse Helms. Even before Congress passed any legislation requiring the Commission to adopt a
total ban on indecency, Helms quizzed then-Chairman Dennis Patrick in 1987 on his intentions
in the fight against indecency. Crigler & Brynes, supra note 36, at 353. Upon receiving Pat-
rick's response that a finding of indecency would be unlikely for indecent programming broad-
cast after midnight, Helms orchestrated the adoption in 1988 of a total indecency ban rider to
an appropriations bill. Id.; see also 134 CONG. REc. S9911-12 (daily ed. July 26, 1988) (remarks
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precise causal link between their activities and the FCC's adoption and en-
forcement of its indecency standards cannot simply be assumed, it is likely
that these groups have come to wield widespread influence,247 at least to the
extent of enhancing the Commission's sensitivity to socially conservative
views.
The Commission's renewed interest in indecency commenced in June
1986, when various conservative decency groups pickted the FCC's offices and
urged letter-writing campaigns in order to protest then-Chairman Mark
Fowler's renomination.248 Subsequently, concerned about Alfred Sikes' com-
mitment to aggressive enforcement of the indecency policy, conservative de-
cency groups engaged in demonstrations against his nomination for
Chairmanship of the agency. 24 9 Chairman Sikes thereafter emerged as an ag-
gressive regulator in the area of indecency.250 Commissioner Ervin Duggan,
who currently serves on the Commission and has made clear his intransigent
of Sen. Helms, quoting letter from then-Chairman Patrick). Characterizing indecent material
as "trash" and "garbage," Helms cited the VCR as proof of the availability of indecent material
to children at any time of the day or night. Id. Most recently, Helms joined the American
Family Association in writing to the FCC to request that it deny Infinity Corporation's pro-
posed purchase of three additional radio stations in major markets on the ground that Infinity
might cause its Howard Stem programming to be aired on the stations. Joe Flint, Hounding
Howard: FCC's $100K Fine, BROADCASTING, Oct. 26, 1992, at 8 [hereinafter Flint, Hounding
Howard]. Although the Commission ultimately decided to approve the purchase, it did so
against vociferous dissent by then-Chairman Sikes. Joe Flint, FCC Fines Stern $600K; OK's
Deal, BROADCASTING, Dec. 21, 1992, at 5 [hereinafter Flint, FCC Fines Stern $600K].
247. On the increasing influence of the religious right generally, see, e.g., DIAMOND, supra
note 69; RODNEY A. SMOLLA, JERRY FALWELL V. LARRY FLYNT: THE FIRST AMENDMENT
ON TRIAL 124-32 (1988). Indeed, the Republican party's adoption of its extraordinarily con-
servative platform on abortion during last summer's convention is evidence of the seriousness
with which religious social conservatives have come to be considered by the rest of Washington.
248. Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 36, at 344-45; Fowler Target of Group, COMM. DAILY,
June 6, 1986, at 9. Far from ignoring the complaints, the otherwise deregulatory and market-
oriented Chairman Fowler and the Commission's General Counsel met on several occasions in
the summer of 1986 with representatives of the National Decency Forum and Morality in Me-
dia. The National Decency Forum agreed to discontinue its planned picketing if the Commis-
sion would "cooperate" on indecency investigations and actions. Crigler & Byrnes, supra note
36, at 345 (quoting letter from Brad Curl of the National Decency Forum). Morality in Media
even provided a memorandum outlining the legal arguments in support of a 24-hour ban on
indecency over the air. Id. at 345. The Commission's General Counsel then told Morality in
Media to pass on to its supporters the suggestion that they tape or provide transcripts of broad-
cast material they found offensive. Id. The FCC General Counsel also wrote to the Reverend
Wildmon in late 1986, discouraging him from filing a complaint with regard to a particular
televised movie, on the ground that he did not think the complaint "present[ed] the kind of air-
tight case that you want to push at this time." Id. at 346 (quoting Sept. 19, 1986 letter from
FCC General Counsel John B. Smith to Donald E. Wildmon, Executive Director, National
Federation for Decency).
249. See, eg., Religious Right Up in Arms Over FCC Nominees, BROADCASTING, July 31,
1989, at 48 (describing fundamentalists' objections, directed at White House, over FCC nomi-
nations); Anti-Indecency Groups Set to Protest Sikes Nomination Monday, COMM. DAILY, July
28, 1989, at 1. Alfred Sikes was appointed Chairman of the Commission after the tenure of
Dennis Patrick, who had followed Mark Fowler as chair. Chairman Sikes resigned this year, to
be replaced by Commissioner Quello as interim Chairman.
250. See Sikes the Enforcer, BROADCASTING, Feb. 12, 1990, at 24.
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opposition to indecency on the air, was supported in his nomination by vocal
groups of religious conservatives. 51 Even acting Chairman Quello, often per-
ceived as a friend of broadcasters in the context of deregulation, also has
staked out a rather strong anti-indecency position in public statements.z
4. Application of the New Standard
In light of Congressional pressure, decency group intervention, and the
Commissioners' own expressed disapproval of indecency, the agency's increas-
ingly aggressive enforcement regime after 1987 is unsurprising.13 At the
start, the agency focused on explicit sex talk in connection with non-main-
stream radio broadcasting and hostile shock radio. The Commission selected
"send a message" cases that would be used to break the news on the change in
indecency standards.2" 4 Two of the three initial broadcast cases involved pro-
gramming on non-profit, alternative stations: KCSB-FM, a college station,
had aired a punk rock song called Makin' Bacon, by the now-defunct Pork
Dukes," 5 and KPFK, a non-profit station owned by the progressive Pacifica
251. Duggan Sails through Senate, BROADCASTING, Feb. 12, 1990 at 20, see also Flint,
Hounding Howard, supra note 246, at 8.
252. See Flint, Hounding Howard, supra note 246, at 8 (quoting high-level FCC staffer's
view that Quello and Duggan are "hardliners" on indecency); Harry A. Jessell, Quello Lauds
'Marketplace' Curbs on Indecency, BROADCASTING, Jan. 27, 1992, at 39.
253. Although this Article will not describe in detail all of the FCC's enforcement actions
since 1987, it will directly and extensively quote the challenged material of some typical cases.
The purpose of such quotations is not to achieve a prurient effect; rather, I hope to provide a
detailed and concrete sense of what is at stake in the Commission's indecency enforcement
actions. I seek to do so not only to demonstrate the broad range of the FCC's enforcement, but
also to give pause to those who would, in the abstract, stake out an absolutist position on the
issue. I, like Judge Leventhal in his dissent from the circuit court decision in Pacifica, "think it
important, especially because so many may be disposed to consider the matter in absolutist
terms, to know what material it is that the Commission has held was improperly broadcast."
Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Leventhal, J., dissenting), rev'd,
438 U.S. 726 (1978).
254. Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 36, at 345 (quoting FCC General Counsel Jack Smith).
255. The song, Makin' Bacon, involved explicit sexual references:
Makin' bacon, makin' bacon, makin' bacon, makin' bacon
[Inaudible]
A ten-inch cropper with a varicose vein
Makin' bacon is on my mind
Come here baby, make it quick,
Kneel down there and suck on my dick
Makin' bacon is on my mind
Get down baby on your hands and knees
Take my danish and give it a squeeze
Makin! bacon is on my mind
Makin' bacon is on my mind
Turn around baby, let me take you from behind....
In re Regents of the University of California (KCSB-FM), 2 F.C.C.R. 2703, 2703 (1987). The
song was part of a small, equally explicit musical output by a little-known British punk band
recording in 1977 and 1978. INTERNATIONAL NEv VAVE DISCOGRAPHY 318 (B. George &
Martha Defoe eds., 1982).
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Foundation, had broadcast a reading from a critically acclaimed play called
Jerker, about post-AIDS gay phone sex.256 The third enforcement action in
1987 was taken against commercial radio station WYSP(FM) for its broadcast
of segments of the controversial Howard Stem shock radio program.2" 7 In
repartee that can most kindly be described as abusive, misogynistic, and
homophobic, Stem had discussed matters ranging from testicles to
bestiality. 25 8
Both KCSB and KPFK were known in their markets for playing non-
commercial material. The excerpts from Jerker were read during an explicitly
gay program catering to a gay audience on an educational station.2 9 Simi-
larly, college radio stations are often experimental, cater to progressive listen-
ers, and number very few children in their audiences. 2 ° In both cases, the
material was aired after 10:00 p.m. 261 Also in both cases, the sexual references
and descriptions were graphic and explicit. WYSP-FM's broadcast of the
Howard Stem programs, in contrast to the alternative programming in the
other two cases, took place in the morning and involved widely popular main-
stream programming. The Stern material was not as explicit in its sexual de-
scriptions but was intended to be controversial and even offensive.262
Three particulars stand out with regard to these enforcement actions.
256. The broadcast of Jerker included, inter alia, the following language in the first
vignette: "Yeah, it was loving even if you didn't know whose cock it was in the dark or whose
asshole you were sucking." In re Pacifica Found., Inc. (KPFK), 2 F.C.C.R. 2698, 2700 (1987).
This was followed by a descriptive exchange of what the Commission noted as "an anonymous
sexual encounter:"
He lowered himself on top of me and slid his dick in all the way, but so gently, so
smoothly, there wasn't even a bit of pain.... Well, he must have gone at it for twenty
minutes at the very least, just slidin' his cock back and forth inside of my ass. And
then he whispered to me, "You're gonna feel me come inside of you." And I did.
Man, I could feel the cum pulse up his shaft inside of my ass. I could count the pulses
and it felt warm and good.
Id. In the third excerpt found objectionable by the Commission, the characters changed atti-
tude: "None of this nicey-nice, lovey-dovey stuff. I want to make you eat ass, suck my balls,
and drink my piss like you never have before. You get me?" "Hot throbbing cocks, hard
pounding muscles." Id.
257. In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp. (WYSP(FM)), 2 F.C.C.R. 2705 (1987).
258. For example, as part of a "discussion of lesbians," Stern said: "I mean[,] to go
around perking other girls with vibrating rubber products and they want the whole world to
come to a standstill." Id. at 2706. On bestiality, he said: "Well, don't knock it. I was
sodomized by Lambchop, you know that puppet Sherri Lewis holds?" In the process of insult-
ing one of his female callers, he said: "Let me tell you something, honey. These homos you are
with are all limp.... You've probably never been with a man with a full erection." Id.
259. Pacifica Foundation, 2 F.C.C.R. at 2698.
260. On the limited audience for alternative college radio (even within the college context
itself), see Jonathan Gaw, Campus Radio Station is on an 'Alternative' Wavelength, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 17, 1990, at Part E, 5B; Linda Moss, Offbeat Slices of Life Float Over the Airwaves, CRAIN'S
N.Y. Bus., Aug. 21, 1989, at 3; Kevin Zimmerman, Schizoid College Rock: Hip Radio, Safe
Acts, VARIETY, Aug. 16-22, 1989, at 67.
261. In re Pacifica Found., Inc. (KPFK-FM), 2 F.C.C.R. 2698 (1987); In re Infinity
Broadcasting Corp. (WYSP-FM), 2 F.C.C.R. 2705 (1987); In re The Regents of the University
of California (KCSB-FM) 2 F.C.C.R. 2703, 2704 (1987).
262. See, eg., Goldstein, supra note 12, at 3.
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First, they reflect the extent to which sexually explicit talk had come to per-
vade both mainstream and minority cultures. Second, they suggest the Com-
mission's belief that focusing on such explicit discussions of sexuality in
controversial programming would render its decision to crack down on inde-
cency non-controversial. Finally, they cement the connection between the
FCC's 1987 change of course and the influence of the social right wing. Spe-
cifically, all three actions were brought to the FCC's attention by members of
decency groups or their sympathizers: WYSP-FM's broadcast of the Howard
Stem show was brought to the Commission's attention by Mary Keeley, a
supporter of Morality in Media.263 Patrick Buchanan, then-White House
Communications Director, directed the complaint about KCSB's broadcast of
Makin' Bacon to the Commission after the individual complainant had sent
his charge to the Parents Music Resource Center, which forwarded it to the
White House.2 The complaint against the broadcast of Jerker on Pacifica's
KPFK was made by Larry Poland, an "evangelistic minister and Christian
entrepreneur." 265
The enforcement guidelines immediately led to an atmosphere of con-
straint on the broadcast of controversial and sexual expression, especially on
alternative and public stations.266 The new indecency approach thus has fos-
tered an atmosphere in which some popular material is simply excluded by
stations themselves. This has meant that most radio stations have steered
clear of playing the unedited versions of numerous popular raps, ranging from
N.W.A.'s political anthem Fuck the Police2 7 to 2 Live Crew's As Nasty As
They Wanna Be, with its comment that "[b]itches think a pussy can do it all/
So we try real hard just to bust the wall." '268
A constrained attitude on the part of broadcasters cannot but be influ-
enced by yet another factor: the recent change in the Commission's schedule
263. Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 36, at 345.
264. Id. at 345-46.
265. Dennis McDougal, How 'Jerker' Helped Ignite Obscenity Debate, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
18, 1987, Part 6, at 1. Similarly, the sanction subsequently imposed by the Commission on the
Miami stations airing Neil Rogers' shock radio show was sparked by an ultra-conservative
Coral Gables attorney. See Christina Cheakalos, News: Feds to the Rescuel Foul Mouthed Ra-
dio Doomed, NEv TIMES, Nov. 8-14, 1989, at 4; discussion infra note 293 and accompanying
text.
The eflect of the right did not stop there; for example, the fine imposed by the Commission
on WNDE and WFBQ for the broadcast of innuendo-laden parodies on the Bob and Tom Show
in Great American Television and Radio Co. (WFBQ(FM) and WVNDE(AM)), 6 F.C.C.R. 3692
(1990), see infra note 296, resulted from a complaint filed by John Price, a founder of Decency
in Broadcasting. DAILY DIG., July 25, 1990.
266. See Robert Corn-Revere, Regulation By Raised Eyebrow, STUDENT LAW., Feb. 1988,
at 26, 29; David Crook, KPFK Watching Its Language Now, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 30, 1987, Part 6,
at 1; Dennis McDougal, Radio Daze: FCC Moves Indecency Issue to Front Burner, LA. TIMES,
Aug. 17, 1987, Part 6, at 1; Chuck Philips, "'Decency Day" to Air a Free Speech Marathon, L.A.
TmEs, Mar. 2, 1991, at F8; Radio Station Censors ItselfAfter F. C Action, N.Y. TmEs, Apr.
25, 1987, § 1, at 54; see also Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 36, at 359, 361-63.
267. NELSON & GONZALES, supra note 138, at 108.
268. Crenshaw, Beyond Racism, supra note 157, at 6, 30.
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of fines, from a base of $2,000 per violation to a base of $12,500 (up to
$25,000) per violation.269 In light of the FCC's narrow interpretation of "vio-
lation," its increasing tendency to impose large sums in fines, and its potential
imposition of multiple fines for networked or syndicated programming, the
cost of playing with fire in the indecency area likely will be heavy indeed.
Despite the immediately constraining effect of the Commission's new in-
decency approach on some stations, certain of the mainstream commercial
station personnel continued their attempts to resist the FCC's crackdown on
sex talk after 1987, either by simply playing sexually referential music without
sexualized banter or by using humorous innuendo to "get around" the newly
announced standards.
Having announced its new approach in connection with rather explicit
sexual references, the Commission then expanded its enforcement actions
against increasingly indirect and coded references to sexuality. A number of
stations were fined by the Commission for the content of their mainstream
shock, Morning Zoo,270 rock, and talk radio programs.271 The programs that
raised the Commission's hackles after the three 1987 enforcement actions have
varied as to the explicitness, character, tone, and quantity of their sexual refer-
ences. Recent reports of Commission action - consisting, for example, of a
fine for the single utterance of the word "shit" on a morning radio program -
suggest an increasing scope and stringency in the agency's interpretation of its
269. See Standards for Assessing Forfeitures, 6 F.C.C.R. 4695 (1991).
270. "Morning Zoo" programs, while generally classifiable as part of shock radio because
of their outrageousness, see supra note 61, were designed to be less confrontational and shocking
than the prototypical shock radio interview program. The typical morning zoo format consists
of zany, spontaneous, and humorous banter among a number of announcers and audience call-
ers. See Daley, supra note 12, at 1 (describing the wide spectrum of shock radio, ranging from
"bathroom humor" to material that "carries a much harder edge"); Goldstein, supra note 12, at
3, 4 (describing the programming approaches of various "shock jocks").
271. While the Commission did receive complaints and undertake investigations in con-
nection with television programming, virtually all of the agency's enforcement activity focused
on radio stations (as might be expected from the greater format diversity of the medium.). This
is true despite the fact that visually explicit material commonly has an immediate and strong
visceral impact on the viewer. The Commission has not found television to be de facto exempt
from indecency inquiries, however. In 1988, the Commission sought to impose a $2,000 forfei-
ture on Kansas City's KZKC(TV) for airing a nude side shot of the female protagonist in the
movie "Private Lessons." (The forfeiture ultimately was vacated because of questions about the
FCC's authority to enforce its ban.) Doug Halonen, FCC Fines K. C. Station $2,000for Broad-
casting Indecent Film, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, June 27, 1988, at 3; In re Kansas City Television,
Ltd,, 4 F.C.C.R. 6706 (1989) (Order Vacating Proceeding). The film, which aired at 8:00 p.m.,
appears to have been a coming-of-age story concerning the seduction of a young man by his
governess; see also Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 36, at 349 (describing the film and the Commis-
sion's failure to act on an earlier complaint about the same film on a different station).
The Commission is also reportedly inquiring into complaints about indecency in 2 Live
Crew, Enigma, and Michael Jackson music videos. Closed Circuit, BROADCASTING, Mar. 2,
1992, at 17. The BROADCASTING article suggests that the FCC has received indecency com-
plaints about Spokane and San Jose stations' broadcast of 2 Live Crew's Me So Horny and Pop
That Coochie music videos, about the Spokane station's broadcast of Enigma's Principles ofLust
music video, and about the Fox network's broadcast of Michael Jackson's Black and White
video. Id.
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anti-indecency mandate.272
Post-1987 indecency enforcement by the FCC has swept into its net, for
example, broadcasts of Uncle Bonsai's feminist satire Penis Envy, protests by
women about the fact that "the men never have to sleep in the wet spot," and
song parodies whose references to "the cop who carries a big night stick/it's
just an extension of his wick" have a political edge.27 It also has punished
shock radio programming, whose content consists largely of homophobic "hu-
mor" ranging from pedophilia in song parodies like Kiddie Porn to jokes like
"the doctors gave Liberace six more weeks to live... [b]ecause a gerbil came
out of his butt and saw his shadow."'274
Even within the shock radio genre, the Commission has enforced its rule
against both tame and more risk-taking sorts of programming. 275 For exam-
ple, after the 1987 warning, Howard Stern became the subject of a second
enforcement action by the FCC in connection with an abusive and
homophobic skit about a Christmas party in which someone allegedly played
the piano with his penis.276 Stem's "dwelling on sexual matters" with "lewd
and vulgar" references to sexual activities and organs "made in a pandering
272. See Jessell, supra note 252, at 39 and infra text accompanying notes 300-01. Admit-
tedly, although the Commission has imposed a comparatively large number of monetary forfeit-
ures for violations of § 1464, it has not thus far denied a license renewal on indecency grounds.
See In re Jacor Broadcasting of Tampa Bay, Inc., 7 F.C.C.R. 1826 (1992) (denying informal
objection by competitor to license renewal of station which aired the words "suck" and "useless
piece of crap" in connection with complainant).
273. The Commission imposed sanctions on broadcasters who aired the satirical alterna-
tive hit Penis Envy by the popular Seattle feminist group, Uncle Bonsai. In re WIOD, 6
F.C.C.R. 3704 (1989); Guy Gannett Publishing (,VZTA-FM), 5 F.CC.R. 7688 (1990); see also
infra notes 395-96.
274. KCNA(FM), 6 F.C.C.R. 2174, 2175 (1991).
275. The post-1987 enforcement actions focused, by and large, on disc jockey-driven radio
programming rather than music per se. Despite a dispute as to whether Prince's Erotic City
used the word "fuck" or "funk," the Commission took administrative notice of the use of the
offending word and issued a forfeiture order against Las Vegas, Nevada's KLUC-FM for airing
the song at 7:53 a.m. Nationwide Communications (KLUC-FM), 6 F.C.C.R. 3695 (1990). In
fact, it appears that the only non-parodistic songs which have subjected broadcasters to FCC
fines are those which use expletives or consist of non-mainstream references to sexuality. For
example, the Commission found indecent a Miami shock radio program's broadcast of the song
Jet GirL Jet Boy, which refers to oral sex between men and laments the unfaithfulness of the
singer's male lover. In re WIOD, 6 F.C.C.R. 3704 (1989). Both Penis Envy and Jet Boy, Jet
Girl used commonly known terminology to refer to sexual organs and oral sex.
To confuse matters, the Commission dismissed a complaint about the broadcast, by
KSHE-FM, Crestwood, Missouri, of a Lou Reed song from his NEN' YORK album. The song
contained lines such as "Give me your tired, your poor/I'll piss on them" and "the TV whores
are calling the cops out for a suck." Passing Grades Surveying the FCC's Sense of Decency,
BROADCASrING, Nov. 6, 1989, at 36 [hereinafter Passing Grades]. However, the ground for
dismissal is unclear and might well have been jurisdictional.
276. We're back at the Christmas Party... and I gotta tell you it's wild in here.
Robin... the guy who plays the piano with his wiener is here now.
(Gay choir)
We got two gay guys and a heavy-set woman lesbian (Negro). Remember you're
on the radio, will you honey? I get called a fag hag. Have you ever had a man? Have
you been with a man? Disappointment, hell. Oh, you like it? Well, it's not just a
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and titillating fashion" led to a 1990 forfeiture against WXRK(FM),
WYSP(FM), and WJFK(FM) for a program aired in 1988.277 The most
recent Howard Stern programming targeted on KLSX(FM)278 and Infinity
stations WYSP(FM), WXRK(FM), and WJFK(FM),2 7 9 covering twelve
broadcasts, was deemed by the Commission to contain "egregious" mate-
rial,280 ranging from statements like "I've done stuff to myself and thought
about you" (said to a guest) to a promise that with Michelle Pfeiffer, Stem
"would not even need a vibrator.... Boy, her rump would be more black and
blue than a Harlem cub scout."28' The Commission also issued a Notice of
Apparent Liability to KFI-AM for various call-in statements during the Tom
Leykis Show,182 ranging from relatively explicit references to sex acts (such as
one caller's description of an occasion during which she "gave head" to her
lover and another caller's confession that she masturbated her dog) to slightly
more coded discussions of celebrity penis size and oral sex.283
By contrast, WWWE(AM) was fined $8,000 in 1990 for five excerpts of
preference. It just doesn't turn me on as much.., you gotta be glad about the 5-
minute AIDS test. Now you guys can test each other and then hop into the sack.
What is it that men don't find me attractive?.., men who find other men attrac-
tive.., my uh?... your small penis probably ....
How about this? 'A Tuckis So Bright'? (Gay choir) - 'I'm dreaming of some
light torture, some bruises just to make me moan... Masturbate. Humiliate. Gay sex
is fun in the city. Howard Stern is going to learn how great a tuckis can be ...."
(To Robin, about to be hypnotized by Dr. Marshall King) Just think about this.
Every time I rub my ear, you'll be orgasming....
'Bo, you look great. Yes... Bo... getting very aggressive. Bo just rubbed
herself in my face. Juliet (one of the naked girls) getting wild. Oh, my God. Diane
(another naked girl) is whipping Bo. Good, girls, excellent. The big black lesbian is
out of her mind with lust. Look at her. You can't say it on the air? Were you getting
excited? Fabulous. All right. That was really good. Best part of the whole Christmas
Party."
Sagittarius Broadcasting, 5 F.C.C.R. 7291, 7293-94 (1990).
277. Id. at 7291.
278. Greater Los Angeles Radio, Inc. (KLSX(FM)), 1992 FCC LEXIS 6082 (Oct. 27,
1992) (Letter Opinion).
279. See Joe Flint, FCC Fines Stern $600K, supra note 246, at 5. This fine on the Infinity
stations is for the same programming as led to the forfeiture against KLSX(FM).
280. KLSX(FM), 1992 FCC LEXIS at 6084.
281. Id.; see also Joe Flint, Where the FCC Draws the Line, BROADCASTING, Nov. 2, 1992,
at 56 (excerpting some of the numerous pages of the KLSX(FM) transcript). In various refer-
ences to Pee-Wee Herman, for example, Stern expressed dismay at the fantasy of "go[ing] to the
movie theater and ... sitting in Pee-Wee's mess;" suggested that the comedian be given the
sentence of "scrub[bing] the theatre seats where guys drop their load;" and noted that, although
"I... am the head of the masturbation club.., and am totally devoted to masturbation[,] ...
to [masturbate] twice in ten minutes is unbelievable." Id. Stem also lashed out at his competi-
tion, the Mark and Brian Show, during the targeted KLSX programming. Having character-
ized the announcers on the show as "two little pussies with dildos," Stern said: "I want to just
strip and rape Mark and Brian. I want my two bitches laying there in the cold, naked.... I
want them bleeding from the buttocks." Id.
282. KFI, Inc., 6 F.C.C.R. 3699 (1989).
283. In the first broadcast, the discussion of masturbation consisted of the female caller's
confession and the disc jockey's subsequent attempts to press her for more details, including
whether the caller's dog "made any noise" when she masturbated him, whether she enjoyed
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the Gary Dee Show, a call-in personality program much tamer than the How-
ard Stern program or the Tom Leykis show. Although they did not have the
sexual detail of some of the shock radio discussions of sex, and although the
announcer made clear that there were limits to acceptable discourse when he
excoriated one caller for a sexual proposition directed at another an-
nouncer,2 the offending segments of the Dee show referred to masturbation,
fellatio, and attemptedly humorous but absurd discussions of the results of
moving sexual organs to other places on the body.28
Similarly, in 1991, WVIC-FM of East Lansing, Michigan, was fined for
broadcasting segments of the Michaels in the Morning Show, in which the an-
nouncer asked listeners to come up with a headline for a tabloid news story
about a man whose testicle was pulled down a hot tub drain on his honey-
moon.2" 6 The Mass Media Bureau found the show indecent, citing the "ex-
plicit vulgar language" used on the show, 287 the "pandering and titillating"
presentation and the fact that on-air talent "repeatedly solicited audience con-
doing so, and whether the dog "ever reciprocate[d]" the masturbatory activities. Id at 3699-
3700.
The later broadcasts involved briefer interactions. In response to the question "what is the
grossest thing you have ever put in your mouth?," one female caller referred to "anteater
smegma," having distinguished men on the basis of whether they were "anteaters" or "firemen's
hats." In a less coded vein, the announcer interviewed the founder of the "Hung Jury," who
explained that "when a limp penis is short... it can sometimes go twice [its flaccid] length."
He opined that women thought "size did make a difference to their vaginal opening, to their
clitoral stimulation," and then informed the audience as to the prodigious penis sizes of Warren
Beatty, Milton Berle, and Lyndon Johnson. Id. at 3699-701.
284. Tlie exchange was reported as follows:
Caller: "Gary, I have a comment to make and then I want to tell you what my dream
and my goal was for me in life."
Gary D: "Excellent."
Caller: "My comment is Lou told me that Chris James gives fellatio okay. Now my
dream... is to get in Chris James' pants."
Gary D: "Well, why don't you be a man and go down there and say that to her face.
You know, you are just like a little kid masturbating in public. You've got no class,
you've got no taste."
Independent Group Limited Partnership (WWE-AM1), 6 F.C.C.R. 3711, 3712 (1990).
285. Id. At one point, the disc jockey commented: "But you know, when God in his
infinite wisdom, you know, but to me the missionary position is sort of funny. It's sort of weird.
And it would be a lot easier if we did have our organs, our sexual organs, on our elbow and you
could, you know....' The caller replied, "it would make normal things a lot more fun, like
driving and... shopping." Id
286. In re Goodrich Broadcasting, Inc. (WVIC-FM), 6 F.C.C.R. 7484 (1991). The licen-
see mounted a two-pronged attack on the FCC's finding of indecency. First, it claimed that
since no new safe harbor had been set up pursuant to the latest court mandate in ACT 1II
(referred to in Goodrich as ACTI1), the Commission had no jurisdiction to impose a forfeiture.
Second, the station challenged whether the program was indecent, claiming that it was not
patently offensive, pandering, or titillating in that the reference to the sexual organ had taken
place in the context of a news story (thereby suggesting that it should not be deemed indecent).
aI.; see also In re Goodrich Broadcasting, Inc. (WVIC-INF), 6 F.C.C.R. 2178 (1991) (Notice of
Apparent Liability).
287. Id. The language included the words "ball," "nuts," "jewel," and "suck." Most were
attempts to make bad puns, like "gonad done gone" and "honeymoon couple has a ball in a hot
tub." The Notice of Apparent Liability focused on the following headlines: "man ties knot,
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tributions in the same vein. '  Also less explicit, intense, and sex-packed
than the Howard Stern programming targeted by the FCC was a KCNA-FM
broadcast of two jokes found indecent by the Commission in 1990.2s9 Most
recently, the Commission imposed sanctions on WLUP(AM) for the broad-
cast of a discussion with a caller about penis size on the Steve and Garry Show
and the broadcast of a Kevin Matthews Show in which the announcer sang a
parody of Frankie Avalon's Venus by substituting the word "penis."29
As is evident in these descriptions, the Commission has increasingly at-
tacked language that can be characterized as innuendo or double entendre,
rather than focusing its regulatory attention only on clear and graphic descrip-
tions of sexual or excretory organs or activities. Although double entendre led
the FCC to investigate indecency in the early days of broadcasting,291 such
humor was not at significant risk of FCC sanction after the mid-1950s. In
1976, for example, the Commission staff received an indecency complaint
about the broadcast of a song called Butter Boy and the use of the name
"Pussy Galore" for a character in the James Bond film Goldfinger and con-
cluded that "[t]he words used, at the worst, are double entendres or innuen-
dos. It is, therefore, the staff's view that the language used is not "patently
offensive," as that phrase is employed by the Commission.... 292
The Commission's approach to double entendre now focuses on whether
the reference's sexual aspect is understandable. In other words, if a word has
two meanings, the Commission asks whether the sexual meaning is clearly
understandable and predominant. Since 1987, many of the FCC's indecency
loses nut," "drain sucks off man," "honeymoon drains testicle," "man falls victim to ball
sucker," and "man gets ball sucked on honeymoon." Id.
288. The Mass Media Bureau's Notice of Apparent Liability stated that the broadcast was
pandering and suggestive in tone, but that it would be indecent even if it were not. Id. On
review, the opinion did not address this point. In re Goodrich Broadcasting, Inc. (WVIC-FM),
6 F.C.C.R. at 7484.
289. A forfeiture was imposed on KCNA-FM in 1990 for two 1989 broadcasts of the Guy
Kemp Show, another personality program in which the announcer had an abusive on-air style.
Sound Broadcasting Corp. (KCNA-FM), 6 F.C.C.R 2174 (1991). The station aired a tape of a
telephone conversation by Guy Kemp containing expletives and explicit "dirty words," used to
express anger and not to refer to matters sexual. In addition, the station aired epithet-laden
insults by a caller on three occasions. In a sexual reference more typical to these sorts of shows,
the KCNA announcer made thinly disguised homosexual jokes about Liberace and allowed a
caller to tell a tasteless joke about female urination. 6 F.C.C.R. at 2175-77. With regard to the
vulgar programming, the Mass Media Bureau focused on the following joke: "How come a
woman farts after she pisses? She can't shake it off." Id. at 2175.
290. WLUP(AM) Hit With Second Indecency Fine, BROADCASTING, Feb. 22, 1993, at 6.
291. The most famous of such early FCC investigations concerned the redoubtable Mae
West. In 1937, West caused an outcry by reading an apparently innocent script about Adam
and Eve on the Edgar Bergen show with her usual plummy tones and suggestive innuendo. See,
e.g., MAcDONALD, supra note 170, at 106-07; Stephen E. Louis, Broadcasting Offensive Pro-
gramming Under a New Communications Act, 15 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 427, 442-43
(1980). Similarly, the Commission investigated CBS and the Blue network for their broadcast
of "suggestive" Spanish songs in the mid-1930s. H. P. WARNER, RADIO AND TELEVISION
LAW § 34a, at 337 (1948).
292. Letter to Norman Markovitz, 74 F.C.C.2d 613, 614 (June 3, 1976).
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findings have involved precisely this sort of humorous innuendo. For exam-
ple, shock jock Neil Rogers' The Candy [Virapper and the Butch Beer com-
mercial parody were constructed entirely of puns and lightly coded double
entendre. The song used the names of common candies to make sexual allu-
sions, and the ad parody consisted of plays on words based on slang references
to lesbian sex.293 The Commission opined that the references to sexual activi-
ties were clear, despite their implicit character,294 and stated that humor is not
a defense to a claim of indecency.2 95 Thereafter, the agency consistently im-
posed forfeitures for broadcasts of double entendres whose sexual meanings
were "clearly understandable" and "inescapable" even though the language
consisted only of indirect sexual references, metaphors, and slang.296 The
double entendres at issue in the cases have varied, some being more elaborate
and offensive than others. 97
293. The Rogers program had featured Jet Boy Jet Girl, Penis Envy, the Candy Wrapper
Song, and Walk with an Erection on various days in 1988. Cox Enterprises, Inc. (In re WIOD),
6 F.C.C.R. 3704 (1991). Both Penis Envy and Jet Boy Jet Girl used commonly known termi-
nology to refer to sexual organs and oral sex. The other songs were more circumspect.
The Candy Wrapper Song was a morality tale of sorts:
It was another Payday. I was tired of being a Mr. Goodbar. So when I saw Miss
Hershey standing behind the Powerhouse on the corner of Clark and Fifth Avenue, I
whipped out my Whopper and whispered, "Hey Sweet Tart. How'd you like to
Crunch on my Big Hunk for a Million Dollar Bar?"
She immediately went down on my Tootsie Roll and, you know, it was like pure
Almond Joy....
I was giving it to her Good 'N' Plenty, when all of a sudden, my Star Burst. Yeah, as
luck would have it, she started to grow a bit Chunky and complained of her Wrigley
in her stomach. Sure enough, nine months later, out popped a Baby Ruth.
Id at 3706.
The Butch Beer Commercial was a homophobic ad parody of Busch beer.
Introducing Butch beerl The first beer brewed for women by women. When you grab
a Butch beer, you're taking hold of the Billie Jean King of beers .... With Butch
beer, you've got a beer that goes down easy. Taste it and you'll know why it's our
personal best... Go grab a Butch beer, it goes down quicker... The taste you'll
savor. Go grab a Butch Beer - it's tuna flavor.... Brewed by Ann Howser Bush,
French Lick, Indiana, a Division of Tie One On Industries, Beaver Falls,
Pennsylvania.
d at 3706-07.
294. Id at 3706 ("[N]otwithstanding the use of candy bar names to symbolize sexual ac-
tivities, the titillating and pandering nature of the song makes any thought of candy bars periph-
eral at best. Thus... the song's description of sexual activities is the primary focus."); see also
In re Guy Gannett Publishing Co., WZTA(FM), 5 F.C.C.R. 7688, 7689 (1990).
295. In re WIOD, 6 F.C.C.R. 3704, 3704 (1991) (holding that the humorous nature of
broadcast material does not lessen its patent offensiveness and citing the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Pacifica).
296. For example, a total forfeiture of SI0,00 was imposed on the licensee of WFBQ(FM)
and WNDE(AM) for broadcasts on the Bob and Tom Show in 1987 and 1989. The 1987 broad-
cast like the Neil Rogers show on WIOD in Miami, involved the airing of the Butch Beer
product parody and The Candy [Wirapper Song. The later broadcasts included two other par-
ody songs called Dick & Jane and Stroke Your Dingy. Great American Television and Radio
Co. (WFBQ(FM) and WNDE(AM)), 6 F.C.C.R. 3692 (1990).
297. For example, the Commission recently has focused an investigation on WWZZ(FM)
of Karns, Tennessee, in connection with the broadcast of a punning promotional announce-
ment. FCC Puts Broadcasters on Notice for Indecency, BROADCASTING, Mar. 2, 1992, at 29-30.
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Finally, the Commission's recent actions suggest an increasing initiation
The station's promo ridiculed a rival radio station by discussing its shrinking "testicles" and
told listeners that "[i]t takes balls to rock hard; Z-93 - we keep it harder, longer." Id. at 29.
In 1990, the Commission sent a Notice of Apparent Liability for forfeiture to San Jose's
KSJO-FM for nine separate 1988 broadcasts of the Perry Stone Show, a shock radio program.
Narragansett Broadcasting Co. of California, 5 F.C.C.R. 3821 (1990). They consisted, inter
alia, of two puns recounted by callers, one abusive excretory exchange, and several parodies
ranging in subject from horror movies to classical music compilation ads. The ad parodies were
a trailer for a "horror" movie ("Coming soon, S & M pictures presents, Pecker .... This
Pecker is long and hard and waiting to pounce from the bush"); and an ad for a compilation of
classical music "performed in true Dolby stereo with complete fellatio .... Order today and
get a free Beethoven bib"; and an ad for the "Rodgo foreskin garage opener." Id at 3822. The
excretory exchange involved the disc jockey telling a caller that he'd "like to have a smorgas-
bord in [her] butt. .. " Id. The so-called puns consisted of a song called Sore Pussy; a joke
defining "relative humidity" as "the sweat running down your sister's back when you're doing
her doggie style;" and the following riddle: "If I had a rooster and you had a donkey and your
donkey ate the feet off my rooster, what would you have? Two feet of my cock in your ass."
Finally, the show featured an apparently political parody sung to the tune of the Beverly Hillbil-
lies theme: "Come listen to a story about a man named Boas, a poor politician that barely kept
his winky fed, then one day he's poking a chick and up from his pants came a bubbling
crude.... Jail bait is the place where I really want to be .... "
A Notice of Apparent Liability for $6,000 was also issued to KLOL(FM) for three occa-
sions in 1990 on which the Commission deemed its mornings Stevens and Pruett Show to have
been indecent. Rusk Corp. (KLOL(FM)), 5 F.C.C.R. 6332 (1990). The segments ranged from
a product parody called Aunt Vagina pancakes to an extended session with a caller that in-
cluded obvious double entendres about sex. During the show, the disc jockeys prompted callers
to become ever more detailed about their sexual allusions but to maintain a lightly veiled or
coded manner. Id. In one of the programs at issue, the disc jockeys asked callers what made
their "hiney parts tingle." Id. at 6332-33; see also supra text accompanying note 10. Another
program addressed the question "What are your joys of sex?" The following constituted the
exchange on that question:
FC: I love having a threesome and getting it in my mou (interrupted by horn) and in
my meow at the same time.
MV: Gee, that's got to be a long one.
FC: No, make it long.
MV: What a spoon?
FC: Pardon me.
MV: A spoon, a fork, what are you talking about?
MV2: I don't know, you say you're dining out and bringing your cat to a, I just
don't know what you're talking about.
FC: Oh, come on.
MV: That's it, we just don't understand this.
FC: Oh, come on.
MV: 'Cause if we did there'd be a helluva meeting.
MV2: That's right, so thank you very much.
MV: Yeah, thanks for calling.
FV: Have a good day.
MV: A girl who likes to dine in and
MV2: And loves animals.
FC: In and out it's both good.
MV: Yeah, lets the cat in, lets the cat out.
Id at 6334.
In 1991, the Commission denied reconsideration of its sanction against Chicago's
WLUP(AM). Evergreen Media Corp. (WLUP(AM)), 6 F.C.C.R. 5950 (1991). The station was
fined for two broadcasts of the Steve and Garry Show, one in 1989, commenting on then-Miss
America Vanessa Williams' nude photos in PENTHOUSE, see infra discussion at text accompa-
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rate and a broader scope for the regulatory mantle. The Commission became
more active during the chairmanship of Al Sikes, with fines already imposed
on fourteen stations and actions pending against another nineteen.29 s There is
no indication that the Commission's approach to indecency enforcement will
change under the acting chairmanship of Commissioner Quello.29" With re-
spect to stringency, the Commission imposed a fine of $3,750 on WYBB-FM,
Folly Beach, South Carolina for the single utterance of the word "shit" on one
morning program.3° While such a sanction for a fleeting reference seemed
entirely contrary to the Commission's prior, Pacifica-influenced approach to
"dirty words," the Commission justified it by suggesting that the disc jockey's
repeated references to "crap" as a synonym for "shit" were designed to
enhance the impact of the word when finally uttered.31  The Commission's
increasing stringency is also demonstrated by the larger scale of the fines it
imposes on broadcasters and by its threats of even more severe sanctions. In-
nying note 343, and one in 1987, in which one caller sang a song parody called Kiddie Porn and
another told a homophobic joke about the best pick-up line at a gay bar. See Evergreen Media
Corp. (WLUP(AM)), 6 F.C.C.R. 3708 (1991) (Notice of Apparent Liability). The segment on
Vanessa Williams included lines such as: SD [Steve Dahl]: Went down on that other woman
and oh God, you had your tongue in her vagina. It was fabulous. A lot of your Miss Americas
can.... [Bob Costas, who had interviewed Ms. Williams] had to put his leg up on the ottoman
because he had a stiff-oh.. .. " Id at 3709. The homophobicjoke - "May I push your stool in
for you?" - was recounted by a caller to whom the disc jockey said: "Don't you think those
guys have enough to deal with? We got AIDS and all that and then we're all naming gerbil
jokes and stuff. I don't know." Id at 3710.
The Commission recently has commenced an investigation of Muscatine, Iowa's
KFMH(FM), which mistakenly broadcast two jokes told by callers in a best-joke contest. Both
jokes relied on undermining the listeners' settled expectations. FCC Puts Broadcasters on Notice
for Indecency, BROADCASTING, Mar. 2, 1992, at 29. In one joke, a man goes into a bar and
orders 12 martinis in celebration of his first "blow job." In declining the offer ofa 13th drink,
he says: "No, thanks, if twelve won't take the taste out of my mouth, then nothing will." Id at
29. The other joke is as follows: "What do you do after you eat a bald pussy? Refasten the
diaper." Id. As the contest was live, with no delay mechanism, the jokes were broadcast be-
cause the callers circumvented the station's screening procedures by changing their jokes once
they got on the air.
298. Harry Jessell, FCC Puts Broadcasters on Notice for Indecency, BROADCASTING, Mar.
2, 1992, at 29. Recently, the Commission imposed a $23,750 fine on WSUC-FM, Cortland,
New York, for a broadcast describing sexual activities in "patently ofrensive terms," Co.M.
DAILY, Jan. 8, 1993, at 4, and upheld a $25,000 fine on KMEL(FM, San Francisco, for the
"deliberate dwelling on sexual matters" of the Rick Chase Show, CoMM. DAILY, Jan. 8, 1993, at
4.
299. Nat Hentoff, Censors of the Airwaves, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 1993, at A21; Bloomberg
Business News, The Media Business." Interim FCC Head, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 8, 1993, at D8, col.
2.
300. L. M. Communications of South Carolina, Inc. (WYBBCFM)), 7 F.C.R. 1595
(1992); Jessell, supra note 298.
301. L.M. Communications, 7 F.C.C.R. at 1595.
[ihe scatological material as broadcast involved a deliberate and repetitive use of the
word "crap" to heighten the audience's awareness of and attention to the subsequent
use of the term "shit" by the announcer. Such willfully focused use is patently offen-
sive and inconsistent with any contention that the passage at issue represented an
incidental remark. Moreover, the material fits within the definition of indecency,
since it contained patently offensive language concerning excretory activities ....
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deed, no more than a reference to the unprecedented $600,000 fine imposed on
Infinity in connection with the simulcast of certain Howard Stem program-
ming should be needed to underscore the seriousness of the FCC's crack-
down.3"2 The agency also has made clear that unsatisfactory "past
compliance history" with regard to indecency will justify the imposition of
large fines for new violations of the indecency policy.303 Most tellingly, the
Commission has made no secret of its willingness to revoke Infinity's broad-
cast licenses if Stern continues his brand of sex talk.314
B. Questioning the FCC's Indecency Standard
Despite its aggressive enforcement policy, the FCC has never defined its
"patent offensiveness standard," rejecting an invitation to provide "a compre-
hensive index or thesaurus of indecent words or pictorial depictions that will
be considered patently offensive," and averring that the phrase "must, of ne-
cessity be construed with reference to specific facts. ' 30 5 According to the
Commission, any attempt to adopt a "definitive list" could not be "compre-
hensive. '30 6 Thus, under the new policy, the "context in which the allegedly
indecent language is broadcast [would] serve as an important factor" in deter-
mining whether language "going beyond" the use of expletives is nevertheless
indecent.3 °7
Despite its asserted reliance on context, however, the Commission's ratio-
nales in the indecency area swing strategically between two extremes. On the
one hand, the agency relies on the "inherent vagueness" of the definition of
indecency in order to argue against constitutional challenges. On the other
hand, it relies on the "patent" obviousness of the indecency in the cases in
which it imposes sanctions for violations of its standard. In going from onejustificatory extreme to the other - from inherent vagueness to inherent clar-
ity - the Commission avoids the hard work of really contextualizing and
justifying its indecency applications.
The Commission's attempt to give methodological meaning to patent of-
fensiveness by referring to a number of factors it describes as part of its con-
textual inquiry is of little help. The agency's assertedly contextual approach
consists of conclusory and even contradictory applications of a number of ele-
302. See discussion supra at text accompanying notes 21-22, 234.
303. Citing such "past compliance history," the Commission imposed a new fine of$33,750 on Evergreen's WLUP(AM) in connection with indecent comments on the Steve and
Gary Show of January 13, 1991, and the Kevin Matthews Show of March 4, 1991. WLUP(AM),
Chicago, Notified of Apparent Liability for $33,750 Forfeiture for Indecent Broadcasts, 1993
FCC LEXIS 832 (Feb. 19, 1993); see also supra note 233.
304. Paul Farhi, FCCs Stern Rebuke, WASH. PosT, Dec. 19, 1992, at DI.
305. Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of Pennsylvania (WYSP(FM)), 3 F.C.C.R. 930, 931-32(1988) (Reconsideration Order).
306. Id.
307. New Indecency Standards to be Applied to All Broadcast and Amateur Radio Licen-
sees, 2 F.C.C.R. 2726, 2726 (1987) (Public Notice) [hereinafter New Indecency Standards]; see
also Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 3 F.C.C.R. at 932.
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ments whose interrelationships are never explored and whose potential struc-
tural tilt is never acknowledged or justified.
L The Commission's "Definition" of Context
Although none of the Commission's statements on indecency since 1987
has provided any systematic guidance on the meaning of "context' as an inter-
pretive tool in applying the new indecency definition, the agency has cited a
number of variables to be considered in its case-by-case review of indecency.
In sum, they relate to the composition of the audience, the merit of the work,
and the manner of presentation of the sexual material. There is, however, no
assurance that these factors in fact exhaust the Commission's category of rele-
vant contextual inquiries.
The time of the challenged broadcast and "a determination of the pres-
ence of children in the audience 308 are often referred to by the Commission in
its descriptions of conceptual assessments of indecency. With respect to the
nature of the challenged material, the Commission has rejected the notion that
"if a work has merit, it is per se not indecent" and asserted that the merit of a
work would only be considered as "one of the many variables that make up a
work's 'context.' ,o In addition, the agency has made a distinction between
the substance and manner of presentation of sexual discourse, focusing on
whether it has been presented in a "pandering and titillating" manner;
whether it is "vulgar," "shocking," or "lewd;" and whether it is "isolated or
fleeting.' 310
The Commission has explained that, under its new approach, even sexual
innuendo and double entendre would not be exempt from a finding of inde-
cency, because "in certain circumstances, [they] ... may be rendered explicit
or capable of only one meaning when intermingled with explicit references
that make the meaning of the entire discussion clear.... "3 1  The agency
stresses that the "interplay" of the various contextual variables will "vary de-
pending on the facts presented. 31 2
As previously noted, the Commission also has clarified that its definition
of contemporary community standards was intended to be measured from the
perspective of "an average broadcast viewer," without reference to any specific
geographic communities.3" 3 Thus, the determination of indecency is to be
based on "a broader standard for broadcasting generally," derived from the
Commissioners' "knowledge of the views of the average viewer or listener, as
308. Id. at 930, 932, 937 n.31.
309. Id.
310. See, eg., id at 932; In re Evergreen Media Corp. (WLUP(AM)), 6 F.C.C.R. 502, 504
(1991), reconsideration denied, 6 F.C.C.R. 5950 (1991); In re Peter Branton, 6 F.C.C.R. 610
(1991).
311. New Indecency Standards to be Applied to All Broadcast and Amateur Radio Licen-
sees, 2 F.C.C.R. 2726, 2727 (1987) (Public Notice).
312. Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 3 F.C.C.R. at 933 (1987).
313. Id.
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well as their general expertise in broadcast matters."'3 14
The Commission's decisions discuss context as if a case-by-case analysis
will somehow ineluctably lead to one proper answer in each situation, an an-
swer which the agency need simply discover but cannot predict. In keeping
with this approach, many of the recent indecency enforcement actions rest on
the simple and unelaborated assertion that the challenged material is "patently
offensive." The decisions reiterate a formulaic statement of the indecency
standard and conclude either that the Commission "believe[s]" the material to
be indecent315 or that the language "fits squarely" into the category of inde-
cency. 31 6 Instead of a reasoned analysis of challenged programming in which
the Commission actually balances certain articulated and justified contextual
factors, the agency's post-1987 cases suggest that it is simply recognizing inde-
cency "when it sees it."3a1
7
The absence of an articulated normative hierarchy is particularly troub-
ling in light of the foreseeable conflict among the factors addressed by the
Commission. For example, the Commission does not explain how to deal with
meritorious material that may, in fact, be obviously offensive to some viewers.
Or suppose that the material at issue uses sexual discourse as part of an impor-
tant and powerful political statement, but does so in a manner that is poten-
tially subject to being interpreted as "pandering. '31 8 Although it assures
broadcasters that it will take merit into consideration as part of its contextual
inquiry, the Commission nowhere provides guidelines for exactly how it will
do so if merit in any given case in fact conflicts directly with other contextual
factors.
Contrary to the implicit suggestion in the Commission's cases, contextual
interpretation inevitably takes place neither by itself nor "in the air," but with
reference to a set of normative criteria by which circumstances are organized
and characterized. It is those criteria that dictate the selection of particular
contextual factors and that allow for their balancing and harmonization in
situations in which they conflict.3" 9 Other than a conclusory reference to the
314. Id.
315. See, e.g., Rusk Corporation (KLOL(FM)), 5 F.C.C.R. 6332 (1990); KFI, Inc. (KFI-
AM), 6 F.C.C.R. 3699 (1989) (Tom Leykis Show); Legacy Broadcasting of Detroit
(WLLZ(Fv)), 6 F.C.C.R. 3698 (1989) (broadcast of Walk with an Erection).
316. See, eg., KGB Inc. (KGB-FM), 7 F.C.C.R. 3207 (1992) (holding that broadcast of
Sit On My Face "fit squarely" into indecency definition); Sound Broadcasting Corp. (KCNA.
FM), 6 F.C.C.R. 2174 (1991) (Guy Kemp Show); Narrangansett Broadcasting Co. of California,
5 F.C.C.R. 3821 (1990) (finding that Perry Stone Show excerpts "all fit squarely" into indecency
definition); WVWE(AM), 6 F.C.C.R. 3711 (1990) (holding that five excerpts of the Gary Dee
Show "all fit squarely" into the definition of indecency).
317. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (coining "I
know it when I see it," the now-famous dictum about the difficulty of defining obscenity).
318. Cf Jack Anderson, Portraits of Gay Men, With No Apologies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10,
1993, § 2, at 6.
319. The Commission's selection of contextual factors appears to be based solely on the
Supreme Court's decision in Pacifica; however, that decision focused on particular contextual
analyses precisely because they were the factors that the Commission had pointed out to the
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state's interest in children's "well being," the FCC provides no guidelines pur-
suant to which the "interplay" of variables can be resolved in any given case.
The Commission's refusal to articulate any organizing approach for its
contextual analysis suggests a strategic attempt to provide itself the utmost in
interpretive flexibility in indecency enforcement. Such regulatory flexibility is
troubling:320 it allows the Commission to increase the stringency and breadth
of its enforcement without discussion and to interpret contexts in haphazard,
unpredictable, and even contradictory ways. It even allows the claim of con-
textuality to be transformed into a mere smokescreen for a child-centered and
otherwise acontextual regulatory policy pursuant to which the timing of the
broadcast and the possible presence of children in the audience would be the
only relevant criteria. To the extent that the Commission's actions are unpre-
dictable and its regulatory extensions unexplained, its decisions are difficult to
understand and rationalize. This, in turn, is contrary to the Commission's
own assumptions. To the extent that the Commission's approach is nothing
more than child-centered acontextuality, it is surely a far cry from the individ-
ualized, case-by-case, multi-factorial context analysis suggested in the Com-
mission's rhetoric.
The FCC's application of its indecency policy since 1987 appears to re-
flect these troublesome tendencies.321 As described above,3 2 the Commis-
sion's enforcement policy appears to have become increasingly stringent over
the years since 1987. The history of enforcement also demonstrates a broad
scope of coverage, although shock radio has been the most insistent target of
the Commission's ire. The Commission has not required "descriptions" of
sexual activity or organs in any literal sense; mere references to such matters
frequently have been sufficient.32 In response to broadcaster complaints of
Court. The Court's references were entirely descriptive, with no claim to prescription. FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978).
320. This is so even if the particulars of the FCC's actions would not be troublesome
enough to constitute violations of constitutional or administrative law per se, as will be dis-
cussed infra Part III.
321. The extensive administrative discretion afforded by the FCC's contextual standard
leads to accountability problems as well. Most systems of governmental discretion are said to
be legitimated by openness to oversight. While diplomatic operations and prosecutorial discre-
tion, for example, demonstrate that openness and public monitoring are not the norm for all
governmental activity, both the Federal Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (1974),
and parallel state open-government laws suggest that openness is at least an aspirational ideal
for most administrative and legislative functions. Since the Commission's indecency complaints
are considered matters of public record, the FCC's indecency enforcement process could be said
to be open to oversight. However, the difficulties of contending with the Commission's bureau-
cratic systems and the government's filing system (which appears to be organized by station
rather than topic) make it hard for the public to develop a sophisticated sense of the agency's
indecency enforcement patterns overall. Because it is difficult to compare the indecency com-
plaints on which the FCC has acted with those that it has denied or ignored, the public cannot
easily assume the role of watchdog.
322. See discussion at text accompanying notes 253-304.
323. See Sagittarius Broadcasting Corp. (WXRK(FMI), WYSP(FN1)), 7 F.C.C.R. 6873
(1992) (holding that the minimal level of description be gauged by whether it is "readily under-
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arbitrary and inconsistent treatment of similar cases, the Commission has sim-
ply asserted that "[m]aterial which is indecent is not the less so, nor is it ren-
dered immune to our enforcement authority, simply because it is less graphic
or egregious than material we have heretofore found actionable.324
The inconsistency between the Commission's rhetoric and its actions in
applying its assertedly contextual approach underscores the lack of predict-
ability in the indecency area. Three related examples should serve to make the
point.
First, one of the contextual factors emphasized by the Commission is an
apparent distinction between the subject of sex and the manner of its presenta-
tion.325 The Commission has said that "subject matter alone does not render
material indecent. Only when that matter is presented in a manner that is
patently offensive will it be considered indecent. ' 326 Thus, the agency consist-
ently disclaims any desire to punish sexual subject matter per se. Yet, the
Commission also has responded to broadcaster claims that their sexual mate-
rial was not presented in an offensive manner by saying that an acceptable
manner of presentation would not necessarily preclude the imposition of sanc-
tion for a broadcast of sexually-referential material.327 On its face, this seems
either self-contradictory or bluntly outcome-oriented. It is reminiscent of the
"heads I win, tails you lose" gambit in children's games.
Second, as noted above, one of the specific contextual factors mentioned
by the Commission is whether the potentially indecent material is repetitive or
"isolated or fleeting." 328 Yet, by punishing broadcasts that would previously
have passed the fleeting references test, the Commission's recent cases suggest
standable" by children and rejecting claim that by not asking for "detailed" descriptions, FCC
effectively eliminated "description" requirement from indecency definition).
324. Goodrich Broadcasting, Inc. (WVIC-FM), 6 F.C.C.R. 2178 (1991); see also Sagitta-
rius Broadcasting Corp. (WXRK(FM), WYSP(FM) & WJFK(FM)), 5 F.C.C.R. 7291, 7291-92
(1990), affid, 7 F.C.C.R. 6873 (1992); Great American Television & Radio Co., Inc.
(WFBQ(FM) & WNDE(AM)), 6 F.C.C.R. 3692, 3694 n.3 (1990); Cox Enterprises, Inc.
(WIOD), 6 F.C.C.R. 3704, 3705 (1989) ("[We do not accept constraints on our discretion to
pursue violations less egregious than others may have been.").
325. The coherence of this distinction is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 373-
86.
326. Infinity Broadcasting Corp., WYSP(FM), 3 F.C.C.R. 930, 932 (1987); see also Sagit-
tarius Broadcasting, 5 F.C.C.R. 7291, 7292 (1990); King Broadcasting Co. (KING-TV), 5
F.C.C.R. 2971 (1990).
327. See, e.g., In re Evergreen Media Corp. (WLUP-FM), 6 F.C.C.R. 502, 504, reconsider-
ation denied, 6 F.C.C.R. 5950 (1991). In its letter to WVIC-FM concerning the Michaels in the
Morning Show, the Commission opined that "it is not necessary to find that material is pander-
ing or titillating in order to find that its references to sexual activities or organs are patently
offensive." Goodrich Broadcasting, Inc. (WVIC-FM), 6 F.C.C.R. 2178 (1991). In In re Guy
Gannett Publishing Co. (WZTA-FM), 5 F.C.C.R. 7688, 7689 (1990), the Commission stated
that even if the material at issue were not pandering or titillating in nature, "case law has not
held these characteristics to be essential to a finding of indecency under 18 U.S.C. § 1464"; see
also In re Cox Enterprises Inc. (WIOD), 6 F.C.C.R. 3704 (1991) ("[I]t is not necessary to find
that the material is pandering or titillating in order to find that its references to sexual activities
and organs are patently offensive").
328. Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 3 F.C.C.R. at 932; Evergreen, 6 F.C.C.R. at 504.
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a trend away from an approach that would exculpate isolated and fleeting
indecency.329 As noted earlier, for example, the Commission recently imposed
a fine on a radio station for the single utterance of the word "shit" on one
morning program.33 ° This action seems inconsistent with the several possible
rationales that could have motivated the Commission to exempt fleeting sexual
references from sanction in the first place.331 Moreover, even if the Commis-
sion were to retain its "isolated and fleeting" test, its application - by requir-
ing a comparative assessment of the whole work - could well be inconsistent
with the Commission's effective refusal to consider the whole work in other
respects.
Third, the Commission's approach to merit in news and entertainment
programming seems inconsistent. 332 Although the Commission explicitly re-
fused to adopt a news exemption to the indecency rules in its Reconsideration
Order,3 33 a recent FCC decision indicates that even expletives, when used as
part of a "bona fide" news program, will be tolerated over the air .33  Thus,
narrow categories of otherwise indecent material might be acceptable if they
air on serious, legitimate news reports. Former FCC Chairman Alfred Sikes
has been quoted as opining that a newscast showing the sexually explicit pho-
tographs of Robert Mapplethorpe on WGBH-TV would not have been consid-
ered indecent even if it had been aired before 8:00 p.m. 335 Similarly, the
329. L. M. Communications of South Carolina, Inc. (WYBB(FM)), 17 F.C.C.RL 1595
(1992). In fact, WYBB may actually signal the abandonment of the "isolated or fleeting" char-
acter of a reference as a contextual factor to be considered in an indecency determination. The
Commission went to great lengths to assert that the repeated use of "crap" heightened aware-
ness to the single use of the term "shit" and then matter-of-factly stated, "[m]oreover, the
material fits within the definition of indecency, since it contained patently offensive language
concerning excretory activities." Id (emphasis added). This suggests that the broadcast was
indecent without regard to the isolated or fleeting character of the reference.
330. See L M. Communications, 7 F.C.C.R. 1595; In Brief, BROADCASTING, Feb. 24,
1992, at 57; see supra text accompanying note 272.
331. Although the Commission's decision did not specify why the isolated and fleeting
character of sexual references should exempt broadcasts from findings of indecency, several
possibilities come to mind. First, the Commission might have thought that, from the audience's
point of view, repetition can tend to increase the force and impact of offensive material. Second,
repetitive sexual references also might function as attractive nuisances to children, who might
be less likely to look for "the good parts" if such parts were fleeting and uncertain to arise.
Third, one could argue that listeners are more likely to learn repeated offensive references than
those made in passing.
332. A substantive critique of the merit factor is addressed infra at text accompanying
notes 387-403. The focus here is on the Commission's uncertainty, inconsistency, and ambiva-
lence in its applications of the merit factor.
333. 3 F.C.C.R. at 937 n.31.
334. In re Peter Branton, 6 F.C.C.R. 610 (1991) (allowing wiretap of expletive-laden tele-
phone conversation with John Gotti to be broadcast by National Public Radio program in
connection with Gotti trial). The Commission also dismissed a complaint against High Point,
North Carolina's WGHP-TV in connection with a series on topless bars (and promotional spots
for the series) which showed a scantily clad woman in a bump-and-grind pose. Passing Grades,
supra note 275, at 36. It is unclear whether this was one of the agency's substantive dismissals.
335. Patrick Sheridan, Indecency Exemption for News in All but Name, BROADCASTING,
Feb. 18, 1991, at 34.
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Commission has dismissed indecency complaints about sexual material
presented in a clinical, educational, and informational fashion. For example, a
complaint against KING-TV, in connection with a 1988 broadcast of a sex
education program entitled Teen Sex: What About the Kids?, was dismissed
despite the fact that explicit models of sex organs were used to demonstrate
information.336 Indeed, despite complaints, sensationalistic and homophobic
discussions of sex have passed FCC indecency review, so long as they are
presented in a format that is formally characterizable as "informational" or
"instructional." Thus, for example, the Commission did not impose sanctions
for the following on-air statement during a talk show on Tampa's WFLA-
AM: "Two vaginas don't go together, no, but if you rub the two of them
together there is a great sensation and it feels good. Nevertheless, it's still
perversion., 337
This prompts the question of why there is an effective exemption for news
programming, while an unsystematic, case-by-case approach to the mitigating
character of merit governs in other, non-news contexts. The Commission's
failure to define merit or to justify the distinction between different sorts of
news-related broadcasts has led to a lack of predictability in connection with
news-related programming as well. For example, while the Commission has
permitted sexually explicit speech in the bona fide news context,338 and in a
typically sensationalistic Geraldo talk show about sex information entitled
Unlocking the Great Mysteries of Sex, 33 9 it rejects claims of news-relatedness
(and merit) in other broadcasts if they are not nominally news or informa-
tional programs. Once past the "reputable" news organizations, how does the
Commission distinguish on merit?
The Commission's imposition of a forfeiture on KSD-FM in St. Louis in
connection with a 1987 reading from a Playboy magazine interview with Jes-
sica Hahn about her claim of rape against the now-infamous evangelist, Rever-
end Jim Bakker, puts this question in bold relief.340 Rejecting the station's
claim that this was an "issue-related program" and that newsworthiness
should be dispositive, the Commission staff said that the explicit description of
the rape was indecent, "contained lurid language" about sex and sexual or-
336. King Broadcasting Co. (KING-TV), 5 F.C.C.R. 2971 (1990).
337. Id. The Commission also dismissed complaints about a morning discussion, aired on
Wilmington, North Carolina's WAAV-AM, in which a sex therapist discussed the particulars of
painful sex when the partners' sexual organs differ in size and about a segment of Geraldo,
shown on St. Louis, Missouri's KTVI-TV, which featured a sex therapist who assured the audi-
ence that penis size was irrelevant to sexual pleasure. Id.; see also note 339. The complaints
presumably were dismissed because the broadcasts were aired as news-related or informational
programs. Perhaps under an analogous sports programming exception, the FCC also dismissed
complaints against KZKC-TV of Kansas City for presenting GLOW (Gorgeous Ladies of Wres-
tling) at 9:00 a.m. Id.
338. In re Peter Branton, 6 F.C.C.R. 610 (1991).
339. See Sagittarius Broadcasting Corp., 5 F.C.C.R. 7291, 7294 n.3 (1990) (citing Letter to
Gerald P. McAtee, KTVI, St. Louis, Mo., dated Oct. 26, 1989, dismissing complaint).
340. KSD-FM, 6 F.C.C.R. 3689 (1990).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
[Vol. XX:49
BROADCAST INDECENCY
gans, and was presented in a pandering manner." This was despite the fact
that the hosts of the show veered between referring to the excerpt as "the good
parts" and commenting unfavorably on the forcible nature of the sex and its
perpetrator.' 2 Similarly, although Penthouse magazine's publication of nude
photographs of the first Black Miss America, Vanessa Williams, was consid-
ered newsworthy by mainstream news organizations at the time, a discussion
of the Williams photos on a morning radio program on WLUP was considered
unacceptable by the Commission. Despite the stations' claims that it consti-
tuted political and social commentary with news value, the FCC found the
discussion indecent because it contained "vulgar" material presented in a
"pandering and titillating" manner. The expletive-laden wiretap of mob boss
John Gotti in the Branton case, however, was not subject to such criticism." 3
In sum, the FCC's new definition of indecency does not function as much of a
definition at all.
2. The Implicit Tilt in the FCC's Contextual Factors
If anything, the interpretive flexibility of the FCC's contextual approach
to indecency has allowed the agency to apply its multi-factorial analysis with
conservative, anti-majoritarian rationales and results. Although the Commis-
sion's description of its contextual approach implicitly suggests that its consid-
erations will be fair, unbiased, and simply dictated by the facts of the given
case, its factors are easily subject to regulatory tilt. This is not to make the
crude point that the FCC uses its promise of contextualism as a self-conscious
smokescreen to shield the acontextual imposition of the right-wing social
341. Id, at 3689. This finding is particularly striking in view of the fact that, after reading
the excerpt from Playboy and joking in parts of the reading, the announcer finally said "this is
rape" and articulated his disapproval of Bakker's alleged behavior. Id. at 3690.
342. The FCC's transcript contains the following commentary:
JC: I was reading this last night and I was getting sick.
JOE: Yea, I know.
JC: This was rape.
JOE: Yea, really.
JC: This was not, this was not some guy who just had like a little bit of a twist in a
hotel room with a church secretary. This was rape!
JOE: Yea.
JC: Well, pretty incredible you know, because we've been making jokes about all this.
JOE: Yea, don't you ever come around here Jim Bakker or we're going to cut that
thing off.
.... See this [the magazine] is not out yet. I went to all the book stores yesterday
trying to see if this thing is out....
DJ: It kind of makes you wonder who people are following really.
JC: Well, I think there is a natural curiosity about all of this too, though.
DJ: Yea.
Id.
343. See In re Evergreen Media Corp. (WLUP(AM)), 6 F.CC.R. 5950, 5951 (1991) (dis-
tinguishing the WLUP case from Branton). The description occurred in a discussion about
pornography which led to a spoof of Ms. Williams' appearance on NBC's Bob Costas Show. In
re Evergreen Media Corp. (WLUP-FM, 6 F.C.C.R. 502, 503, reconsideration denied, 6
F.C.C.R. 5950 (1991).
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agendas of its fundamentalist masters.3 " The regulatory ambivalence
sketched out above provides ample evidence that the FCC does not seek to
preclude all sexual allusions on the broadcast airwaves. The agency does not
find indecent every broadcast brought to its attention by a socially conserva-
tive individual or pressure group. But the factors chosen by the FCC in its
definition of context - the average broadcast audience member as the analytic
vantage point, the narrow scope of agency review, the manner/subject distinc-
tion, and the equivocal role of merit - are all amenable to a conventional and
socially conservative tilt.3 45 At the very least, they are interventionist and reg-
ulatory. When the stage for enforcement of such norms is set by well-organ-
ized decency groups, the FCC's decisions are constrained within a framework
that provides only more or less conservative options. 346 As pointed out above,
the particular institutional context of indecency enforcement has a marked
effect on the meaning of the Commission's claims to contextual, yet neutral
and non-partisan, decision making in the area of indecency regulation.
Admittedly, the Commission's apparent responsiveness to the socially
conservative New Right is hardly its first reaction to political pressure. With
regard to its historical patterns of enforcement in the area of indecency, the
Commission has moved back and forth between regulatory and deregulatory
approaches, presumably in response to some combination of political pres-
sures, the status of the broadcast industry's self-censorship efforts, and the
agency's legal interpretations of section 1464. 3a7 It is useless to engage in an
unequivocal polemic against the influence of political factors in the Commis-
sion's policy-making and adjudicative forays. The elimination of factors we
might call "political" is impossible.
Nevertheless, there are some differences between the history of political
pressure on the Commission and the current political context. One major dif-
ference relates to the content of the messages addressed. Professor Powe has
demonstrated that the FCC's enforcement of its rules against indecency his-
torically operated to promote middle-class values and, in most instances -
particularly in the 1960s - to chill non-mainstream, dissenting speech.348
344. As noted above, other observers have criticized the Commission for effectively be-
coming the pawn of the religious right. See generally Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 36.
345. The Commission's approach is subject to critique for its amenability both to conven-
tionalism and to social conservatism. Conventionalism refers to the tendency to support ex-
isting views at the expense of experimental, cutting-edge, and avant garde programming.
Conservatism refers to the substantive political stance shared by religious social conservatives
seeking to encourage sweeping enforcement of the Commission's indecency policy.
346. A left-wing agency committed to diversity presumably would look at different kinds
of factors to assess indecency; it might also apply categories neutral in name but designed to
have diversifying effects in application. Such a Commission might look at the amount of diver-
sity actually available on the airwaves in a particular market, the different culturally defined
groups comprising the area broadcasters' demographic base, the extent to which the challenged
material represented otherwise unrepresented points of view, and whether the material insulted
any identifiable cultural or political groups.
347. For a more detailed account, see Levi, supra note 36.
348. POWE, supra note 3, at 165-72.
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Similarly, the FCC's adoption of a narrow vision of acceptable sex talk exerts
a clear constraining influence on broadcast speech, particularly on the speech
of small, non-profit organizations. 349 It doubtless has a particularly silencing
effect on certain groups targeted by the far right. For instance, the fundamen-
talist right has made its moral opposition to homosexuality abundantly clear
and has sought to pressure the Commission to enforce its new indecency
norms against depictions of homosexual life.350 This has hardly exhausted the
conservative social agenda, however. Much of the material against which the
Commission has been enforcing its rules since 1987 is largely mainstream and
popular, often politically conservative, programming. Thus, probably in re-
sponse to pressures by Congress and the social conservatives of the religious
right, the agency recently has been spotlighting majoritarian preferences and
values in addition to non-mainstream speech.
Despite the change to the Clinton administration and the resignation of
the FCC's Chairman Sikes, there is little reason to believe that the regulatory
bent fostered by the FCC's current contextual indecency factors will be subject
to radical change, at least in the near term. Neither Commissioner Duggan
nor Commissioner Quello has made a secret of his strong antipathy to broad-
cast indecency.3 ' The religious conservatives continue to be a social force to
be reckoned with, particularly because it is difficult for legislators to resist
right-wing pressure on issues such as this one. Doing so subjects them to the
charge that they vote to protect "smut" rather than America's children. In
any event, since the concern with the broadcast of sexual messages is shared
by progressives as well as social conservatives, as discussed above, many in the
Clinton administration will presumably be sympathetic to the regulation of at
least some types of broadcast indecency.352
349. See supra text accompanying notes 266-68.
350. In 1991, for example, the FCC received many indecency complaints in connection
with public television stations' airing of Tongues Untied, a sexually explicit documentary about
homosexual lifestyles. See supra note 266 and sources cited therein.
351. Commissioner Ervin Duggan's dissent from the Commission's refusal to impose a fine
for a radio station's broadcast of expletives during a bona fide news program suggests that he
favors a sanitized discourse over the airwaves. In re Peter Branton, 6 F.C.C.R. 610, 611-12
(1991) (Duggan, dissenting); see also supra text accompanying notes 250-51 for references to the
two Commissioners' conservatism on this issue.
352. See Farhi, supra note 304. It should not be forgotten that Vice President Al Gore's
wife, Tipper, was a founder of Parents Music Resource Council, a group that called for the
inclusion of warning labels on records containing explicit or violent lyrics. RUSSELL SANJEK &
DAVID SANJEK, AMERICAN POPULAR MUSIC BUSINESS IN THE 20TH CENTURY 264 (1991).
Moreover, former Chairman Sikes recently recalled that then-Senator Al Gore had voted
against his nomination as chairman, but "only because he didn't think FCC had gone far
enough in opposing indecency." Sikes Finds Agreement With Gore on Key Issues, CO:,iM.
DAILY, Jan. 8, 1993, at 2.
In addition, particularly in light of the possibility that a future Republican administration
might resuscitate the indecency standard even if it were relaxed during the Clinton administra-
tion, a look at the structural tilt of the current standard is indispensable.
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a. The Acontextuality of the Analytic Vantage Point
Tensions and unarticulated assumptions plague the Commission's con-
cept of the "average broadcast viewer or listener" from whose vantage point
the contextual inquiry into indecency is supposed to take place.35 3 Presuma-
bly, the agency's focus on the average audience member is intended to provide
a fair and neutral perspective for a determination of patent offensiveness by
privileging neither extremely permissive nor extremely squeamish viewpoints.
Yet because the Commission's offensiveness inquiry does not have an empiri-
cal basis, the standard is applied acontextually and conservatively, reflecting
the views of an imaginary "average" listener rather than the real listeners in
the relevant market.
The reference to an "average broadcast viewer or listener" could indicate
a market-directed inquiry into the views of the audience in a given station's
market.35 4 In keeping with this, many broadcasters have attempted to re-
spond to Notices of Apparent Liability for indecent broadcasts by introducing
market-based evidence of the popularity and community acceptance of their
programs. 5  As noted above, for example, broadcasters of shock radio pro-
grams truthfully can claim that such shows are highly popular. In addition to
the ratings information provided in target broadcasters' responses to Commis-
sion Notices of Apparent Liability, a survey of 1,000 adults in medium- and
large-sized cities regarding their tolerance for shock radio programming sug-
gested that "substantial majorities" of survey respondents were not offended
by the broadcast material." 6 The Commission did not base its assessment on
this data. The Commission's approach to market data demonstrates that the
average broadcast viewer or listener is really a hypothetical and formal con-
353. See, e.g., Rocio de Lourdes Cordoba, To Air or Not to Err: The Threat of Conditioned
Federal Funds for Indecent Programming on Public Broadcasting, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 635, 662,
669-70 (1991); Linda Meisler, A New Approach to the Regulation of Broadcast Programming:
The Public Nuisance Doctrine, 28 AM. U. L. REv. 239, 257-62 (1979).
354. This assumes the problematic proposition that a market inquiry can lead to the dis-
covery of an "average" viewer or listener. Nevertheless, such an approach at least would be
consistent with an attempt to gauge the reality of audience reactions to broadcast material.
355. See In re Evergreen Media Corp., Licensee of Radio Station WLUP (AM), 6
F.C.C.R. 502, 503 (1991); In re Guy Gannett Publishing Co., Licensee of Radio Station
WZTA-FM, 5 F.C.C.R. 7688 (1990); Sagittarius Broadcasting Corp., 5 F.C.C.R. 7291, 7292
(1990); Great American Television & Radio Co., Inc. (WFBQ(FM)), 6 F.C.C.R. 3692, 3692-93
(1990); In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp. (WYSP(FM)), 2 F.C.C.R. 2705 (1987). This was also
the case in the original topless radio context in the early 1970s. HIMMELSTEIN, supra note 90,
at 294-97 (discussing the popularity of topless radio programs).
356. Dirty Words Don't Offend: Majority of Public Doesn't Want Govt. Censoring Shock
Radio, COMM. DAILY, May 12, 1987, at 4.
All this suggests that, at the very least, the Commission should seriously address the issue
of why it would ignore such data. For a discussion of the relationship between popularity and
indecency, see Richard G. Passler, Regulation of Indecent Radio Broadcasts: George Carlin
Revisited - What Does the Future Hold for the Seven "Dirty" Words?, 65 TUL. L. REv. 131,
164-65 (1990); Helen T. Schrier, A Solution to Indecency on the Airwaves, 41 FED. COMM. L.J.
69, 96-97 (1988).
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struct of the Commission's imagination.35 7 The reality is that the Commis-
sion, while attributing its decisions to the views of the "average" broadcast
viewer, is not attempting to gauge majoritarian tastes. If it were, it might well
be persuaded by the level of market acceptance demonstrated by ratings.
While espousing a contextual approach to the issue, the Commission has
neglected even to explain why it systematically ignores data of actual listener-
ship that reflects popularity and market acceptance. At most, the agency has
stated that "the popularity of allegedly indecent broadcasts in any given com-
munity cannot vitiate an apparent violation of federal law."3 58 It might be
said, by those who hew to classic arguments about the distinctions between
conduct and standards, that popularity data reflect only mere practices, and
not necessarily the population's standards and aspirational norms. Even so, it
is unlikely that an outraged audience would in fact watch or listen to such
programming.
Perhaps the underlying problem is that there is a taste for what the Com-
mission might call indecency. This, in turn, suggests that the Commission
holds a particular, substantive view of offensiveness in sexually referential
speech and that its indecency enforcement test is nothing more than an unar-
ticulable, intuitive assessment of whether that standard has been exceeded.
The Commission cannot pass off reliance on such a substantive vision as the
reflection of the average listener's views, discovered in the agency's exercise of
its expertise; rather, it must be specifically admitted and justified, especially
because First Amendment values are at stake. While it is certainly possible to
articulate rationales for refusing to base social values and regulatory policies
on the existing preferences of majorities, the Commission has neither devel-
oped nor articulated such justifications for its indecency policy.35 9
357. The Commission's refusal to consider market data of popularity on the patent offen-
siveness issue is in ironic contrast to its reliance on market-wide data of the presence of children
in order to justify a narrow time frame into which broadcast indecency should be channeled.
See, eg., In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464,
1993 FCC LEXIS 314, at *38 (Jan. 19, 1993) (rejecting broadcasters' invitation to substitute
station-specific, program-specific, or format-specific audience measurements for market-wide
data on the presence of children in the audience.) Even though the two sets of data are not in
themselves comparable, they do suggest that the kind of market and audience evidence that the
Commission finds relevant is a function of the substantive result it seeks to reach.
358. Evergreen Media Corp., 6 F.C.C.R. at 503; Cox Enterprises, Inc. (In re WIOD), 6
F.C.C.R. 3704, 3705 (1991).
359. The leading treatise on American constitutional law bases a critique of Pacifica on the
ground that "[s]peech... cannot properly be valued according to the preferences of the major-
ity." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAwV 942 (2d ed. 1988). The cita-
tion to Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Pacifica suggests that the basis of this assertion is
the countermajoritarian character of First Amendment protections: that speech should be pro-
tected even if a majority of people find it offiensive, as long as there is a minority of listeners
unoffended by the communication. Id. at n.95. The converse is not necessrily true, however,
The FCC's sub rosa substantive approach reads the First Amendment as allowing the govern-
ment to ban majority speech simply because a minority does not approve of it. At best, the
Commission's subtext adoption of a substantive and largely constraining vision of appropriate
public speech unjustifiably ignores the mainstream acceptance of such material without explain-
ing why it should be discounted.
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Moreover, even if the "average broadcast viewer or listener" standard did
not call for a hypothetical construct, it would still assume the appropriateness
of the average as the right measuring stick for an offensiveness finding. This
uncritically ignores the multiplicity of broadcast viewers and listeners and the
cultural meanings of sex talk. Particularly in light of the fact that self-censor-
ship by broadcasters already precludes the airing of much popular material
considered too risky for radio and television, the FCC's focus on what the
average audience member would find patently offensive further circumscribes
the community out of which the average viewer or listener is to be identified.
The Federal Communications Commission has always interpreted its
mandate to regulate in the public interest as requiring the promotion of broad-
cast diversity."6 The Commission has consistently assumed that the public
interest would properly be served by a "marketplace of ideas" in which diverse
points of view are represented. In order to avoid excessive and direct intrusion
into the editorial judgments of broadcasters, however, the FCC has sought to
insure viewpoint diversity indirectly by implementing structural regulations
designed to promote diversity of ownership.36 In addition, the FCC's histori-
cal commitment to programming guidelines, based in large part on licensee
ascertainment of community needs, also attests to the agency's belief in the
value of community-responsiveness and diversity.362
Ironically, despite this commitment to structural diversity, the Commis-
sion's approach to indecency fails to address the questions of diversity raised
by the issue. Specifically, the Commission's decision to judge patent offensive-
ness from the vantage point of a hypothetical "average" broadcast viewer or
listener assumes a homogeneous national broadcast community in which the
360. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3010 (1990) ("[S]afeguarding
the public's right to receive a diversity of views and information over the airwaves is... an
integral component of the FCC's mission.").
361. See, eg., Multiple Ownership of AM, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, 100
F.C.C.2d 17 (1984) (discussing goals of ownership diversity); MARC A. FRANKLIN & DAVID A.
ANDERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MASS MEDIA LAW 762-63 (1990). The Commission
has adopted minority ownership and preference policies in an effort to foster broadcast diver-
sity. See, e.g., Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68
F.C.C.2d 979 (1978). The Supreme Court upheld the Commission's diversity-based minority
enhancement policy and its distress sale policy in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct.
2997 (1990); see also Matthew L. Spitzer, Justifying Minority Preferences in Broadcasting, 64 S.
CAL. L. REV. 293, 293-302 (1991).
362. See, e.g., The Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Appli-
cants, 27 F.C.C.2d 650 (1971). Admittedly, the FCC's formal ascertainment requirements were
eliminated in the radio and television deregulation decisions of the 1980s. Deregulation of Ra-
dio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981), aff'd sub nom. Office of Communication of the United Church of
Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Deregulation of Commercial Television, 98
F.C.C.2d 1076 (1984), modified on reconsideration, 104 F.C.C.2d 358 (1986), aff'd in part sub
nom., Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Nevertheless,
elimination of the formal requirements does not mean that ascertainment is no longer necessary
and appropriate. Stations must still program in the public interest and in a manner responsive
to their communities even if the Commission does not prescribe the particular procedures to be
used in ascertaining community needs. See, e.g., Deregulation of Radio, 104 F.C.C.R. 505
(1986).
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American population is conceptualized as an undifferentiated group with uni-
form cultural and linguistic norms. The reality is that we are not a homogene-
ous society; we consist of "innumerable subcultures, ' 3 63 of groups and
subgroups. Gender, race, religion, class, sexual orientation, age, nationality,
geographic location, and political affiliation - to mention a few characteris-
tics - all imply differences. Although the relevance, importance, and interre-
lation of these factors are complex and variable, 36 each can affect what a
particular group of people will either understand or find offensive in a commu-
nicative act.
Broadcast practices increasingly respond to and reflect audience diversity.
Market factors, such as the increase in types of available media, have led to
audience fragmentation and a concomitant attempt by broadcasters to "nar-
rowcast" programming for subgroups rather than targeting the traditional
lowest common denominator of a mass audience. 365 Although this phenome-
non is most obvious in radio, television has also joined the narrowcasting
bandwagon as a result of the networks' audience erosion.366 The FCC's ap-
proach refuses to recognize the varied character of broadcasting and the mar-
ket niches into which broadcast audiences now self-select. Thus, it completely
363. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 777 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
364. See FisKE, supra note 78, at 17.
365. See, e.g., CHR-Top 40: Programming a Moving Target, BROADCASTING, June 11,
1990, at 48, 49; Radio Formats, BROADCASTING, Apr. 15, 1991, at 75; The Ups and Downs of
Radio Formats, BROADCASTING, Mar. 26, 1990, at 92.
366. While there is still some incentive to program for the same mass audience, audience
erosion and fragmentation have increasingly plagued the three traditional television networks
since the mid-1980s. See eg., Bill Carter, The Media Business Cable Networks See Dimmer
Future, N.Y. TIMEs, July 22, 1991, at D1; Bill Carter, The Media Business Television, N.Y.
TiMEs, Nov. 5, 1990, at Dl; Joe Flint, No More Bull Market, BROADCASTING, Dec. 17, 1990, at
63; Tom Shales, The Endangered NBC Peacock, WASH. PosT, Mar. 28, 1991, at B2; TVShouMd
Consider Radio Ways, BROADCASTING, Jan. 21, 1991, at 36. Indeed, niche marketing is ex-
panding in the cable industry as well. See, e.g., Cable Ponders Filling Channels Created by
Compression, BROADCASTING, Oct. 7, 1991, at 52 (describing, inter alia, MTV's plans to offer
three channels with diverse musical genres).
The spread of new technologies, such as cable, and the emergence of Fox as a competing
broadcast source have seriously affected the conventional networks' market shares and profit-
ability. See, eg., Tom Shales, CBS Network Eliminates 400 Jobs, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 1991, at
Dl. Consequently, the networks have begun to differentiate audiences to a much greater extent
in the past few years. It has become evident, for example, that CBS has been programming
primarily for a relatively older, more conservative, and more "heartland" audience. By con-
trast, ABC and Fox have taken many more programming chances in order to attract a younger,
"yuppie" audience. See e.g., Stuart Elliott, NBC Likes Young Vlewer Judging From its Fall
Plans, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1992, at D18, col. 3; Who Holds High Cards in Network Program-
ming?, BROADCASTING, June 11, 1990, at 39, 42.
The need for intra-format diversity, as well as incentives to program for more narrowly
defined audiences, is likely to increase, even on television. This in turn might create economic
incentives for broadcasters to air less sexually timid shows. In addition to the common assump-
tion that "sex sells," and that there may be a connection between economic downturns and the
rise in sexually explicit programming, see e.g., PAUL OLIVER, SCREENING THE BLUES, supra
note 118, at 181, the existence of sexually explicit programming on cable pay channels suggests
that there are at least some demographic niches whose viewing tastes would be satisfied by such
fare.
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rejects the idea of testing broadcasts by reference to narrow communities in
order to promote diversity.
b. The FCC's Narrow Lens
The implicit regulatory tilt of the FCC's indecency standard is also re-
flected in the narrow scope of the Commission's review of material challenged
for indecency. Consideration of a whole work, and not only its "dirty" parts,
can save challenged material from a finding of obscenity.367 Conversely, the
Commission's narrow compass for the assessment of offensiveness has the pre-
dictable effect of making it reasonably easy to find material indecent. Under
its approach to indecency regulation, the Commission does not use a broad-
cast day schedule, or even the entire text of a program, in order to determine
whether or not the station has broadcast indecent material.368 Songs alone are
the discrete units assessed in some indecency findings, with the live and free-
wheeling character of the program as a whole considered irrelevant. 369 More-
over, even to the extent that the Commission looks at whether the material
was isolated or fleeting, the real question is "fleeting compared to what?"
Challenged speech may well fail the "fleeting or isolated" test if assessed with
a narrow compass. 370 The Commission's approach consists simply of pluck-
367. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (proposing that the sexual material
must be assessed in the context of the whole work rather than in isolation); see also TRIBE, supra
note 359, at 909. This element of the Miller test and its immediate predecessors constitutes a
reversal of the early standard for obscenity established in Regina v. Hicklin, 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360,
371 (1868), under which the permissibility of a work was to be judged by the "tendency" even
of its isolated sexual passages to "deprave and corrupt those minds that are open to such influ-
ences." See also Meisler, supra note 353, at 272-74; Filthy Words, the FCC, and the First
Amendment: Regulating Broadcast Obscenity, 61 VA. L. REv. 579, 627-30 (1975) [hereinafter
Filthy Words].
368. In the WYSP case featuring the early Howard Stem material, the Commission stated
that "the tape recordings were considered in their entirety." In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp.
(WYSP(FM)), 2 F.C.C.R. 2705, 2706 (1987). However, claims that it considered the whole
program have not surfaced in the Commission's subsequent decisions. Further, it is not entirely
clear what the Commission's consideration entailed in the WYSP case. There is no indication of
how many broadcasts the "tape recordings" contained or what length of time they encom-
passed. Moreover, the Commission's citation to the problematic material in isolation precludes
any independent assessment of the Commission's conclusory characterization of its "contex-
tual" review.
369. See, eg., In re Evergreen Media Corp., Licensee of Radio Station (WLUP(AM)), 6
F.C.C.R. 502, 503 (1991) (imposing forfeiture order despite station's claim that the context of
the program was an "extemporaneous, frank, live and spontaneous, open forum, often humor-
ous but never pandering or titillating, often discussing important public issues and incorporat-
ing listener comments in over half of its dialogue (subject to WLUP's reasonable seven-second
screenings)"); Independent Group Limited Partnership (WWWE(AM)), 6 F.C.C.R. 3711
(1990); Cox Enterprises, Inc. (In re WIOD), 6 F.C.C.R. 3704 (1989) ("Whether or not the
context of the entire Neil Rogers Show dwelt on sexual themes, the songs themselves provide
sufficient context to determine their patent offensiveness and can be considered discrete
units ... ").
370. The station argued in Sagittarius that the written excerpts of the Howard Stern show
at issue there "exaggerate and concentrate the fleeting nature of the references which were
extended throughout an entire program." Sagittarius Broadcasting Corp., 5 F.C.C.R. 7291,
7292 (1990).
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ing out of a program its most striking and egregious sexual references. This
does not allow the sexual material to be "diluted" by a more broad-ranging
consideration of the particular program or the entire programming schedule.
It also sometimes precludes a clear understanding of either the meanings of
the sexual language used in context or their derivation.71 Indeed, the full
program is considered by the Commission only as an aggravating, rather than
mitigating, factor in the offensiveness inquiry.3 72 It follows that the FCC is
apt to consider a number of unadulterated sexual references to be offensive,
appraised in the abstract, even though they might be unlikely to be perceived
as assaultive by the audience if widely dispersed and explained.
In light of the narrow scope of its review, it is not surprising that the
Commission also ignores the character of the broadcast market in which the
challenged material appears. Except for a reference to the presence of chil-
dren, the FCC does not attempt to determine the composition of the station's
audience or the larger social context in which the sexually explicit material is
heard. In making its determinations of indecency, the agency neglects to look
at what other material is available in the culture. Despite the potential tilt of
using such a narrow scope in considering the context of challenged material,
the Commission neither addresses nor justifies the highly contingent nature of
its inquiry.
a The Elusive Manner/Subject Distinction
The Commission's asserted distinction between the subject of sexuality
and the manner of its presentation is both manipulable and potentially inco-
herent. The most dangerous aspect of the distinction is that it can disguise
attempts by the architects of the controversy over indecency to suppress se-
lected substantive speech about sexuality. Specifically, it can cause favorable
depictions of disfavored practices such as homosexuality to be suppressed
while preserving deniability against charges of discrimination.373
Because the manner and style of expression sometimes may be as substan-
tive an element of the message as the subject matter itself,374 it is disingenuous
for the Commission to suggest that its manner/subject distinction is simply a
means of stripping away extraneous and gratuitously offensive speech.375 The
371. In recent enforcement actions, the best example of this is the Howard Stem Christ-
mas party skit, which is very difficult to decipher in the snippet form provided in the Commis-
sion's case appendix. See Sagittarius Broadcasting Corp., 5 F.C.C.R. at 7293-94.
372. KGB, Inc. (KGB-FM), 7 F.C.C.R. 3207 (1992).
373. For example, Senator Helms stated that Jerker "is a sick, sick discussion between two
homosexuals on how they perform their perversion[,]" making it clear that he objected as much
to the substance of what was portrayed in the broadcast as to the manner in which it was
portrayed. 134 CONG. REc. S9885, S9912 (1988); see also Cordoba, supra note 353, at 637-43.
374. See, eg., Post, The Constitutional Concept, supra note 41, at 663 n.314 ("mhe dis-
tinction between style and substance is tenuous and unconvincing: often how something is said
determines what is said."); see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); see also supra Part I, text
accompanying notes 47-50 (discussing the emotive character of sex-referential speech).
375. See, e-g., In re Peter Branton, 6 F.C.C.R. 610 (1991) (finding that words were not
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very determination of extraneousness is a substantive assessment based on cul-
tural understandings." 6
Moreover, the Commission's characterizations of what constitutes an un-
acceptable manner of presentation beg the very questions they presume to an-
swer and effectively conflate the distinction between manner and subject. For
example, characterizing the offensiveness of certain sexual material as inhering
in its "vulgar" or "shocking" character is simply an unsupported and circular
conclusion. It is useless to look to the concept of "vulgarity" in order to make
clear and predictable the concept of "patent offensiveness." Nor do the Com-
mission's conclusory assertions as to the vulgarity of material take into ac-
count the class-based social aspects of such characterizations. 3 " The
Commission has articulated its distinction between the subject of sex and the
manner of its presentation by asking whether programs deal with sex in a
"pandering and titillating manner." In light of the imprecision of the notion
of "pandering," the FCC fails in this attempt to define what might be offensive
about the manner in which sexually explicit speech is presented.3 78 The im-
precision of the "pandering" concept is aggravated by the Commission's fail-
ure to articulate any particular rationale for its view that pandering and
titillating presentations of sexual matter are patently offensive. The Commis-
used gratuitously in legitimate news report). The Commission first explicitly articulated the
distinction between form and content in In re WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d 408, 415 (1970) (find-
ing that the expletives used in the broadcast of an interview with Jerry Garcia of the Grateful
Dead were unnecessary, "gratuitous," and served no social purpose).
376. WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d at 422-23 (Johnson, dissenting) (discussing the extent to
which the manner/substance distinction discriminates by culture and is used particularly to
combat counter-cultural speech).
377. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2566 (1971) (tracing the
term "vulgar" to the Latin "vulgaris," or "of the mob, of the common people").
378. For a critique of the concept of "pandering" as an aggravating factor in the determi-
nation of obscenity in cases such as Ginsburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1965), see TRIBE,
supra note 359, at 911; see also Andrea L. Bonnicksen, Obscenity Reconsidered: Bringing Broad-
casting into the Mainstream Commentary, 14 VAL. U. L. REV. 261, 273 (1980); Gey, supra note
43, at 1574. Pandering is problematically vague in the obscenity context; it is all the more so in
the broader and more amorphous indecency arena.
In many of its indecency enforcement actions, the Commission's focus on "pandering and
titillating" presentations appears to raise a passion/reason dichotomy, as does the Supreme
Court's current obscenity standard. The focus on the leering manner of presentation reflects, at
some level, the notion that obscenity is excluded from the realm of First Amendment protection
because it appeals not to reason and probity, but to assertedly unmediated passion. See supra
note 197 and text accompanying notes 62-63; infra notes 448-55. In Ginzburg v. United States,
383 U.S. 463, 470 (1966), for example, the Court found sexually-oriented materials constitution-
ally unpalatable because they stimulated the reader to "look[] for titillation, not for saving
intellectual content." Similarly, the purported distinction between reason and passion has been
used to justify a First Amendment approach that excludes obscene speech from constitutional
protection. See, e.g., John Finnis, "Reason and Passion". The Constitutional Dialectic of Free
Speech and Obscenity, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 222 (1967). It is beyond the scope of this Article to
elaborate a critique of obscenity law or of the role in obscenity doctrine of a distinction between
reason and passion or, indeed, to stake out a position on the continuing controversy over
pornography.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
[VCol. XX:49
BROADCAST INDECENCY
sion's failure to provide such a grounding leaves the concept entirely without
form.
Although one can speculate as to potential rationales, each variation
raises problems for the Commission's manner/subject distinction. One possi-
ble rationale rests on the observation that when something is presented in a
pandering and titillating manner, it is made attractive and desirable. 7 9 The
manner of presentation thus may be part of the substantive view of sexuality
that the speaker espoused. If that is the case, it may well be that the FCC does
not want to be in the position of condoning certain sorts of public sexual activ-
ities or depictions. This might be because the agency panders to the moralistic
homophobia of the religious right. Alternatively, the agency might disapprove
of pandering descriptions of sexuality because they objectify or commodify
sexuality. As noted above, social theorists on both the right and the left have
criticized the objectification and depersonalization of sexuality.3"' Some of the
language in the Supreme Court's opinion in Pacifica suggests a parallel ap-
proach.8 At least one problem exists with this argument as a ground for the
FCC's indecency policy: sexuality, gender, and the consumption of products
have become so linked in our culture that it would be difficult to mark the
outer boundaries of the Commission's regulatory intervention. 8
Another option is to suggest, on the basis of now-conventional, middle-
class morality, that indecent expression simply mixes up the categories of pub-
lic and private. On this view, a certain level of reticence about private matters
is necessary for a civilized society.38 3 In a similar vein, it might be argued that
379. This may be the meaning of Commissioner Duggan's unexplained reference to pan-
dering as "catering to low tastes" in his Branton dissent. In re Peter Branton, 6 F.C.C.R. 610,
611 (1991). There appear to be two ways in which material may be sexually pandering or
titillating. First, the material can be a serious depiction of sexuality and have the effect of
arousing the audience. This is akin to the prurient appeal of sexually explicit material that
might be considered obscene under the prevailing Miller standard. Alternatively, material may
titillate not through direct prurient appeal, but by turning people's attention to matters of sex
through humor.
380. See, eg, Cass Sunstein, Neutrality, supra note 42, at 181-89; discussion supra at notes
72-78.
381. The plurality opinion in Pacifica expressed concern that sexually explicit language
might be "debasing" and "brutalizing" to human beings "by reducing them to their mere bodily
functions." 438 U.S. 726, 746 n.23 (1978) (quoting the Commission's ruling below in 56
F.C.C.2d at 98). Thus, what appear to be concerns about the objectification of people are con-
sistent with, if not identical to, concerns about commodified sexuality. See also Sunstein, Neu-
trality, supra note 42, at 18 (suggesting that people who believe that sexuality is private and
sacred often favor the regulation of pornography to protect sexuality from the "exploitative and
degrading depictions of the marketplace," just as feminists argue for regulation on the ground
that pornography debases and objectifies women).
382. See EWvEN, supra note 75, at 47-50 (analyzing the connection between product adver-
tising and eroticism/desire); HAUG, supra note 77, at 55 (describing the sexualization of ob-
jects); see also supra text accompanying notes 72-78 (discussing the image of sexuality in
consumer culture as a counterpoint to the view of sex as necessarily empowering).
383. See NORBERT ELIAS, THE CIVILIZING PROCESS: THE HISTORY OF MANNERS 169-91
(1978) (describing the history of "the civilizing process" as involving an increasing reluctance,
after the Middle Ages, to talk openly and publicly about matters of sexuality, and a connection
increasingly felt between sexuality and shame or embarrassment); KAREN HALTruNEN, CoN-
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when material is sensationalistic in style, it necessarily is presented in a pan-
dering fashion. Nevertheless, the private/public distinction does not answer
the question of what should be kept limited to the private realm and which
public references to sexuality, whether in substance or style, should be charac-
terized as offensive. Moreover, in addition to potential conflicts with ques-
tions of merit, critiques based on sensationalism historically share a class-
based, rationalistic bias.384 Most importantly, all of these rationales are sub-
ject to the argument that any attempt by the FCC to address or influence the
substantive content of sexual speech would conflate the distinction that the
agency originally drew between manner and substance and thus would conflict
with the Commission's asserted desire to punish not the choice of subject mat-
ter, but only the manner of presentation.
Further complicating the analysis is that the FCC's imprecise focus on
the pandering manner of presentation effectively puts at risk whole forms of
bawdy humor and song. An overview of recent material that the Commission
found indecent demonstrates an increasing focus on more or less coded hu-
morous plays on words385 on the ground of their pandering and titillating
overtones. The Commission's approach to the double entendre both dessicates
the form and serves as a good example of a context in which the Commission's
manner/subject distinction becomes unworkable. The whole point of double
entendre is that it be understood; it is pointless otherwise. Double entendre
simultaneously leads to snickering over the shared joke and convinces the
hearer of the speaker's verbal cleverness. This dual aspect is the source of the
amusing character of the reference. The manner of its presentation - the
signal that the dual meaning of the reference is being mined - is, in a funda-
mental way, the substance of the form. In addition to undermining the man-
ner/subject distinction, the Commission's approach to the double entendre
FIDENCE MEN AND PAINTED WOMEN: A STUDY OF MIDDLE-CLASS CULTURE IN AMERICA
1830-1870 104 (1982) (describing rituals of etiquette and privacy developed by the antebellum
middle class and the reflection of those rituals in the geography of the home). Reticence and
privacy have been said to reflect a mode of social life in which individuals perceive their status
as dependent on inner virtue and believe that outward conduct reflects inner virtue, thus requir-
ing at least the appearance of complete bodily self-restraint. See also Robert P. George, Moral-
istic Liberalism and Legal Moralism, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1415, 1422 (1990) (discussing the
immorality of immodesty, according to moral conservatives).
384. Charges of sensationalism - exaggerated appeals to emotion - historically have a
class-based aspect. In the press context, criticism based on sensationalism had its roots in the
"moral war" waged by respectable newspapers of the educated middle and upper classes in the
1880s and 1890s against the "yellow sheets," which carried sensationalistic human interest sto-
ries and were geared to appeal to immigrants and the uneducated middle and working classes.
MICHAEL SCHUDSON, DISCOVERING THE NEWS 99, 101, 112-14 (1978).
385. In recent years, the Commission has found several types of double entendre to be
indecent. Some of the challenged material consisted of classic plays on words; such double
entendres have been the traditional stuff of wit, both puerile and sophisticated. Other chal-
lenged programming contained sexual references that were not terribly clear or explicit and that
lacked the character of wit and cleverness associated with the classic double entendre. For a
discussion of double entendre and indecency, see Schrier, supra note 356, at 90; see also supra
text accompanying notes 44-46, 52-56, 104-06, 270-72, 291-97 and infra text accompanying
notes 392-94.
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leads to the ironic conclusion that its regulatory net might snare more coded
material than overt discussions of sexuality. Indeed, a serious enforcement
policy could lead to the all-but-elimination of a whole genre of popular Ameri-
can humor. In light of the prevalence of the double entendre in modem hu-
mor and its characteristic appearance in African-American musical forms
such as the blues, for example,3"6 the application of the manner/subject dis-
tinction to broadcast sex talk can have unexpectedly skewing cultural effects.
d. The Uncertain Place of Merit
The Commission's treatment of merit, as yet one more factor to address
in its contextual assessment of potentially indecent material, is also problem-
atic in ways that belie the Commission's assumption of "patently" obvious
answers on indecency questions addressed in context.
First, even if the Commission were committed to some "appropriate"
consideration of merit as a mitigating factor in indecency, many today would
argue that the merit inquiry is incoherent on its face. On this view, the tradi-
tional distinction between works of artistic merit and other expressive works is
an illusory difference inappropriate in a postmodern landscape.38 7 Holders of
this opinion would suggest that, among works containing sexually explicit ma-
terial, there is no neutral definitional principle by which one could distinguish
works with merit from those without. Thus, they would consider the Com-
mission incapable of developing rationalizable content for its merit-based con-
textual inquiry.
Second, even if the merit inquiry were substantively justifiable and a con-
sensus could be reached at least on the existence of degrees of merit, the con-
cept is nevertheless highly manipulable and far from value-neutral. It requires
the decision maker to take substantive positions on the value and purpose of
material asserted to be art. The dangers of allowing governmental agents to
determine the merit of expressive works are quite obvious.388 At best, we
could argue that the discretionary character of the inquiry makes it difficult to
predict how the Commission would take the merit factor into account. At
worst, it suggests that the Commission can use the cloak of "merit language"
to make substantive decisions on other grounds without considering merit at
all. Most likely, the presence of discretion suggests that the standard is often
used conventionally and conservatively. Both critiques can come into play
386. See supra text accompanying notes 121-25.
387. See generally Amy M. Adler, Post-Modem Art and the Death of Obscenity Law, 99
YALE L.J. 1359 (1990). At least since Marcel Duchamp and the Dada movement conflated the
distinction between art and mass production by recognizing collections of produced objects as
art, there has been a move in the art world to undermine the distinction between the highbrow
world of "fine" art and the lowbrow universe of everything else. This tendency to subvert old
categories is even more pronounced now as part of a postmodern, iconoclastic aesthetic. In a
world of deconstructionists, surely anything can be characterized as art. But see Robert
Hughes, Art, Morals; and Politics, N.Y. REV. OF BooKs, Apr. 23, 1992, at 21-27.
388. See supra text accompanying notes 338-43, for a discussion of the Commission's
treatment of merit in the news context.
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when the Commission decides to evaluate merit as a factor in its indecency
decisions. As Justice Holmes recognized, albeit in a different context, govern-
mental decisions on the merit of art tend to promote conventionalism. 38 9 The
attempt to regulate away shock radio programs like those of Howard Stern is
a current context in which to address issues of conventionalism. Surely, Mr.
Stem's programming is self-consciously designed to be unconventional and
challenging to authority.3 90 Moreover, a review of the FCC's decisions in the
indecency area suggests that they are animated by a socially conservative
vision.
The history of the Commission's approach to sexually explicit speech for
which claims of merit could be made is instructive in this connection. Polit-
ical aspects of indecent material, both implicitly and explicitly critical of con-
ventional and conservative viewpoints, have been insufficient to deter the
FCC's imposition of sanctions. Merit-based and political arguments can be
made about Pacifica itself, to which the current Commission refers as if it were
the uncontroversial starting point of inquiry in the indecency area. George
Carlin, who has been a social satirist for the past several decades and tends to
ridicule government and conventional society, specializes in iconoclastic rou-
tines of a liberal or progressive political bent.391 In the monologue at issue in
Pacifica, Carlin attempted to focus attention on the hypocrisy of double enten-
dres and the fact that government purported to protect us from "dirty" words
in broadcasting while leading us into the Vietnam war.392 The self-conscious
use of these words was designed to make a point, yet the Commission did not
look at the meaning and intent of the words in the context of the monologue.
It focused instead on the broadcast of the words themselves and disapproved
their use in any context so long as children might be present in the broadcast
audience.
The same approach prevails with the current Commission. In 1989,
WLLZ(FM) was fined for its 1988 broadcast of Walk With an Erection, a
389. "It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the
narrowest and most obvious limits. At one extreme, some works of genius would be
sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the
public had learned the new language in which their author spoke.... At the other
end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated
than the judge.
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903) (adopting what has
come to be known as the anti-discrimination principle in copyright).
390. This is not the point at which to address the issue of whether Stern-type shock pro-
gramming is in fact as unconventional as its propagandists suggest it is intended to be. Suffice it
to say that the extraordinary commercial acceptance of the form suggests otherwise, as does the
rather typical set of stereotypes on which Stem relies in order to construct his assertedly taboo-
smashing diatribes.
391. See, e.g., Lawrence Christon, Facing Ourselves With Two Veteran Social Observers,
L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 14, 1991, at F6; William Grimes, George Carlin: Small but Amusing, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 1992, at C13; Patricia Smith, To Carlin, 'Lifestyle' is a Dirty Word, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 20, 1991, at 9.
392. See supra note 188.
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parody of the Bangles' popular song Walk Like An Egyptian.393 Walk With
an Erection used sexually descriptive slang (such as "hard on" and "pink
dolphin"), contained rather clear descriptions of masturbation, and used a sex-
ual metaphor to make a political attack on the police.39 4
At the same time, two Miami radio stations were fined in connection with
the broadcast, inter alia, of the feminist, satirical song Penis Envy3 s on a
393. Legacy Broadcasting of Detroit (WLLZ(FM)), 6 F.C R. 3698 (1991).
394. He puts the Penthouse in his desk
He's got big muscles in his wrist
He holds his organ in his fist
He gives his pink dolphin (?) a mighty twist
All the boys from Maine to Mexico
Are all obsessed with sex and blow
Like the cop who carries a big night stick
It's just an extension of his wick
He busts those hookers on the block
Unless they give service 'round the clock
Goes home to wife and kids so nice
Although he gets off on working vice
All the girls from B.U. they say, "Hard-on,
hard-on, beg my pardon"
Walk with an erection
Walk with an erection.
Id.
395. The lyrics of to the song are as follows:
If I had a penis, I'd wear it outside
In cafes and car lots, with pomp and with pride
If I had a penis, I'd pamper it proper
I'd stay in the tub and use me as the stopper
If I had a penis, I'd take it to parties
I'd stretch it and stroke it and shove it at smarties
I'd take it to pet shows and teach it to stay
I'd stuff it in turkeys on Thanksgiving Day
I'd rival my buddies in sports cars with stick shifts (2)
I'd shower my spire with girlies and gifts
I'd peek around comers, I'd aim at my toilet
I'd poke it at foreigners, and soap it and oil it
If I had a penis, I'd run to my mother
Comb out the hair and compare it to brother
I'd lance her, I'd knight her, my hands would indulge
Pants would seem tighter and buckle and bulge
A penis to plunder, a penis to push
Cause one in the hand is worth one in the bush
A penis to love me, a penis to share
To pick up and play with when nobody's there
I'd sit like a guy, I'd straddle the chair
I'd play with my fly, I'd beat it with care
I'd dip it in chocolate, I'd stick it in sockets
I'd stroll to the movies with hands deep in pockets
I'd stick it in vacuums on vacant verandas
Gas-guzzling Volvos and poodles and pandas
And puddles and drainpipes and doggies and ditches
And potholes and bottles and bitches
Zucchinis and zebras, tomatoes, tomah-toes
And pineapples, pumpkins, and gulches and grottos
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morning shock radio show in 1987.396 The Commission also rejected station
WFBQ's claim of news value in connection with its broadcast of material that
had been targeted by the FCC and alluded to in the reports of local
newspapers. s97
Similarly, the critical acclaim received by Robert Chesley's Jerker did not
dissuade the Commission from finding it indecent (and even potentially ob-
scene), although it was broadcast with content warnings to a self-selected
nighttime audience.3a 8 The explicit homoerotic character of much of the ma-
terial challenged both convention and conservative social viewpoints.
As discussed above, the influence of religious social conservatives is even
more dramatically evident in the Commission's failure to recognize the
"merit" or "news" quality of a radio program in which an announcer read
portions of the Playboy article recounting Jessica Hahn's claim that Reverend
Jim Bakker raped her.399
In a less pedestrian vein, the Commission also refused to give Pacifica a
declaratory ruling of acceptability on one of its stations' planned readings
from James Joyce's Ulysses, traditionally scheduled to take place on Bloom-
sday.4  Having once survived an obscenity prosecution,4"' Joyce's work was
again subjected to the mercy of government censors. The station's failure to
And melons and marshmallows, gloves and gorillas
Slurpees and slippers, Chinooks and chinchillas
A penis to plunder, a penis to push
Cause one in the hand is worth one in the bush
A penis to love me, a penis to share
To pick up and play with when nobody's there
If I had a penis, I'd climb every mountain
I'd force it on females, I'd pee like a fountain
If I had a penis, I'd still be a girl
But I'd make much more money and conquer the world.
In re Guy Gannett Publishing Co., WZTA(FM), 5 F.C.C.R. 7688, 7689-90 (1990).
Interestingly, the station owner did not try to make a political argument about this song
but simply claimed that it was innuendo-laden, "silly and puerile," and not pandering or titil-
lating. The response to the FCC's Notice of Apparent Liability also argued that since the sta-
tion forbade this song and any sexual references by Neil Rogers in the future, it should not be
exposed to a forfeiture. Id. at 7688.
396. News: Feds to the Rescuel Foul-Mouthed Radio Doomed, NEW TIMES, Nov. 8-14,
1989, at 4; Cox Enterprises (In re WIOD), 6 F.C.C.R. 3704 (1991); In re Guy Gannett Publish-
ing Co. (WZTA-FM), 6 F.C.C.R. 3702 (1991), on reconsideration, 5 F.C.C.R. 7688 (1990); see
also FCC Turns up the Heat on Indecency, BROADCASTING, Aug. 28, 1989, at 27 (containing
transcripts of other programs censored by the FCC in 1989).
397. Great American Television & Radio Co., Inc. (WFBQ(FM) & WNDE(AM)), 6
F.C.C.R. 3692, 3694 n.1 (1990).
398. See supra text accompanying note 259.
399. Pacific & Southern Co. (KSD-FM), 6 F.C.C.R. 3689 (1991); see supra discussion at
notes 340-42 and accompanying text.
400. In re Pacifica Found., Inc. (WBAI(FM)), 2 F.C.C.R. 3957 (1987); see also Crigler &
Byrnes, supra note 36, at 347. Nevertheless, the program was broadcast without FCC
sanctions.
401. For a readable description of the obscenity prosecution, see EDWARD DE GRAZIA,
GIRLS LEAN BACK EVERYWHERE: THE LAW OF OBSCENITY AND THE ASSAULT ON GENIUS
7-39 (1992).
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identify its planned program as consisting of Joyce excerpts - and the Com-
mission's initial failure to recognize the work and exempt it from challenge -
highlighted the Commission's difficulties with the merit factor.402
Finally, in a further twist on the merit question, one could characterize
even such shock radio programs as Howard Stem's as containing political
content." 3 Many of the scatological and sexual comments made by Stem,
however insulting and demeaning, are made in response to matters of the day
on which Stern sees fit to comment. The Commission's failure even to advert
to the politically-grounded character of at least some of the shock program-ing that includes sex talk suggests the agency's inability to take account of
claims of merit in controversial circumstances.
a The "Chilling Effect" and the Irrelevance of Repentance
Even the FCC's enforcement strategy contains something of an implicit
conservative bias because of its predictably Chilling effect on broadcast speech.
After the FCC's adoption of its 1987 indecency guidelines, alternative and
public stations carefully considered whether their planned programming
would pass muster under the new rules, and some cancelled previously sched-
uled shows.' Even the stations that did not do so sought declaratory advice
from the Commission with regard to their programming plans.4°5 Self-censor-
ship at the public station level was also promoted by the general atmosphere of
controversy created during the past several years by conservative attacks on
public funding of art with sexual content. For example, seventeen public tele-
vision stations in the top fifty markets refused to air a documentary on Black
gay life entitled Tongues Untied because of its depictions of nudity and sexual-
ity." 6 New developments enhance the likelihood of censorship and self-con-
straint. Jesse Helms, joining Pat Buchanan's presidential campaign ads in
focusing on Tongues Untied, criticized the program for being about "homosex-
ual men dancing around naked." The continued existence of some program-
ming that refers to sexuality in more or less explicit ways does not undermine
the self-censorship concern. Discourse does not have to be frozen in order to
exhibit significant signs of chill. The concern about chill is particularly
weighty in light of the Commission's striking new tendency to impose very
402. Before the Commission denied a declaratory judgment, Commissioner James Quello
stated publicly that he thought the highlighted Ulysses material was "probably indecent."
Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 36, at 347 (quoting the Commissioner as saying that, although he
had never read the Joyce book, its swear words "are stuff you deck someone over," and as
expressing his surprise that the book had become a "classic").
403. See also infra text accompanying note 549.
404. Corn-Revere, supra note 266, at 29; Crook, supra note 266.
405. Corn-Revere, supra note 266, at 28-29; see also In re Pacifica Found., Inc.
(WBAI(FM)), 2 F.C.C.R. 3957 (1987) (petitioning FCC for a declaratory ruling on a proposed
broadcast of an excerpt from James Joyce's Ulysses); Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 36, at 338-41.
406. See, e.g., Kit Boss, Public TV Too Liberal, Say Conservatives, SEATrLE TIMEs, Apr.
5, 1992, at L8; Rich Brown, P.O. V Gets More Money More Flak, BROADCASTING, Nov. 18,
1991; John Leonard, Culture Shock, NENVSDAY (Nassau and Suffolk ed.), Mar. 5, 1992, at 64.
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stiff fines for indecency. The stiffer the potential fine, the less likely are mini-
mally-funded alternative stations to take the financial risk of airing controver-
sial sex talk. Although broadcaster testimonials of a chilling effect may be
thought suspect because of their inherently self-serving character,4 "7 there is
sufficient evidence of broadcaster concern and action to substantiate claims of
a newly constrained approach to programming. Even commercial stations are
not immune: many licensees have publicly apologized for their programming
and reprimanded, fired, or suspended offending disc jockeys upon mere in-
quiry by the Commission." 8
The FCC's reassurances that it applies its indecency regulations only as
the context warrants are put into question by the agency's effective refusal to
consider as mitigating factors either (1) explanations for error and claims of
good-faith attempts to comply with the rules, or (2) apologies, self-regulation,
and self-policing by the broadcast entities targeted.4°9
In the contexts of many of its other regulations, the agency has been care-
ful to give a significant amount of leeway for broadcaster discretion and good-
faith broadcaster judgments.41 0 That has clearly been the case, for example, in
other content-related areas in which the Commission has decided that defer-
ence to good-faith broadcaster discretion would maximally promote First
Amendment interests in editorial freedom. In the context of indecency regula-
tion historically, abject apologies and self-imposed punitive measures by
broadcasters sometimes have served to stave off Commission sanctions. 1'
Since 1987, by stark contrast, the FCC has not allowed broadcasters to clean
up their own houses in connection with indecency, despite the agency's assur-
ance that it "generally considers prompt and effective remedial action by a
licensee in determining the appropriate sanction level .... ,,411 A number of
broadcasters have explicitly apologized for the remarks of their on-air person-
alities, have suspended or fired responsible personnel for having violated
agency policy, and - despite clear evidence of self-censorship - have never-
theless had to bear the imposition of sanctions.413
407. Even this concern may be more illusory than real. The Commission itself pointed
out, in another context, that reputational concerns, among other factors, provide disincentives
for broadcasters to admit to such chilling effects. Fairness Report, 102 F.C.C.2d 143, 180-82
(1985); see also Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 662-64 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990). Thus, while there is a self-serving character to the protestations
of institutions arguing for the elimination of the assertedly chilling rules, the reputational con-
cerns of such institutions may temper the incentives to exaggerate such claims.
408. See infra text accompanying notes 413-15.
409. Admittedly, the FCC rhetoric only relies on context with respect to the determination
of the decency of the material, rather than its actionability once indecency is found.
410. Cf In re Peter Branton, 6 F.C.C.R. 610 (1991) (noting that the FCC "traditionally
[has] been reluctant to intervene in the editorial judgments of broadcast licensees on how best to
present public affairs programming to their listeners").
411. See, e.g., Mile High Stations, Inc., 28 F.C.C. 795 (1960), discussed supra note 179.
412. Narragansett Broadcasting Co. (KSJO(FM)), 5 F.C.C.R. 3821 (1990).
413. See, e.g., KGB Inc. (KGB-FM), 7 F.C.C.R. 3207 (1992) (issuing Notice of Apparent
Liability for $25,000 forfeiture due to broadcast of Candy Wrapper and Sit on My Face, despite
the station's assurances that the disc jockey was admonished, the broadcasts were contrary to
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Once having decided to impose sanctions, the Commission has refused to
back down simply because broadcasters argue that their broadcasts of inde-
cency were inadvertent or, at worst, unavoidably small side-effects of human
error occasioned by the live format of controversial, socially-useful
programming.4 14
Finally, the Commission has considered broadcaster's failure to self-cen-
sor in response to previous FCC rulings to be an effectively aggravating cir-
cumstance deserving of punitive sanctions. This is so despite the fact that the
agency claims to apply a contextual determination of indecency, whereby the
same material could be considered either actionably indecent or perfectly ac-
ceptable, depending on the case and context. In one case, a station claimed to
have mistakenly broadcast a song that the FCC had found indecent when
played by another station. Nevertheless, the FCC imposed an extra $12,500
fine for the broadcast precisely because the agency had found the material
indecent previously.415
What can be made of the agency's decision to ignore error-based explana-
station policy, and the records had been destroyed); WYBB(FM), COMM. DAILY, Feb. 25, 1992
(imposing sanction despite the station's claim that the broadcast was in violation of its policy
and that the disc jockeys involved were "severely admonished," suspended without pay, and
subsequently placed on probation for some time); Narragansett Broadcasting Co. (KSJO(FM)),
5 F.C.C.R. 3821 (1990) (holding that a licensee's action in suspending an oflending disc jockey
was not adequate to stave off a $20,000 fine because it was not triggered by the indecency
policy); In re Guy Gannett Publishing Co. (VZTA-FM), 5 F.C.C.R. 7688, 7689 (1990) (impos-
ing forfeiture despite the licensee's installation of a stringent station policy, forbidding disc
jockey Neil Rogers from mentioning anything sexual and withholding money from his
paycheck for violation of company policy, because nearly two months had elapsed between the
subject broadcast and the remedial actions); Pacific & Southern Co. (KSD-FM), 6 F.C.C.R.
3689 (1990) (imposing forfeiture for the Jessica Hahn broadcast despite the fact that station
management admonished employees who aired the material). The Commission is also investi-
gating WWZZ(FM), as noted above, for an innuendo-laden promotional announcement. This
apparently stringent indecency inquiry is particularly surprising in light of the fact that the
station had not used the promo for some time and had changed formats from album-oriented
rock to country. Harry A. Jessell, FCC Puts Broadcasters on Notice For Indecency, BROAD-
CASTING, Mar. 2, 1992, at 29-30. Recent newspaper reports reveal that one station previously
fined for airing Howard Stem material is now editing The Stern Show prior to broadcast. Clau-
dia Puig, Stern Editing Elicits a New Kind of Shock, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1993, at Fl; Claudia
Puig, Editing of Stern Show Admitted, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 12, 1993, at Fl.
414. In one case, a station mistakenly broadcast two jokes as part of a call-in best-joke
contest. Focusing on the fact that the contest was live and not subject to any delay mechanism,
the FCC held it to be irrelevant that the jokes were broadcast only because the callers changed
their jokes once they were on the air, thus circumventing the station's screening procedures.
Jessell, FCC Puts Broadcasters on Notice, supra note 405, at 29-30. The investigation was un-
dertaken by the Commission despite the station's contemporaneous apologies to its audience
and its disqualification of the joke-tellers from the contest. Id.; see also Sound Broadcasting
Corp. (KCNA-FM), 6 F.C.C.R. 2174 (1991) (terminating a call after a joke is "belated action"
that "cannot excuse" the violation, given that the material would not have aired at all if the
station had employed adequate screening techniques).
415. KGB Inc. (KGB-FM), 7 F.C.C.R. 3207 (1992) (imposing a S25,000 fine on a station
that broadcast Candy Wrapper, in light of the station's knowledge that the FCC previously had
found the song indecent when broadcast by Neil Rogers (in Miami)). Cf. In re Evergreen
(WLUP(AM) Chicago), 1993 FCC LEXIS 832 (Feb. 19, 1993) and supra notes 233, 303.
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tions and abject apologies? In the few cases in which the Commission actually
addressed the question, it effectively characterized the apologies and self-cen-
sorship measures as "too little, too late." One could argue, then, that the
agency was engaged in the minutiae of context analysis, assessing on a case-by-
case basis the bonafides of claims of repentance. This argument has particular
force in light of the FCC's apparently underlying suspicion, in the context of
shock radio programs, that the measures of repentance undertaken by the tar-
get broadcasters were really small sacrifices made to evade sanctions, that
some of the station-imposed punishments for on-air indecency were minimal
and quickly reversed, and that the broadcast stations actually had policies
pressing their on-air personalities to engage in sex talk as close to the line as
possible, while still disclaiming corporate responsibility when particular an-
nouncers "got caught."
The message to be gleaned form the Commission's published approach to
error, apology, and self-censorship is unmistakable. Whatever the reason, I
am aware of no instances in which a broadcast station has received the benefit
of the Commission's mercy after the agency had deemed its broadcasts other-
wise indecent. This stance has surely had the effect, intended or not, of send-
ing a "strict liability" message to all broadcasters, not only the shock radio
jocks trying to test regulatory limits. Strict liability is likely to reinforce con-
servatism, particularly on stations that otherwise might have broadcast more
politically progressive fare.
III
THE LIMITS OF THE EXISTING DOCTRINAL VOCABULARY
The existing legal vocabulary that has been called upon to address the
problem of indecency, as defined by the FCC, is largely that of constitutional
and administrative law. Challengers of the Commission's broadcast indecency
enforcement have relied on free speech precedent, have deployed notions of
unconstitutional vagueness and overbreadth, and have mounted claims of fail-
ure in the administrative process. This Part argues that although both consti-
tutional law doctrine and principles of administrative law supply persuasive
arguments for a traditional critique of the generic definition of indecency and
the FCC's censorial role, those arguments are subject to challenge. Constitu-
tional and administrative law can be mined to equal profit for arguments in
support of the FCC's intervention. Most fundamentally, neither use of the
doctrines in the field of litigation thus far has focused on the complex reality
that is at stake in the FCC policy of suppressing broadcast indecency.
A. The Indefiniteness of Current Constitutional Argument in
Resolving the Dispute
The constitutional status of the FCC's generic definition of indecency is
an open question. The Commission's sanguine assurance that its definition
has already implicitly passed constitutional muster in the Supreme Court's
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
[Vol. XX:49
BROADCAST INDECENCY
decisions is highly overstated. Indeed, powerful claims of unconstitutional
vagueness and overbreadth can be made by challengers to the FCC's inde-
cency actions. On the other hand, although it may be instrumentally neces-
sary and appropriate for challengers to make such arguments, it is far from
certain that those claims in their traditional guises would find a receptive ear
in the current Supreme Court. The relevant free speech precedent is subject to
multiple interpretations, and vagueness and overbreadth arguments are sub-
ject to the criticism that they do not in themselves answer the underlying nor-
mative dilemma posed by the amorphous notion of indecency.
1. Pacifica and Sable
To be sure, the D. C. Circuit stated inACTI that the Supreme Court had
implicitly found the Commission's generic indecency standard acceptable in
Pacifica.416 However, the court seriously overreads the Pacifica decision in
concluding that it represents tacit approval of the generic indecency standard
articulated and applied by the Commission since 1987.417
While the Supreme Court's Pacifica decision can be read both broadly
and narrowly, it is clear that the Court sought to limit its review to the FCC's
determination that the Carlin monologue was indecent as broadcast.418 In
other words, the Court did not address the Commission's definition of inde-
cency as a general policy but, rather, focused on the decisional rule of a partic-
ular adjudication. Justice Stevens noted that in the FCC's opinion, "questions
concerning possible action in other contexts were expressly reserved for the
future." '4 19 Pacifica was a narrowly drawn, highly divided decision in which
no opinion was signed by a majority of the Justices. The only point on which
they all clearly agreed was that they were deciding a single, particular applica-
tion of the FCC's power.420 That application involved "dirty words," and the
Court's entire analysis was specifically predicated on the assaultive effects on
the audience of the repeated broadcast of such language.42 1 Emphasizing "the
416. ACTI, 852 F.2d 1332, 1340 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also TRIBE, supra note 359, at 942
(suggesting that by "accepting the FCC's broader interpretation of indecency (as extending
beyond obscenity), the Pacifica Court implicitly embraced a general or national standard of
offensiveness").
417. See Sehrier, supra note 356, at 69, 84 (criticizing the ACT court's reliance on Pacifica
to establish the constitutionality of the current indecency standard).
418. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 735 (1978). The plurality agreed that § 326(the anti-censorship provision of the Communications Act) did not "limit the Commission's
authority to impose sanctions on licensees who engage in obscene, indecent, or profane broad-
casting." Id at 738.
419. Id. at 734.
420. Id. at 734-35, 742 (plurality opinion); id at 757 (Powell, J., concurring). On the
narrowness of Pacifica, see, e.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Marjorie L. Esterow, Censoring
Indecent Cable Programs: The New Morality Meets the New Media, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 606,
627-30 (1983).
421. Id. at 739 (plurality opinion); iaE at 757 (Powell, J., concurring). The reference to
"verbal shock treatment[s]," now associated with Pacifica, is found in Justice Powell's concur-
ring opinion; the plurality opinion also focused on the repetitive and assaultive character of the
language when intruding into the home.
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narrowness of [its] holding," the plurality expressly stated that it had not de-
cided that "an occasional expletive" in a two-way radio conversation by a
cabdriver or the broadcast of an Elizabethan play "would justify any sanc-
tion. ' 422 In addition, the "patent offensiveness" of the language at issue was
not challenged in Pacifica.423 Thus, while the Pacifica Court did not take
pains to disapprove the Commission's generic definition of indecency, neither
can it fairly be said to have approved the definition.
Nor was the definitional matter resolved in Sable Communications, Inc. v.
FCC,4 2 4 in which the Supreme Court struck down a total prohibition on the
transmission of indecent "dial-a-porn" messages by telephone lines.425 There,
the issue before the Court was whether a total prohibition could apply to inde-
cent as well as obscene material, given that indecent material enjoys First
Amendment protection. Sable assumed a constitutionally cognizable distinc-
tion between indecent and obscene speech and nowhere purported to define
the precise contours of indecent material.426 In short, the Supreme Court's
FCC-related precedent does not resolve the constitutional propriety of the
Commission's latest indecency definition.
422. Id. at 750.
423. Id. at 739. In.ACTI, the court argued that the Pacifica Court's reference to a diction-
ary definition of indecency suggested that the Supreme Court found the generic definition of
indecency acceptable. 852 F.2d 1332, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In Pacifica, the Court cited Web-
ster's Dictionary for the proposition that the "normal definition" of indecent "refers to noncon-
formance with accepted standards of morality." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 740. The Court adverted
to the dictionary definition in support of the argument that indecency was intended to mean
something other than obscenity as used in 47 U.S.C. § 1464. Id. at 739-40 & nn.14 & 15. The
Court was trying to justify its conclusion that prurient appeal, a necessary element of obscenity,
was not ordinarily seen as a component of indecency. Id. This was certainly not a ruling on the
substantive content of indecency or the constitutional propriety of a "patent offensiveness" stan-
dard.
Professor Post suggests that Pacifica demonstrates the Court's sensitivity to the conflict
between democratic claims for public discourse and countervailing community-based pressures
on the public sphere, and that it constitutes an ideologically determined boundary to the do-
main of public discourse. Post, The Constitutional Concept, supra note 42, at 629-33. Just as
Professor Post's argument does not explain why offensiveness is considered constitutionally less
tolerable in Pacifica than in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, his perceptive description of the
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence does not suggest a definitive constitutional outcome in
the broadcast indecency context. This is because, as Professor Post readily concedes, tile pe-
riphery of public discourse "will remain both ideological and vague, subject to an endless nego-
tiation between democracy and community life." Id. at 684.
424. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
425. In Sable, the Court addressed the constitutionality of § 223(b) of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934, which regulates sexually-oriented, pre-recorded telephone messages (popu-
larly known as dial-a-porn). Id. at 117-18. Sable held that while the statute and the FCC could
completely preclude obscene messages from being transmitted over the telephone, a total ban on
indecent programming violated the First Amendment. The Court made certain, however, to
distinguish carefully the context of the telephone from that of broadcasting, apparently in order
to maintain the vitality of Pacifica. Id. at 128 ("[U]nlike an unexpected outburst on a radio
broadcast, the message received by one who places a call to a dial-a-porn service is not so
invasive or surprising that it prevents an unwilling listener from avoiding exposure to it.").
426. Id. at 124, 126-31 ("The cases before us today do not require us to decide what is
obscene or what is indecent.").
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2. Vagueness and Overbreadth
The centerpieces of virtually all of the doctrinal arguments regarding the
scope of the FCC's new approach to indecency, whether by broadcasters in
the ACT oases or commentators on the Commission's actions, are the assert-
edly unconstitutional vagueness and overbreadth of the definition of inde-
cency.427 The notion of a case-by-case assessment of whether depictions or
descriptions of sexuality or excretion will be considered patently offensive to
the average broadcast viewer or listener is claimed to be obviously vague. In
addition, it is argued that the Commission's failure to create a categorical ex-
clusion from indecency for works of serious merit renders the regulation un-
constitutionally overbroad. 28
The judicial and regulatory attention paid to the constitutional propriety
of time channeling has delayed a thorough analytical assessment of the consti-
tutional objections to the definition of indecency. Indeed, in both the FCC
cases and the judicial precedent there is an underlying implication that by a
legal legerdemain, limitations on the time frame of regulation - akin to time,
place, and manner rules - can take the constitutional sting out of governmen-
tal control of constitutionally protected speech. Consequently, and despite the
FCC's assurance in its Reconsideration Order that the issues of indecency and
actionability are separate inquiries,429 the two-pronged character of the new
427. See, e.g., ACT , 852 F.2d 1334, 1339-40 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In the academic litera-
ture, see, e.g., Julie Ann Alagna, 1991 Legislation, Reports and Debates O ver Federally Funded
Art Arts Community Left with an "'Indecent" Compromise, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1545,
1574-76 (1991); Cordoba, supra note 353, at 635, 656, 662, 669-70; Crigler & Byrnes, supra note
36, at 337-44; Jay A. Gayoso, The FCC's Regulation of Broadcast Indecency: A Broadened
Approach for Removing Immorality from the Airwaves, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 871, 912-14
(1989); Reiss, supra note 208, at 238, 240-41; Schrier, supra note 356, at 84, 88-96, 94-98; cf
TRIBE, supra note 359, at 942 (criticizing 18 U.S.C. § 1464, the statute at issue in Pacifica, as
failing on its face to define the conduct prohibited); Filthy Words, supra note 367, at 593
(mounting an analogous vagueness and overbreadth attack on Pacifica).
428. The argument that the indecency standard potentially encompasses works of serious
literary, scientific, and artistic value and thus applies to both protected and unprotected expres-
sion is the most common overbreadth argument in the briefs and literature. See, eg., Act III,
932 F.2d 1504, 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Cordoba, supra note 353, at 670.
429. In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 3 F.C.C.R. 930, 936 n.6 (1987) (Reconsideration
Order). Although no substantive message can properly be deduced from the Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari n ACTIII, only the 24-hour facet of the ban was presented for review in the
government's petition for certiorari. FCC v. Action for Children's Television, 112 S. Ct. 1282
(1992). Thus, the D. C. Circuit's finding of unconstitutionality currently stands as to that issue.
While the Supreme Court precedent is inconclusive on the constitutionality of a total tem-
poral ban, there are persuasive arguments that the total ban on indecency should be deemed
unconstitutional, particularly when the definition of indecency is as encompassing as in the
current generic standard. Admittedly, although the Supreme Court struck down the total ban
on indecency in telephone communications in Sable Communications Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115
(1989), it carefully distinguished broadcasting, leaving itself conceptual maneuvering room to
permit more extensive regulation. Cf Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., I11 S. Ct. 2456 (1991)
(upholding, on easily distinguishable grounds, a state's public indecency law banning totally
nude dancing). Nevertheless, for example, the FCC has not demonstrated that a total, 24-hour
ban is the least restrictive option. Even if indecent material is available in non-broadcast con-
texts (a questionable assumption as to live radio broadcasts) there is a troubling "let them eat
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enforcement regime has enabled the agency to avoid a stringent analysis of the
substantive content of the patent offensiveness test. The following analysis
will specifically address constitutional claims regarding the indecency defini-
tion itself.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine, based on due process notions, requires
that statutes and regulations be struck down as unconstitutionally vague if
persons of "common intelligence must necessarily guess as to [their] meaning
and differ as to [their] application."430 Vague laws and regulations are said to
violate constitutional norms by failing to provide fair warning, by allowing
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement and, when expression is at issue, by
leading to a chilling effect on protected speech. Thus, in addition to promot-
ing an interest in fair notice, the void-for-vagueness doctrine is designed to
serve the value of government accountability by regularizing and constraining
the discretion of administrative officials. Simply put, government "cannot vest
restraining control over the right to speak in an administrative official
where there are no appropriate standards to guide his action."43' Although
the vagueness doctrine originates in the Due Process Clause, it has been ap-
plied with particular care and attention in the First Amendment context in
order to eliminate the possibility of discriminatory enforcement and because of
the perception that the chilling effect of vagueness on expression is especially
pernicious. 32
cake" quality to the FCC advising the poor that they can go to clubs or subscribe to cable or
buy books and tapes in order to hear the material that the Commission would ban from the
airwaves. Moreover, least restrictive alternative analysis does not require the FCC to reject
anything less than a 24-hour ban simply because some very small percentage of teenagers may
be awake and listening in a given market. The notion necessarily involves a certain level of
compromise with respect to the State's substantive interest. A normative judgment must be
made about the number of teenagers whose potential presence in the overnight audience is
insufficient to justify a restriction on speech. For critiques of the total ban, see, e.g., Cordoba,
supra note 353, at 668-69; Passler, supra note 356, at 155-60 (1990).
430. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); see also Grayned v. City
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-10 (1972); TRIBE, supra note 359, at 1033. Professor Tribe
explains that "[s]uch vagueness occurs when a legislature states its proscriptions in terms so
indefinite that the line between innocent and condemned conduct becomes a matter of guess-
work." Id. The vagueness doctrine was originally deployed to invalidate penal statutes that did
not "define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand
what conduct is prohibited." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). The notion was
subsequently exported to the non-criminal, First Amendment setting.
431. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 295 (1951).
432. See, eg., Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 1ll S. Ct. 2720, 2732 (1991); id. at 2749
(O'Connor, J., concurring); City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 758
(1988); City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 465-67 & n.15 (1987); Kolender v. Lawson, 461
U.S. 352, 358 (1983); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73, 575 (1974); Papachristou v, City
of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972); see also TRIBE, supra note 359, at 1034-35 (contend-
ing that because of a fear of the chilling effect of vague legislation, "the Supreme Court requires
more specificity of a statute potentially applicable to expression sheltered by the First Amend-
ment than in other contexts, although no doctrinal formulation of the required increment in
specificity has seemed possible"); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100
YALE L.J. 853, 904 (1991) (suggesting that although the minimal requirement of fair notice
imposed by the due process-based vagueness doctrine, in its most familiar form, is applicable in
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The overbreadth doctrine, which often overlaps with the vagueness prin-
ciple, allows persons whose own expression may properly be prohibited by a
statute or regulation to challenge the rule and evade sanction on the ground
that the rule would unconstitutionally include protected speech within its
sweep as well. 33 The doctrine, commonly viewed as an exception to ordinary
standing requirements, is permitted in the First Amendment context by virtue
of the Court's desire to preclude an undue chilling effect on protected
speech.434 Since overbreadth is perceived by the Court as "strong medicine,"
it is used sparingly.435 The scope of a statute does not make it unconstitu-
tional unless the overbreadth is "substantial... judged in relation to the stat-
ute's plainly legitimate sweep. ' '4 36
In common parlance, the FCC's current, generic definition of indecency
is indefinite on its face. No more is needed to support this point than a refer-
ence to the language of the regulation itself, with its unexplained mention of
"patent offensiveness." In addition, as has been detailed above, the FCC's
attempts to define indecency are imprecise, manipulable, and largely respon-
sive in practice to pressures from socially conservative special interest
groups.43 Raising the spectre of discriminatory intent, they implicate pre-
cisely the concerns that are said to justify the vagueness doctrine.
However, imprecision, unpredictability, and administrative discretion do
not automatically mean that a regulation will be considered so vague as to
offend the Constitution. Similarly, that the FCC might ban, from normal day-
time hours, some meritorious material with no appeal to the prurient interest
does not mean that the agency's definition of indecency is necessarily to be
considered substantially and fatally overbroad.
One could argue that invalidation for vagueness is particularly inappro-
priate for notions like indecency, which are inherently amorphous and vague
because we cannot predict in advance every form of expression that might be
patently offensive. In just such an argument, the D. C. Circuit agreed with the
Commission that bright-line rules are arbitrary in the context of indecency
regulation.43 The Commission could not provide a rational justification for
the First Amendment context, "[t]here is... a separate, additional vagueness doctrine that
applies in First Amendment cases").
433. See, eg., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112 n.8 (1990). While vagueness and over-
breadth are related doctrines that are often both implicated in the constitutional review of legis-
lation, they are not necessarily coextensive. For example, it is possible to have perfectly clear
and precise laws that unconstitutionally trammel protected expression.
434. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 112 n.8; Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503(1985); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). For conflicting views on the extent
to which the doctrine serves prophylactic functions, see Fallon, supra note 432, and sources
cited therein.
435. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613.
436. Id at 615; see also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982);
Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458 (1987).
437. See discussion supra Part II.A.3 & II.B.I.
438. The court relied not only on what it perceived to be the Supreme Court's implicit
approval of the generic indecency definition, but also on Judge Leventhal's dissenting opinion in
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enforcing indecency regulations only against a few offensive words when there
is far more sexualized expression that could plausibly be considered indecent
by a segment of the population.439 Having thus expanded the universe of
regulable material by discounting the rationality and justifiability of bright-
line rules, both the FCC and the court concluded that vagueness is inherent in
a generic description of indecency adequate to account for all sexual expres-
sion that would be found socially offensive. According to this argument, since
vagueness and breadth are inescapable in any responsible and logical definition
of indecency, the one chosen by the Commission should not be considered
unconstitutionally vague per se.
This is essentially an argument that the type of inherent vagueness diag-
nosed by the court in the indecency area should not completely preclude regu-
lation, precisely because the difficulty of drawing exact lines cannot in itself
justify the refusal to draw them at all."' After all, we could resolutely decide
to ignore the lack of broad consensus on what is indecent, at least at the mar-
gin, and simply admonish regulatory agencies and legislatures to be as specific
as possible in drafting regulations despite inherent vagueness. The process of
regulation could then unfold by the accretion of specifics.
Yet, the court's justification of regulation by reference to inherent inde-
cency of the sort it diagnoses involves a non sequitur. The observation that
the definition of indecency must be inherently vague and amorphous because
any attempt to cabin it would be arbitrary still does not answer the question of
whether we should accordingly regulate or decline to do so. There is some-
thing troubling about the position that a statute or regulation that is admit-
tedly vague on its face can be saved from constitutional infirmity simply by the
expedient of saying that the kind of broad coverage it envisages cannot be
accomplished by a less vague rule. While the Supreme Court's vagueness ju-
risprudence does allow for the adoption of saving constructions, the Court
also has struck down statutes that purport to regulate behavior the description
of which is necessarily vague.44 We might say, then, that the D.C. Circuit's
finding of "inherent" vagueness should counsel regulatory timidity.
Pacifica, in which he referred to the vagueness "inherent" in the subject matter of indecency.
ACTI,, 852 F.2d 1332, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1988). As the majority stated, "the difficulty.., is not
the absence of 'reasoned analysis' on the Commission's part, but the '[v]agueness ... inherent in
the subject matter.'" Id. (citation omitted).
439. Id.
440. Cf Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment. A Play in Three Acts, 34
VAND. L. REV. 265, 294-95 (1981) (making this argument, but also counseling against the
opposite error and suggesting that categories like "offensiveness" might raise a serious risk of
misapplication because they are "so inherently and extremely indeterminate and so linguisti-
cally ill-defined").
441. For example, the Court has struck down statutes or ordinances prohibiting "annoy-
ing" conduct akin to vagrancy or loitering. See, e.g., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971)
(finding an ordinance vague where it made it illegal for a number of persons to assemble on a
sidewalk and "there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by"); of
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (holding a particular vagrancy ordi-
nance to be unconstitutionally vague without explicitly stating that vagrancy statutes' necessar-
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Simply put, although a vagueness argument seems well-suited and per-
suasive in the indecency context, there are countervailing claims that make a
vagueness finding uncertain. First, although the vagueness doctrine is of po-
tentially expansive application, it has received limiting constructions. 2 The
degree of tolerable vagueness explicitly depends on the type of enactment at
issue, with greater tolerance for imprecision in the civil rather than the crimi-
nal context." a It is now a truism that unconstitutional vagueness cannot be
based on "potential uncertainty at the margins."' " In addition, examples of a
history of implementation may be used to avoid a vagueness finding. The
existence of "common understandings" can cure what appears to be facially
vague language." Finally, the Court has stated that absolute perfection and
precision are not preconditions to regulation in the event that specificity is
impossible. 4 Even the most stringent vagueness test does not "expect mathe-
matical certainty from our language." 447
Therefore, supporters of the FCC standard could argue that the notions
of indecency and patent offensiveness, due to their use in different contexts
over a reasonably long period of time, have developed a core of common un-
derstandings or meaning. For example, since Miller v. California"4 3 estab-
lished the modem approach to obscenity, the concept of offensiveness has
found a home in the Supreme Court's obscenity jurisprudence, despite the
ily vague attempts to describe the range of prohibited conduct would render all such ordinances
per se vague).
In an analogous context, the Court held that "[a]lthough due process does not require
"impossible standards" of clarity," a state statute requiring loiterers to account for their pres-
ence by producing "credible and reliable" identification upon request by the police did not
constitute "a case where further precision in the statutory language is either impossible or im-
practical." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 (1983). This indicates that the Court's
interpretation of the "impossible clarity" standard is in fact rather stringent. It might well ba
argued that the Commission's definition of indecency would also fail for lack of adequate
precision.
442. The sweep of the overbreadth doctrine is limited by the requirement that objectiona-
ble breadth be substantial. Narrowing constructions are allowed to save otherwise facially over-
broad rules, just as such clarifications routinely save regulations subject to vagueness claims.
Because the arguments are parallel for vagueness and overbreadth, the discussion in text will
deal only with vagueness.
443. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 498-99 (1982).
444. See. ag., United States v. National Dairy Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32 (1963).
445. See, eg., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974). Although the Court more recently
distinguished Parker on the ground that the military context involved in that case had required
a less stringent vagueness analysis, see Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, n.8 (1982), the Court
apparently used Parker to affirm the more general notion that narrowing constructions of vague
language, either by reviewing courts or "less formalized custom and usage," could save the
provisions. Parker, 417 U.S. at 754.
446. See; eg., Kolender, 461 U.S. at 361; United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1946)
(reversing the dismissal of a criminal information on the ground that § 506(a)(1) of the Com-
munications Act, designed to discourage featherbedding, was unconstitutionally vague: "The
constitution does not require impossible standards. Common understanding and practices
make the language convey sufficiently definite warning").
447. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972).
448. 413 U.S. 15 (1973); see TRIBE, supra note 359, at 904-19; Gey, supra note 43, at 1567-
81 (describing the development of obscenity doctrine).
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trenchant critique to which the doctrine has been subject." 9 It may be argued
that if the offensiveness standard is considered sufficiently determinate in the
obscenity context by the Court, then it should be, a fortiori, constitutionally
permissible in the definition of indecency.450
However, nothing impels us to accept such transplantation. The notion
of common understanding, like the concept of common sense, is a subtly
loaded idea pursuant to which social consensus on fundamental issues of value
is simply taken for granted. 5 I One could argue that accretions of meaning to
the notion of indecency in other contexts are and should be irrelevant when
the FCC context is at stake. Indeed, the FCC's own changes in definition and
enforcement policy in the indecency context over the years could be said to
have obscured the meaning of the concept and made it vague. 52
In any event, although the Miller Court referred to offensiveness as deter-
mined by contemporary community standards in a fashion superficially simi-
lar to the Commission's definition of indecency, the Miller test requires that
the states specify concretely the sexual descriptions and depictions considered
obscene.453 Such specificity is nowhere required under the FCC's indecency
scheme. The Miller test also demands the application of the standards of a
particular community rather than the reactions of a constructed "average
broadcast viewer or listener. ' 454 Therefore, both the legislative precondition
and the applicable community standard in the obscenity context are arguably
more concrete than the FCC's definition of indecency. Moreover, it must be
noted that material subject to the Miller test traditionally has been perceived
as excluded from the protection of the First Amendment. 45 5 Surely, the
449. In Miller, the Court adopted a three-pronged definition of obscenity, focusing on
whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; whether the work depicts or describes,
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct as defined by the State; and whether the work, taken
as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 413 U.S. at 24; see also
supra note 197.
450. In an analogous overbreadth challenge to a statute prohibiting the possession and
viewing of nude photographs of minors, the majority of the Court in Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S.
103, 112 (1990) was unswayed by the dissent's argument that the state court's narrowing con-
struction, requiring a showing that the targeted nudity constituted "a lewd exhibition or in-
volve[d] a graphic focus on the genitals," led to an unconstitutional level of vagueness. Id. at
133-40.
451. See generally RICHARD CAMPBELL, 60 MINUTES AND THE NEWS: A MYTHOLOGY
FOR MIDDLE AMERICA (1991) for a discussion of the role of common sense in deflecting value
inquiries in the media context.
452. See Levi, supra note 36. The history of the FCC's indecency enforcement efforts is
subject to numerous interpretations. For a view contrary to that in text, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 516-17 (arguing that the Commission's approach to indecency has been relatively
stable rather than haphazard).
453. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
454. Id. at 30-33. For discussions of the relationship between Miller and indecency, see
Cordoba, supra note 353, at 662; Schrier, supra note 356, at 97-98; Robert Wolff, Pacifica's
Seven Dirty Words: A Sliding Scale of the First Amendment, 1979 LAW F. 969, 1004 (1979).
455. But see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (opinion of Scalia, J.)
(challenging the categorical method of addressing obscenity and the First Amendment).
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FCC's challengers could argue that even if somewhat vague standards are con-
stitutionally acceptable in connection with expression outside the protection of
the First Amendment, the same cannot be said about speech within its ambit.
Despite the argument distinguishing Miller as providing a limiting con-
struction for indecency, there are conflicts in the lower courts over the consti-
tutional propriety of the notion of indecency. For example, one court recently
held that a regulatory reference to "decency" as a criterion for the grant of
public art funding was unconstitutionally vague because there was "no ques-
tion" that persons of common intelligence would have to guess at the meaning
of the reference to decency.45 6 Other courts have reached contrary conclu-
sions. Recently, for example, the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit Courts
of Appeal upheld the FCC's definition of indecency in the dial-a-porn context,
using a standard virtually identical to that adopted by the agency in the broad-
cast arena.457 In distinguishing FCC usage from references to "offensiveness"
in public health grant guidelines, yet another court concluded that indecency
456. In Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457 (C.D. Cal. 1992),
the court held void for vagueness the "decency clause" of the National Endowment for the
Arts' (NEA's) governing statute, pursuant to which "general standards of decency and respect
for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public" must be taken into consideration in
the grant of NEA funds. 20 U.S.C. § 954(d). In support of its conclusion, the court pointed out
that the undefined reference to decency "clearly gives rise to each of the three evils identified in
Grayned." Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1472. As the court specified:
(1) it creates a trap for the unwary applicant who may engage in expression she or he
believes to comport with the standard, only to learn upon receiving notice that her or
his grant has been withdrawn or a new application denied because she or he has of-
fended someone's subjective understanding of the standard; (2) panelists, the Council,
and the Chairperson are given no guidance in administering the standard; each appar-
ently is supposed to draw on her or his own personal views of decency or some ephem-
eral "general American standard of decency;" and (3) it necessarily causes the
imposition of self-censorship wider than the line drawn by the statute because the line
is, in effect, imperceptible.
Id. at 1472 (citation omitted).
457. In Dial Info. Services of N.Y. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991), cert
denied sub nom, Dial Info. Services Corp. v. Barr, 112 S. Ct. 966 (1992), the court rejected a
vagueness challenge to an FCC regulation defining procedures for preventing access by minors
to indecent dial-a-porn services on the ground that the rule tracks the definition of indecency
"that [the FCC] developed in the radio broadcast context and that passed muster in the
Supreme Court." IdL at 1540. Dial challenged the 1989 Helms Amendment to the Communi-
cations Act of 1934, which shielded dial-a-porn providers from prosecution for the provision of
indecent material to minors if they complied with certain telephone company presubscription
procedures or engaged in independent billing and collection.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit upheld FCC dial-a-porn rules incorporating the indecency
definition in Information Providers' Coalition for Defense of the First Amendment v. FCC, 928
F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1991). The court accepted the Commission's argument that, as defined, the
term indecency was no more vague than the definition of obscenity applied in Supreme Court
cases and that the term had a definition that had already received the imprimatur of the Court
in the broadcast context. The court inferred support for its position in the Supreme Court's
failure to address the vagueness argument in Sable: "By saying that it was not necessary 'to
decide what is obscene and what is indecent ... ' the necessary implication of the Court's
action is that the term "indecent" as interpreted by the Commission is not per se void for
vagueness." Id at 874 (citations omitted).
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was "a clearly defined term" in the context of FCC interpretations. 45 3 And
for courts that find no undue vagueness in regulations hinging on the notion
of "nuisance," the reference to patent offensiveness may be equally
untroubling.45 9
The conflicts among the lower courts reflect a parallel, and equally non-
dispositive, conflict in the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence
beyond the direct precedent on broadcast indecency. Other than discussing
the matter in Pacifica, the Supreme court has never defined indecency for pur-
poses of the relevant statute.46° The instances in which the Court previously
has struck down statutes regulating indecent speech in other contexts are not
particularly useful for the current analysis.461 In addition, the Court's public
order and public morality cases demonstrate the conflicting character of the
precedent.462 In addition, despite the Commission's cavalier assumptions, in
458. In holding unconstitutional grant guidelines of the Centers for Disease Control which
precluded "offensiveness" in educational materials related to AIDS, the court in Gay Men's
Health Crisis v. Sullivan, 792 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) distinguished the broadcast and
dial-a-por contexts. The court opined that under FCC usage, indecency was "a clearly defined
term... specifically set forth in a[n] FCC Report and Order and drawn from decades of that
agency's interpretation of 'indecent' communications" and was narrowed by being limited to
explicit "depictions of bodily functions or organs." Id. at 300.
459. See, eg., Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1264 (3d Cir. 1992) (upholding,
against vagueness challenge by a homeless person, public library regulations allowing the evic-
tion of "patrons whose bodily hygiene is so offensive as to constitute a nuisance to other
persons").
460. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 740-41 (1978).
461. The Supreme Court, in Pacifica, stated that the definition of indecency under 18
U.S.C. § 1464 need not be limited to obscenity, even though it had previously construed the
term "indecent" to be the same as "obscene" in other statutory contexts. The Court indicated
that the reasons supporting the equation of indecency and obscenity in prior cases addressing
the constitutionality of statutes regulating non-broadcast communications did not apply to
§ 1464. 438 U.S. at 741.
462. A plurality of the Court recently agreed in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct.
2456 (1991), that a state's interest in "societal order and morality" could justify the incidental
burden on marginally expressive conduct of banning totally nude dancing. Id. at 2461. Simi-
larly, a number of the Court's cases in the area of "erogenous zoning" also suggest that, despite
speech-related implications, the Court recognizes countervailing governmental interests in
safety, public order, and even public morality or decency. See TRIBE, supra note 359, at 934(coining the term "erogenous zoning"). In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S.
41 (1986), the Court upheld a zoning ordinance that prohibited adult movie theatres within
1,000 feet of residential, school, church, or park zones on the ground that the legislature simply
had sought control of the theatres' "secondary effects" on the surrounding community. Id. at
47-48; see also Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 71-72 (1976) (upholding zoning
ordinances that limited the location of "adult" movie theatres on the ground of "the city's
interest in preserving the character of its neighborhoods").
The Court generally has treated these cases as raising First Amendment concerns about
expression only incidentally, thereby justifying less searching constitutional scrutiny of the chal-
lenged legislation. See Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2461. By contrast, the FCC's indecency actions are
directly related to the suppression of particular speech in the service of public morality goals.
Moreover, concerns for public order and individual sensibilities were insufficient to trump con-
stitutional values in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). See also discussion supra notes 49-
50. In Cohen, Justice Harlan relied on the notion that offensive utterances are by-products of
free expression and must simply be tolerated, at least in venues without a substantial expecta-
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none of the central cases in which the Court sought to protect children from
exposure to sexually explicit material can we find a clear answer as to the
doctrinal status of the FCC's current indecency policy.463
The seemingly inconsistent results in vagueness cases suggest that the
vagueness doctrine is often used by courts as a doctrinal proxy for substantive
considerations that require a complex balancing of the costs and benefits of
regulation. Vagueness, as a ground for facial invalidation, is neither content-
neutral nor self-defining. It is not a mechanical doctrine with results predict-
able in the abstract. Because words are used in varying contexts and necessar-
ily require interpretation, language is, in some sense, inherently vague and
tion of privacy, in order to reject the proposition that the states "acting as guardians of public
morality, may properly remove [an] offensive word from the public vocabulary." Id. at 22-23.
In Ernoznick v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975), the Court struck down a regula-
tion prohibiting a drive-in theatre from showing scenes of nudity because they could be seen by
passers-by. Although a narrowly drawn traffic regulation requiring the screening of drive-in
theatres from public view might well pass constitutional muster, the Court found the existing
legislation unconstitutional because it discriminated between movies on the basis of content and
would deter the showing of non-obscene and constitutionally protected films. Id. at 215 n.13.
Despite this precedent, however, one could argue that the Court has been moving in the direc-
tion of a tiered approach to the value of speech, with sexually expressive/offensive speech at the
outer periphery of First Amendment protection, as suggested in Justice Stevens' opinion in
Pacifica. See TRIE, supra note 359, at 934-40. If so, it may be deemed to deserve less search-
ing constitutional scrutiny than more fully protected speech (such as political expression), mak-
ing indecency a less likely candidate for a vagueness finding.
463. The Court has suggested in other contexts that the State has a particular interest in
protecting children from sexually explicit, albeit not obscene, material. See, eg., Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (establishing "variable obscenity" standard, pursuant to which
the sale of material not obscene as to adults would nevertheless be prohibited to children as
obscene because of the state's interest in minors' welfare). In a similar vein, the Court noted in
Sable that it had "recognized that there is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and
psychological well-being of minors," and that this interest "extends to shielding minors from
the influence of literature that is not obscene by adult standards." 492 U.S. at 126 (citing Gins-
berg, 390 U.S. at 639-40); see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986)
(upholding the imposition of a short disciplinary sanction on a student for having addressed a
school assembly with a sexually explicit, though not obscene, metaphor). In Bethel, the Court
reasoned that society has an interest "in protecting minors from exposure to vulgar and offen-
sive spoken language," id at 684, and "in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropri-
ate behavior." Ia at 681.
Yet the Court has not abdicated the field entirely to state regulation based on child-protec-
tive rationales. It held in Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957), for example, that the First
Amendment did not tolerate regulations that reduced the whole adult population to seeing and
hearing only what is fit for children. In Butler, the Court struck down a Michigan statute that
purported to criminalize the general dissemination of material deemed harmful to minors even
though the material was not obscene as to adults. Id; see also TRIBE, supra note 359, at 910,
912.
Moreover, the Court did not intend to eliminate the distinction between indecency and
obscenity in Ginsberg. See Danile R. White, Pacifica Foundation v. FC" "Dirty Words " the
First Amendment and the Broadcast Media, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 164, 179 (1978) (distinguishing
Ginsberg from the FCC's definition of indecency in Paciflca on the ground that "that case dealt
with obscenity, not indecency, and the variable obscenity upheld there was a significantly closer
approximation of the then prevailing and current definitions of obscenity than is the Commis-
sion's definition of indecency").
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unclear.464 The question whether a rule is so unclear that persons of common
understanding must necessarily guess at its meaning is always "a matter of
degree" and "practical judgment. 4 6  Thus, normative decisions about what
speech should be protected must be made in the process of deciding whether a
statute or regulation is too vague. As Professor Anthony Amsterdam argued
in his still-seminal student note on the vagueness doctrine, the traditional ra-
tionale of providing fair warning does not adequately explain the development
or application of the doctrine.46 6 Rather, the vagueness doctrine is used as a
doctrinal "makeweight" in order to preserve a certain level of breathing space
for selected provisions of the Bill of Rights; in short, it is a surrogate for merits
considerations.467 A parallel argument can be made about the doctrine of un-
constitutional overbreadth.4 6a Thus, the simple characterization of some stat-
utory or regulatory language as vague does not in itself answer the question of
the proper constitutional outcome.469 Such a substantive inquiry in the case of
broadcast indecency leads to the kind of contradictory picture drawn in Part I
above. In sum, although an argument can be made that the indecency stan-
464. See J. M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the
First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 425-27 & n.109 (1990).
465. Id. at 426-27 n.109.
466. Anthony Amsterdam, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U.
PA. L. REv. 67, 72 (1960).
467. Professor Amsterdam argued that the courts' ultimate response on vagueness issues
depended on the nature of the menaced freedom, the probability of violation, the deterrent effect
of enforcement, and an assessment of the danger of the regulated activity. Id. at 72.
468. Scholars exploring the complex area of overbreadth have argued that the doctrine,
much like the related void-for-vagueness rule, is applied to achieve particular substantive ends.
Fallon, supra note 432, at 904. The overbreadth claim of overinclusiveness both begs the ques-
tion and requires value choices in application. The necessity of determining whether a particu-
lar statute or rule's overbreadth is sufficiently substantial to be unconstitutional gives courts
"considerable leeway" to take value and context into account. Balkin, supra note 464, at 426;
cf Martin Redish, The Warren Court, the Burger Court, and the First Amendment Overbreadth
Doctrine, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1031 (1983) (suggesting the necessity of sensitivity to context in
overbreadth analysis). Moreover, the claim that the agency's definition sweeps protected as well
as unprotected expression into the net because it does not exclude works of merit from its ambit
is a substantive argument that the First Amendment precludes the regulation of expression that
is both patently offensive and of serious merit. It is an argument about the legitimacy of the
category of "indecency" and begs the question whether we can channel serious and meritorious
sexual expression simply because it is patently offensive. If we accept that there can be some
category of indecent speech that can be channeled in order to protect child viewers or listeners,
then there is no reason to suggest that even some work of serious literary and artistic merit
should not be channeled, since it is not being entirely repressed. In addition, much of the sting
of the overbreadth argument may be said to be removed by the FCC's decision to consider the
merit of a work and to exclude classic news treatments from the sweep of its coverage. In any
event, it seems clear that these substantive arguments about protecting the expression we choose
to protect under the First Amendment cannot simply be avoided by references to overbreadth:
the overbreadth claim assumes that some resolution has been reached about the content of
protected expression.
469. See Amsterdam, supra note 466; cf Post, The Constitutional Concept, supra note 41,
at 625-26, 632-33 (noting that the problematic aspect of the distinction between outrageous and
non-outrageous speech is not that it is subjective or arbitrary, but rather that it is "constitution-
ally inappropriate" as the standard to regulate public discourse).
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dard should be considered unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, that claim
must be made in effect on substantive grounds.
3. The Hate Speech Analogy
The current debate on the propriety of regulating hate speech, while iu-
minating, is ultimately limited in its analogic usefulness in the broadcast inde-
cency context. Although the Court's recent decision in RA. V v. City of St.
Paul,47 striking down a "hate speech" ordinance, bears importantly on the
issue of indecent speech, it does not settle the matter.471
Although all members of the Court concurred in the result in RA. V-.,
they differed fundamentally in their rationales.472 The interpretation of
R.A. V and its impact on future First Amendment law are uncertain and will
evolve over time.47 3 The case can be read both narrowly and broadly, but, in
either case, its ramifications for indecency are unclear. Although Justice
Scalia's opinion in R.A. V speaks in sweeping generalities about the unconsti-
tutionality of content-based regulation of expression even in constitutionally
proscribable categories of speech,47 the opinion in fact reaffirms the tradi-
tional content-based regulation inherent in the fighting words and obscenity
doctrines.47 5 It also allows for content-based distinctions within those catego-
ries of speech so long as the basis for those distinctions "consists entirely of the
very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable;" is grounded on
the association of a subclass of expression with particular secondary effects; or
entails "no realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot."476
Accordingly, rather than the first step in the Court's jettisoning of the
categorical approach to the First Amendment, R.A. V might most fruitfully be
read narrowly, as a case allowing content-based discrimination against speech
so long as disfavored topics or viewpoints are not selectively singled out. In
other words, RA. V might be little more than a strong affirmation of the prin-
ciple of state neutrality as to ideas. On this reading, the ordinance at issue in
470. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
471. The St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance at issue in the case provided that
[w]hoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, charac-
terization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika,
which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resent-
ment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly
conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id at 2541.
472. For a typically insightful treatment of the ILA. V. decision and the jurisprudential
differences it reflects, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards,
106 HARV. L. REv. 22, 40-45, 103-07 (1992).
473. It is not only the doctrinal contours of the case that are subject to multiple interpreta-
tions. Indeed, as Justice Blackmun contended, "[t]he majority opinion signals one of two pos-
sibilities: it will serve as precedent for future case, or it will not. Either result is disheartening."
Id, at 2560 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The fractured character of the Court's approach to the
issue undermines simplistic predictions.
474. R.A. V, 112 S. Ct. at 2543 (1992).
475. I am particularly grateful to Professor Laurence Tribe for his thoughts on R.A. V
476. 112 S. Ct. at 2545-47.
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R.A. V would have passed constitutional muster if it had been an inclusive
offensiveness statute that covered all fighting words and did not specifically
target bigoted speech of a particular sort. The real linchpin of such an "un-
derbreadth" approach is likely a concern that hate speech ordinances like the
one at issue in R.A. V constitute viewpoint-based, rather than merely content-
based, discrimination. Thus, on this view, R.A. V does not eliminate govern-
mental power to proscribe hate speech in all circumstances.
If this is the proper reading of the case, then the FCC could argue that its
indecency definition and enforcement policy do not discriminate among view-
points or context, except to the extent that they channel the most patently
offensive depictions and descriptions of sexuality and excretion. Justice Scalia
contemplates that a state might prohibit "only that obscenity which is the
most patently offensive in its prurience... ."I'l If such content-based discrim-
ination is acceptable in the obscenity context under Justice Scalia's first excep-
tion to the presumption of neutrality, a similar argument might be made by
analogy in the indecency context. Channeling the most patently offensive sex-
ual and excretory material to broadcast times at which it will not be available
to children arguably regulates the material for its proscribable elements and
thus would be consistent with R.A. V's exception to the content-neutrality
rule. In addition, the FCC could argue that, because its enforcement policy
claims to regulate not the subject matter of sex but, rather, only the manner of
its presentation, the kind of subject matter and viewpoint distinctions that
Scalia characterized in R.A. V would not be implicated in the broadcast inde-
cency context.478
On the other hand, this argument assumes that indecent broadcast speech
is "proscribable," in the terminology of Justice Scalia's opinion, despite the
fact that indecency encompasses a broader scope of expression than obscenity.
"Proscribable speech" was never defined in the Scalia opinion; the analysis
simply noted that certain classes of speech were traditionally considered
outside First Amendment protections due to the social decision that those
sorts of expression did not contain sufficient social value to justify constitu-
tional protection. Although the explicit allegiance of three concurring Justices
to the principle of a hierarchy of speech protections, with non-obscene sexual
speech considered as a "second class" type of expression,479 might support an
extension of the proscribability argument to indecent speech, this is hardly the
traditional reading.
477. Id. at 2546.
478. This is not to say that the Commission in fact applies its indecency standard in the
fashion described above. David Cole has suggested recently that the notion of content neutral-
ity in Justice Scalia's opinion referred to whether the regulations at issue "maintain a formal
neutrality among the citizenry" (as the category of obscenity is supposed to do through its
reference to "general community standards") or whether they seek to single out and protect
particular groups "by excising certain disapproved messages or forms of expression from the
social vocabulary." David Cole, The U.S. Supreme Court Year in Review 1991-1992: 'Hate
Speech' is Protected, N.J. LAW J., Aug. 24, 1992, Supp. at 14.
479. 112 S. Ct. at 2564.
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Even if content-based discrimination were acceptable in order to prohibit
such indecency as is the most patently offensive "in its prurience," as Scalia
suggests, the notion of prurience is understood as entailing "that which in-
volves the most lascivious displays of sexual activity."4' 0 Though this lan-
guage is not a model of clarity, it could well be said to provide a more
determinate basis for distinction than that provided by the Commission's ge-
neric definition of indecency in broadcasting.
Finally, it could be argued that the FCC's application of its indecency
regulations, to the extent that it contains identifiable cultural biases and skew-
ing effects, should be interpreted as implicating the kind of viewpoint discrimi-
nation explicitly made impermissible by R.A. V.. Even if the FCC could
permissibly prohibit all indecent speech, its current application of its inde-
cency rules may in effect be too class- and race-dependent to avoid the kind of
viewpoint discrimination that even a narrow reading of R.A. V would suggest
is impermissible.
Challengers to the regime of FCC indecency enforcement would find even
more solace in a broad and sweeping reading of the case, seeing the decision as
the foundation for the establishment of blanket constitutional security against
most content-based regulation and the first step in the dismantling of a cate-
gorical approach to the First Amendment. It is unlikely, however, that R.A. V
would be interpreted so broadly. At the very least, the anti-absolutist stance
of four Justices suggests that they would strongly resist such radical changes
to modem First Amendment doctrine.
A broad reading even in the specific context of regulating sex talk is
equally unlikely. R.A. V focused on fighting words481 and did not address di-
rectly the issues posed by regulation of indecent speech. Nevertheless, if the
case provides security for language long thought to be outside the purview of
the Constitution, it stands to reason that at least the same (if not more) protec-
tion would follow in connection with content-based discriminations in the
context of speech that traditionally has been protected.48 One could argue
that the FCC's regulation of indecency is a classic example of content-based
discrimination applied to speech protected by the First Amendment and not
subject to the exceptions Justice Scalia admitted in the context of proscribable
480. Id at 2546.
481. The Minnesota Supreme Court had sought to avoid overbreadth claims by construing
the ordinance to cover fighting words, a category of speech whose regulation was permitted in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). R.,.V , 112 S. Ct. at 2540.
482. By suggesting this, I am not addressing Justice Blackmun's reference to the realpoli-
tik of First Amendment jurisprudence, pursuant to which he predicts that the demise of the
categorical approach will in fact lead to a relaxation of the level of scrutiny applied to all con-
tent-based laws. R.,A V., 112 S. Ct. at 2560. My sole point is that a reading which extends
Justice Scalia's reasoning to areas of fully protected speech would cast doubt on other content-
based selective speech regulations as well. The concurrences' suggestion that the perverse result
of Scalia's approach is to protect fighting words more stringently than commercial speech and
even political speech seems mostly rhetorical, since the majority opinion could be read to adopt
implicitly the extreme position of extending the content-neutrality principle beyond its current
status in the protected speech area in order to assure symmetry.
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speech. With regard to broadcasting, a reading of R.A. V that would under-
mine the FCC's decision to regulate indecency in the first place would require
that Justice Scalia's opinion be read to cast serious doubt on the continuing
vitality of Sable and Pacifica itself. However, in light of Scalia's approving
citation of Sable in R.A. V (as permitting content-based discrimination "only
in certain media and markets,")483 and his own argument, in Sable itself,
which noted that the increasing regulation of indecency hinged on the contrac-
tion of the obscenity principle,484 one could question whether the hate speech
precedent would be read indirectly to eliminate the FCC's jurisdiction to regu-
late broadcast indecency.485
The decision in R.A. V aside, the disparate First Amendment traditions
of the broadcast and print media also rob the hate speech analogy of some of
its parallelism. Although increasingly under attack,486 the traditional justifi-
cation for extensive governmental regulation in the broadcast area has been
the assertedly unique scarcity of the electromagnetic spectrum and the govern-
mental role in its allocation. First articulated in National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States487 in Justice Frankfurter's notion that the "unique" distinguish-
ing characteristic of radio is that it "inherently is not available to all," the
focus on broadcast scarcity reached its apogee in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC,4 ss in which the Court used the notion to reject a constitutional challenge
to applications of the fairness doctrine. Red Lion, then, made possible the
perception of a fundamental distinction between the government's power to
regulate speech in the newspaper or from the soapbox and its power to do so
over the airwaves. Whatever we ultimately think about the persuasiveness of
technological scarcity as the justification for the disparate constitutional treat-
ment afforded to the broadcast medium, the reality is that a competing First
Amendment model of broadcast regulation has been "enthusiastically em-
braced" 4 9 by the Supreme Court since the inception of broadcasting.
The traditional amenability of the broadcast medium to governmental
regulation does not mean, however, that the powerful new scholarship 490 con-
483. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2543.
484. Sable, 492 U.S. at 132 (Scalia, J., concurring).
485. Justice Scalia's opinion sought to downplay Pacifica by characterizing it as a mere
plurality opinion. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547 n.6 ("Justice Stevens cites a string of opinions as
supporting his assertion that 'selective regulation of speech based on content' is not presump-
tively invalid.... Analysis reveals, however, that they do not support it. To begin with, three of
them [including Pacifica] did not command a majority of the Court.. . ."). This footnote dic-
tum should not be given too much interpretive weight, especially since the Court's failure to
reach a majority in Pacifica did not relate to the broad question of whether selective regulation
of speech in terms of content is invalid. As noted above, Pacifica addressed the FCC's jurisdic-
tion to regulate under a federal statute a particular instance of indecent, but not obscene,
speech.
486. See supra note 202.
487. 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (upholding the FCC's authority to adopt the Chain Broadcasting
rules).
488. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
489. LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 72 (1991).
490. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, IfHe Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Hate
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structing arguments in support of the regulation of racist hate speech should
simply be transposed to the indecency context. The FCC's definition of inde-
cency presents a different, and arguably more complicated, problem for the
justification of governmental regulation than racist hate speech.491
First, the contexts in which hate speech regulations have been addressed
are distinguishable in important respects from those involved in the broadcast
indecency ban. Regulations of hate speech have been implemented in two
contexts: campus hate speech codes and criminal municipal ordinances. Free-
dom of speech in the school context has been interpreted differently than in
the other ordinary settings of expressive life.492 Similarly, although criminal
penalties are stiffer than sanctions imposed by the FCC, criminal statutes and
regulations have to be especially narrowly drafted in order to pass constitu-
tional muster. Further, the processes of the criminal justice system allow for a
spectrum of due process and fair trial guarantees, not the least of which is a
jury trial. The FCC's regulation of indecency on the airwaves is not subject
either to the narrowed scope of a campus ordinance or to the extreme proce-
dural care ideally required in the criminal context.
Second, many of the hate speech regulations at issue in the scholarly liter-
Speech on Campus, 1990 DuKE L.". 431; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech:
Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989); Robert C. Post, Racist Speech,
Democracy and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 267, 267 n.5 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter Post, Racist Speech] (collecting representative citations). Even public choice theorists have
argued for some regulation of hate speech. See, eg., Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without
Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment, 105 HARV. L REv. 554, 572 (1991).
491. See; eg., Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Ruler" Constitutional Narratives in
Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 343, 386 (1991) (suggesting that racial insults are different from
other offensive speech acts). The text might suggest that I find the regulation of hate speech
"easy," but I am not ignoring the arguments that have been made by civil libertarians or civic
republican fellow travelers in response to the proposals for the regulation of hate speech. See
e.g., Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus. A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 484. For an individualist critique of arguments in support of the regulation of hate speech,
see, e.g., Calvin R. Massey, Hate Speech, Cultural Diversity, and the Foundational Paradigms of
Free Expression, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 103 (1992). Although the issue is a difficult one for civil
libertarians, like myself, who habitually argue for the First Amendment as a bulwark against
governmental attempts to subdue dissent and establish a single orthodoxy, I believe that there is
much to be said in support of the constitutionality and wisdom of regulations that purge at least
narrowly-defined racist and anti-Semitic hate speech from public discourse. As the discussion
in the text illustrates, however, I do not adopt the strong version of the current scholarly cri-
tique of free speech libertarianism, based on a fundamental challenge to the public/private dis-
tinction in the speech context. See Sullivan, supra note 472, at 104-06.
492. Public high schools have been given more than ordinary leeway in the regulation of
student speech. See, eg., Hazelwood School District v. Kulhmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), discussed supra note 463; see Richard L
Roe, Valuing Student Speech. The Work of the Schools as Conceptual Development, 79 CAL. L
REv. 1271, 1272-73 (1991) (discussing cases and arguing for broader protection than currently
available for student speech). While the Court also has refused to characterize the First
Amendment as a bar to all regulations of speech in the public university context, see Post,
Racist Speech, supra note 490, and cases cited therein, some recent dicta suggest a particularly
generous interpretation of the First Amendment in the university context. See RA. V., 112 S.
Ct. at 2568 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,
277-80 (1981)); Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1776 (1991).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
1992-93]
REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE
ature and extant campus codes and ordinances concern speech acts that ap-
pear to be far more clearly identified and delineated than those that might be
swept into the net of indecency by the FCC. While the label of impermissible
indecency could be applied to virtually any reference to or depiction of sexual
conduct (and not simply a list of offensive words), much of obvious hate
speech consists of specific, identifiable words which demean and subordinate
others on the basis of group identity. Admittedly, there may be instances at
the periphery in which we could not easily distinguish between sex talk and
hate speech, yet even when hate speech consists of more than such easily iden-
tifiable and generally recognized offensive words, it can still arguably be de-
fined in narrower and more predictable ways than can the definition of
indecency adopted by the Commission.
Third, and most importantly, many proponents of regulation of hate
speech rest their arguments on the fact that hate speech is a particularly pow-
erful weapon with which to exclude target group members from public dis-
course, particularly in light of the history of racism, sexism, and anti-
Semitisim in our culture. And, civil libertarians who object to the regulation
of hate speech do not do so on the basis of truth claims or arguments about the
affirmative value of such speech to social discourse. Rather, they do so for
indirect reasons, believing that learning to withstand the worst offenses will
build up the desirable civic virtue of tolerance,493 or that relaxing the protec-
tions of the First Amendment with respect to this most offensive type of
speech will call into question the Constitution's guarantee of freedom with
respect to all sorts of other, socially valuable speech and thus threaten the
expression of dissenters and racial minorities.494 Although I am not arguing
that these justifications for tolerating hate speech are less strongly held be-
cause they are indirect, it is important to note that, overall, sexually-oriented
expression that might be swept into the FCC's indecency net has the Janus-
faced character of being both affirmatively liberating and disempowering.
Thus, even if we could mount by-now-standard arguments questioning the ul-
timate persuasiveness of slippery slope claims like the ones used to justify non-
intervention in hate speech,495 the harm posed by broad indecency regulations
might be said to be far more certainly direct, attacking affirmatively liberating
expression. Admittedly, it might be argued that not all instances of sex talk
present this paradoxical, ambiguous character, and that the claim of contra-
diction applies to sex talk only as a whole. Indeed, particular instances of sex
talk could be characterizable on close examination as either disempowering
493. See, e.g., BOLLINGER, supra note 148; Strossen, supra note 491, at 560 (discussing the
positive effect of racist hate speech in raising public consciousness about the underlying social
problem of racism).
494. See, e.g., Post, Racist Speech, supra note 490, at 290-300 (testing arguments for the
regulation of racist speech against the principle of democratic self-governance); Strossen, supra
note 491, at 536-41, 555-59.
495. For an analytic dissection of slippery slope arguments, see Frederick Schauer, Slip-
pery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1985); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILO-
SOPHICAL ENQUIRY 83-85 (1982).
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and silencing, like hate speech, or as affirmatively liberating, with few exhibit-
ing both characteristics as to either speaker or audience. For example, just as
those subjected to ethnic name-calling are silenced by such hate speech, it
might be that both feminists and social conservatives would find themselves
silenced by explicit sex talk demeaning to women. While this view suggests
that at least some part of the universe of sex talk raises the same issues as hate
speech and should be dealt with in the same way, it does not necessarily ad-
dress the different meanings of sex talk in different cultures. Moreover, it en-
tirely dispenses with any claim to governmental viewpoint neutrality in a way
more troubling to civil libertarians like myself than the narrower sweep of hate
speech cases.
B. The Uncertainties of Administrative Law
In addition to the constitutional arguments at center stage of the debate
on the FCC's indecency policy, two objections have been culled from adminis-
trative law by indecency litigants and scholarly commentators. Principally,
broadcasters and other FCC challengers have argued that the Commission's
1987 approach to indecency violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
by constituting a change in long-standing policy without any adequate expla-
nation for the shift.4 96 Another claim based on administrative law doctrine is
the argument that the process used by the FCC to adopt its indecency enforce-
ment policy ran afoul of rulemaking requirements under the APA.4 97 Such
arguments based on current administrative law doctrine are unlikely per se to
provide an adequate response to the problem of broadcast indecency.
1. The Asserted Lack of Reasoned Analysis
The classic statement of administrative law doctrine on the point of
agency inconsistency is that although administrative agencies are not pre-
cluded from changing their policies, they must "articulate a reasoned explana-
tion for [their] departure from prior norms."" 8 Such a "reasoned analysis"
496. See, eg., Brief of Petitioners on Petition for Review of an Order of the Federal Com-
munications Commission, Action for Children's Television v. FCC (ACT 1), 852 F.2d 1332
(D.C. Cir. Mar. 25, 1988) (No. 88-1064).
497. See, e.g., Reiss, supra note 208, at 248-51.
498. Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 800 F.2d 1181, 1184 (D.C. Cir.
1986); see also Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741, 745-47 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-44, 50-51, 58
(1983); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
Because current FCC indecency regulation involves affirmative enforcement of policies
rather than discretionary decisions not to enforce, the close-to-plenary level ofjudicial deference
established by Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), on the basis of a prosecutorial discretion
analogy is inapplicable. In any event, even under Heckler, inconsistency with a long practice of
enforcement patterns is one of the possible exceptions to the extreme deference listed by Justice
Rehnquist. See Cass Sunstein, Review ofAgency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI.
L. REv. 653 (1985) (arguing that Heckler should not be read as a general rejection of judicial
review of agency inaction); Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative
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must indicate that prior policies and standards have been "deliberately
changed, not casually ignored .... ,,9 The requirement that the agencies
take a "hard look at the salient problems""s enables reviewing courts to un-
derstand the agencies' actions and judge their consistency with legislative
mandates,0 1 as well as assuring that the general standards will be "applied
without unreasonable discrimination. '50 2
As with all matters doctrinal in this area, the application of this classic
doctrine to the broadcast indecency context is complex and indeterminate.
First, the extent to which the generic definition of indecency would trigger
hard look review is unclear. Second, the initial determination of whether there
has been an agency policy change triggering hard look review is itself contin-
gent and dependent on the selection and characterization of the historical time
frame in which agency action is to be addressed. Third, even when courts
engage in hard look review, there is a built-in range of meaning in such an
inquiry. Both proponents and opponents of the FCC can mount respectable
arguments as to whether the rationales expressed by the Commission were or
Law, 74 MiNN. L. REV. 689, 762-69 (1990) (discussing, inter alia, application of Heckler to
refusals to initiate rulemaking proceedings).
499. Greater Boston, 444 F.2d at 852 (footnote omitted); see also American Hosp. Ass'n v.
NLRB, 111 S. Ct. 1539, 1546 (1991) ("Given the extensive notice and comment rulemaking
conducted by the Board, its careful analysis of the comments that it received, and its well-
reasoned justification for the new rule, we would not be troubled even if there were inconsisten-
cies between the current rule and prior NLRB pronouncements.").
500. Greater Boston, 444 F.2d at 851; see also Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy,
Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Ade-
quate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 410-25; Marianne Koral Smythe,
Judicial Review of Rule Rescissions, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1928 (1984); Cass Sunstein, Deregula-
tion and the Hard Look Doctrine, 1983 SuP. Cr. REv. 177 [hereinafter Sunstein, Hard Look
Doctrine]. The hard look required of agencies in circumstances of inconsistency is a particular
example of what has come to be known as the hard look doctrine of judicial review, pursuant to
which a court will review administrative policymaking with more than the traditional level of
extreme deference.
There is a certain lack of clarity, however, as to whether the essence of the hard look
required under the doctrine is a searching inquiry into the process used by the agency and its
fidelity to statutory commands or a true review of the merits of the agency's decisions, or both.
See Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX. L. REV. 207,
238-39 (1984) (characterizing hard look review as properly consisting of an assessment of the
record's support for agency policy rather than a review of the distributional fairness of regula-
tion); Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REv. 505, 526-49
(1985) (same); Shapiro & Levy, supra this note, at 419-22; Smythe, supra this note, at 1963-67
(arguing that in most circumstances, hard look review should not require agencies to discredit
the factual premises of the administrative position they have rescinded); Sunstein, Hard Look
Doctrine, supra this note, at 181-84 (describing both procedural and substantive aspects of hard
look review). Some cases suggest that the requisite judicial review is satisfied by a judicial
discernment of the footprints of the agency's actions, see, e.g., Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S.
Ct. 2767, 2779 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring), while other cases, such as State Farm, 463 U.S.
29, show the Court reviewing the merits of the agency's action. In light of the discussion of
administrative process below, this Part will focus on the merit-based interpretation of the hard
look doctrine.
501. Telecommunications Research, 800 F.2d at 1184 (quoting Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 808 (1973)).
502. Greater Boston, 444 F.2d at 851.
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were not "reasoned" according to conventional administrative benchmarks.
Most problematically, because both the FCC and the Court of Appeals ig-
nored the political context of the Commission's change of mind, the actual
interpretation of the requirement of reasoned explanation had the effect of
driving underground a truly complex question implicated by the shift in the
Commission's regulatory approach. Even if the courts had sought to be more
sensitive to the political framework of the issue by analogy to the traditional
administrative law concern about agency capture, however, the attempt would
likely yield no more satisfactory an analysis.
In addition to the hard look doctrine of independent judicial review of
agency policymaking, administrative law currently contains the Chevron doc-
trine of substantial deference to agency interpretations of statutory terms.50 3
Pursuant to the Chevron doctrine, judicial review of agency interpretations of
statutory terms in legislation administered by the agency in question consists
of a two-step process. First, the court must determine whether Congress has
spoken precisely to the issue and, if so, must simply effect the legislation's
plain meaning. If Congress has not spoken so clearly, the second step requires
the court to extend full deference to any agency reading of the statute that is a
rational interpretation of what Congress meant to regulate. If there are sev-
eral possible rational interpretations of a term, the court is to give deference to
the meaning selected by the agency, even if it is not the best interpretation in
the court's own view.5 4
503. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
44 (1984).
The relationship between the two doctrines is complex and has been subjected to searching
inquiry and critique. See, ag., Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year Some
Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review ofAgency Action, 87
COLUM. L. REv. 1093, 1117-18, 1129-30 (1987) and sources cited therein. Some have argued
that there are ways to make the doctrines consistent, see, e.g., Garland, supra note 500, at 549-
53; Strauss, supra this note; while others can be read to claim that the apparent distinctions are
unrealistic and artificial, see, eg., Linda R. Hirshman, Postmodern Jurisprudence and the Prob-
lem ofAdministrative Discretion, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 646, 678-80 (1988) (challenging the ration-
ality of grounding the distinction on the difference between statutory interpretation and agency
policy making).
Whatever the conceptual tensions, it seems clear that Chevron has not displaced hard look
review. Recent scholarship questions the Supreme Court's actual commitment to the level of
deference on statutory analysis theoretically entailed in the Chevron approach itself. See gener-
ally Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992);
see also Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the
Courts?, 7 YALE J. oN REG. 1, 20-23 (1990) (suggesting that the applicability and extent of
Chevron when pure questions of statutory interpretation are at issue depend on how broadly we
read INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987)); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Ad-
ministrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 512 (noting the Supreme Court debate
on the applicability of Chevron to "pure question[s] of statutory construction").
Although a fuller discussion of the issue and the large literature on the proper extent of
judicial deference to statutory interpretations by administrative agencies is beyond the scope of
this Article, it is clear that both the Chevron and State Farm doctrines continue to coexist, at
least in those cases where the Supreme Court finds them useful. Thus, the FCC's policy with
regard to indecency should be subjected to both sorts of review.
504. Recently, in Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 112 S. Ct. 2589 (1992), the Court held,
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Applying these often-intersecting doctrines requires an examination both
of the FCC's indecency policy and of its enforcement actions. As to the for-
mer, because the FCC's indecency policy could be said primarily to consist of
an interpretation of the statutory terms of section 1464, it could well be argued
that the matter is governed by the principles of Chevron only. To the extent
that the Chevron analysis applies, the result is debatable. With regard to the
first prong of the Chevron doctrine, one could argue that in section 1464, Con-
gress had spoken precisely to the issue of the definition of indecency by sug-
gesting that it could not have crafted a less vague definition. Alternatively,
one could argue that Congress had not so spoken since no definition of the
term had been provided or discussed in the legislative history.505 Thus, the
suggestion that the statute is a precise Congressional statement replicates the
same substantive issue discussed above in connection with claims of constitu-
tional vagueness.
Under the second prong of the Chevron doctrine, the question of judicial
deference depends on whether the FCC's definition of indecency could be con-
sidered a rational interpretation of what Congress could have meant to regu-
late in passing section 1464. Although the second prong of Chevron is a
relatively easy standard to meet, this inquiry is also subject to conflicting argu-
ments. In addition, some might argue that the interpretive format of the inde-
cency approach, itself an issue subject to differential characterization, would
influence the extent of judicial deference under Chevron.506
Even under the hard look doctrine, the malleability of the reasoned anal-
ysis inquiry is placed in bold relief in light of the contingent character of the
circumstances triggering rationality review of agency rule changes. Whether
the FCC is said to have acted consistently or inconsistently with its past poli-
cies depends, in large part, on the time frame in which the issue is addressed
and the manner in which it is characterized. Thus, the period between 1978
and 1987 is not the only time frame in which to assess whether the FCC has
provided adequate and rational explanations for its change in policy. If we
were to look at the entirety of FCC indecency enforcement stances since 1934,
for example, the agency could argue that its decision to adopt only a narrow,
bright-line enforcement standard after Pacifica was a radical and insufficiently
justified shift away from a history of interactive FCC enforcement and indus-
under the first prong of the Chevron analysis, that Congressional language in § 33(g) of the
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) was unambiguous in providing
that injured workers who do not obtain employer approval of settlements with third parties
forfeit all future benefits, including medical payments, from their employers. The statement
proffered in the text might be considered an expansive interpretation of Chevron by some. See,
e.g., Cass Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency Action,
1989 DUKE L.J. 522, 523 n.4.
505. See Scalia, supra note 503, at 520-21 (discussing the malleability of the first prong of
the Chevron doctrine and the question it raises as to "how clear is clear?").
506. See, e.g., Anthony, supra note 503 (positing that Chevron does not require courts to
accept agency interpretations when they are expressed in informal formats).
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try self-censorship." 7 Surely, the agency could claim that returning to a his-
torically consistent regulatory regime after what it considered to be a failed
deregulatory experiment is not the kind of abrupt shift in policy for which the
reasoned explanation requirement was intended." 8 Indeed, some might argue
that such an account would constitute a "reasoned explanation" given the
traditional thinness of judicial review of agency action, even in the hard look
context.
The doctrine of review for reasoned analysis of change is also subject to a
critique of its application. The FCC's change of position on indecency in 1987
assertedly was based on the virtues of consistency and completeness, in light of
the agency's obligation to enforce § 1464 "responsibly."' In its Reconsidera-
tion Order, the Commission explained that it was broadening its enforcement
strategy beyond the Carlin dirty words because narrowing the test to that lit-
any of expletives might lead to "anomalous results that could not be justi-
fied."510 Under that standard,
material that portrayed sexual or excretory activities or organs in as
patently offensive a manner as the earlier Carlin monologue - and,
consequently, of concern with respect to its exposure to children -
would have been permissible to broadcast simply because it avoided
certain words. That approach, in essence, ignored an entire category
of speech by focusing exclusively on specific words rather than the
generic definition of indecency. This made neither legal nor policy
sense.
511
Broadcasters argued that the Commission's pre-1987 standard was
adopted in order to provide licensees with both certainty and adequate
"breathing space" for programming and that the agency had not explained
"why it is now necessary to regulate under an inherently vague one."' 512 They
complained that the Commission had not identified the "anomalous results"
that had occurred, had not precisely described what category of speech had
507. See PoWE, supra note 3, at 162-90; Levi, supra note 36.
508. The Supreme Court's analysis in FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582
(1981), provides an apt analogy. There, the Court was rather deferential to the agency's deci-
sion to stop enforcing the "format doctrine," under which it had reviewed proposed changes in
broadcaster entertainment formats to ensure format diversity as directed by the D.C. Circuit's
decisions. Although the Court stated that its ultimate conclusion rested on the FCCs "reason-
able explanation for this preference," the Court did "attach some weight" to the Commission's
past preferences for market solutions to the format question. 450 U.S. at 603. The agency's
shifts in policy were discounted as having flowed from responsiveness to a judicial mandate:
"[A]Ithough the Commission was obliged to modify its policies to conform to the Court of
Appeals' format doctrine, the Policy Statement reasserted the Commission's traditional prefer-
ence for achieving diversity in entertainment programming through market forces." 450 U.S. at
599.
509. 64 R.R.2d at 214; see ACT I, 852 F.2d 1332, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
510. 3 F.C.C.R. at 930; see also discussion supra text accompanying notes 438-39.
511. In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 3 F.C.C.R. 930 (1987), aff'd in part and remanded
in part sub nom. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
512. Brief for Petitioners at 39, Act I, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (No. 88-1064).
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been ignored, and had not stated what considerations outweighed the ease of
applying the formal, bright-line, seven-dirty-words rule.5 13 Specifically, the
petitioning broadcasters chided the Commission for the inadequacy of its ra-
tionale on the ground that
the Commission did not purport to find that the amount of objec-
tionable broadcast programming had increased in the decade since
the original Pacifica case, or that large amounts of such program-
ming were in fact being broadcast under the post-Pacifica standard,
much less provide convincing statistics as evidence of a problem. 14
Although not explicitly set out, the subtext of this argument is an as-
sumption of an irrational and ideologically motivated change in policy on the
part of the Commission. The history of the FCC's approach to indecency thus
could be characterized as a "lurching" model, in which the Commission as-
sertedly has changed policy willy-nilly, responding at least in part to varying
political pressures. According to this view, the Commission's decision to re-
turn to its generic indecency standard after a decade of non-enforcement con-
stitutes nothing more than another instance of the agency's habitual, arbitrary,
and unreasoned submission to political will in derogation of its mandate to act
independently and in the public interest.515
Both positions can be supported, depending on the starting point of the
inquiry. On the one hand, one could emphasize that consistency for its own
sake is not necessarily an absolute value. That governmental actors have the
power to regulate more than a core set of things does not mean that the power
should be exercised if other values would be implicated and undermined
thereby. The arbitrariness of government selections in the realm of sex talk
could be seen as the counterweight to the value of consistency and
completeness.
In contrast, one could underscore the fact that the FCC's position rested
on the arbitrariness of picking only a certain subset of sex talk to regulate
when so much other definitionally indistinguishable material could flourish.
The FCC could claim that if the purpose of regulation is to make certain that
offensive material is not broadcast to children, it is irrational to suggest that
channeling the seven dirty words alone is sufficient to address the goal. As-
sertedly having received many viewer and listener complaints in the last dec-
ade about the indecent sexual content of broadcasting, the FCC could take
official notice of the obvious increase in sexually explicit programming and
argue that its reasoned analysis relied on such complaints without having to
provide statistics, as suggested by the broadcasters.51 6
513. Id.
514. Id.
515. The question of the appropriateness of political considerations in agency decision-
making is addressed infra text accompanying note 532.
516. There is a question whether the agency could do this under the circumstances. The
APA, 5 U.S.C. § 556(e)(1988), provides for a right to rest agency decisions on official notice in
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The Commission could rely also on another of the multiplicity of read-
ings available for the history of the agency's dealings with indecency. An al-
ternative view of the history is that the agency, in its various approaches to the
regulation of indecency, was simply and conscientiously interpreting its statu-
tory mandate under section 1464, primarily in response to interpretations of
Supreme Court precedent, changes in the level of sexual discourse allowed to
air as a result of competitive pressures on broadcaster self-censorship, and an
increasingly risk-taking attitude toward judicial reversal on the part of
changed FCC membership. Far from responding irrationally to political pres-
sures over an uneven history of enforcement, historical evidence could be read
to support the claim that the agency's regulatory moves were properly syn-
chronized with changes in social mores and the agency's legal interpretations.
Indeed, the history could be read as relatively consistent, except for an unu-
sual period of non-enforcement dictated by the agency's interpretation of con-
stitutional limitations on its authority.
The 1987 change in indecency enforcement policy was reviewed by the
D.C. Circuit pursuant to "reasoned analysis" review. The court found that
the Commission "adequately" had explained why it had decided to change its
enforcement standard:517
Short of the thesis that only the seven dirty words are properly desig-
nated indecent - an argument petitioners disavow - some more
expansive definition must be attempted. The FCC rationally deter-
mined that its former policy could yield anomalous, even arbitrary,
results. No reasonable formulation tighter than the one the Com-
mission has announced has been suggested in this review proceeding.
The difficulty, or "abiding discomfort," we conclude, is not the ab-
sence of "reasoned analysis" on the Commission's part, but the
"[v]agueness ... inherent in the subject matter." '18
This conclusion is an example of the malleable character of judicial re-
view of inconsistent agency action. The court just as easily could have asked
whether the FCC's enforcement decision was rational in light of the option of
reading indecency in a manner coextensive with the Supreme Court's current
definition of obscenity, for example.
A hard look at the application of the hard look doctrine to the FCC in
matters involving changes in policy suggests that it has been wielded with
varying levels of analytical rigor across the contexts in which the Commission
has changed regulatory course.5 19 It is beyond the scope of this Article to
formal rule-making and adjudication if the parties have the opportunity to show the contrary of
the propositions to be officially noticed. There is a question whether this statutory requirement
should apply in informal contexts to which the statute does not specifically speak. Nevertheless,
official notice in the administrative context is given far greater latitude than judicial notice. See.
eg., Banks v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 1981).
517. ACT I, 852 F.2d. 1332, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
518. Id at 1338 (citation omitted).
519. Indeed, the thinness of the review that occasionally has passed for hard-look scrutiny
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tabulate and analyze all the instances in which changes in FCC rules have
been judicially reviewed. Nevertheless, a few recent cases suggest that courts
have employed rather deferential standards of review in upholding the ration-
ality of some deregulatory moves, 520 while engaging in more scrupulous and
skeptical review in other such circumstances.521 Indeed, the Supreme Court
itself appears to waver in its doctrinal antipathy to agency changes in policy.
Recently, in Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 522 the Court relied on the "plain
meaning" of the statutory language and refused to defer to an agency interpre-
tation of a statute (on which a private litigant sought to rely) because the
director of the agency changed his views on the issue after the Court had
granted certiorari. Pointing both to prior administrative inconsistency in in-
terpretation and to the change of official interpretation, the Court stated that
"it would be quite inappropriate to defer to an interpretation which has been
abandoned by the policymaking agency itself,"52 particularly because the
agency's failure to "speak with one voice" on the issue "further diminishe[d]
the persuasive power of the Director's earlier decision to endorse the... ques-
tionable interpretation, a decision he has since reconsidered."524
Malleability in application and unpredictability are not the only problems
with the reasoned analysis requirement, however. After all, this sort of objec-
tion might be made with respect to the application of many legal standards,
not the least of which is the reasonableness standard common from torts to
commercial law. An additional problem with the requirement is that it does
has been made evident recently in Justice Stevens' concurrence in Franklin v. Massachusetts,
112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992). There, contending that the basis of administrative changes in policy
need not be more than "reasonably discernible," Justice Stevens suggested that, under State
Farm, the decision of the Commerce Department to include overseas residents in the census for
purposes of apportioning Congressional seats among the states would be permissible despite a
history of administrative flip-flops on the issue and little evidence to support the current posi-
tion. Id. at 2787.
520. See, ag., FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981) (upholding the FCC's
decision to decline review of changes in licensees' entertainment programming formats, leaving
diversity to be promoted by market forces); Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C.
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990) (upholding the FCC's decision that the public
interest would no longer be served by enforcement of the fairness doctrine, despite claims that
the agency's articulated reasons for dropping the long-standing doctrine were inadequate);
NAACP v. FCC, 682 F.2d 993, 999, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (upholding repeal of the Commis-
sion's anti-concentration "top 50 policy" because "Congress did not compel it to adopt" the
policy and because "greater discretion [should be] given administrative bodies when their deci-
sions are based upon judgmental or predictive conclusions").
521. See, e.g., Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(holding inadequate the Commission's market-oriented explanation for its decision to eliminate
its traditional children's commercialization policy, but accepting the adequacy of the agency's
shift from a comprehensive television program log requirement to that of a quarterly list of
significant issue-oriented programming); cf National Ass'n for Better Broadcasting v. FCC,
830 F.2d 270, 275-77 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that the FCC's interpretation of the Communi-
cations Act's sponsorship identification requirement in connection with children's programming
plainly conflicts with Congress' unambiguously expressed intent).
522. 112 S. Ct. 2589, 2597 (1992).
523. Id. at 2597.
524. Id.
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not deal with the political character of the FCC's history of broadcast regula-
tion.52 Thus, the starting point of the argument might be that the current
hard look doctrine has not taken into account the apparent responsiveness of
the indecency enforcement process to socially conservative religious groups
acting in concert with the current Commission.
However, even if courts sought to address the political context of agency
rule changes in their application of reasoned analysis review, such an exten-
sion of the current doctrine would not lead predictably to more determinate
results than current hard look doctrine. It would also raise more questions
than it would answer. What should be the role of the political context in the
judicial assessment of reasoned analysis by agencies? How should the political
context be interpreted? Should the interpretation of the meanings of political
pressure on agencies differ depending on whether they are legislative, execu-
tive, or private?
Much scholarship in administrative law addresses the problem of admin-
istrative discretion and seeks to cabin it by calling for different regimes of
accountability, ranging from stringent judicial review to executive over-
sight.526 In turn, much of the concern about administrative discretion has
focused on the problem of agency "capture" by regulated interests.527 This
concern at first might be thought to provide a useful administrative law tool to
deal with the political background of the FCC's indecency rules.52
525. See Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 36 (criticizing the reasoned analysis requirement,
although not in the context of a specific administrative law critique).
526. For a collection of references, see, e.g., Hirshman, supra note 503, at 646-75 and
sources cited therein; see also CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATiVE LAW: RE-
THINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY (1990) (advocating judicial review pursuant
to sound governance norms); Colin Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State,
133 U. PA. L. REv. 549, 582-93 (1985) (favoring statutory interpretation by agencies over
courts in situations where agencies are endowed with significant policynaking responsibilities);
Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Revie,?, 101
YALE LJ. 31 (1991) (questioning assumptions underlying arguments that strong interest groups
justify enhanced judicial review of administrative action); Sunstein, supra note 504 (suggesting
that although the question is difficult, aggressive judicial review has increased legality, rational-
ity, and administrative justice in many circumstances).
527. On the problem of capture by regulated interests, see, e.g., MARVER H. BERNSrEIN,
REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955) (describing agencies as having
life cycles during which they are at points susceptible to capture); PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY
INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES (1981) (discussing incentives to adopt pro-
industry policies); Hirshman, supra note 503, at 656. For challenges to some traditional as-
sumptions about agency capture, see JAMEs L. BAUGHMAN, TELEVISION'S GUARDIANS: THE
FCC AND THE POLITICS OF PROGRAMMING 1958-1967 (1985); JAMES Q. WILsoN, BUREAU-
CRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND WHY THEY Do IT 81-88 (1989); Cass R.
Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L REV. 271,
291 (1986).
528. I focus on scholarly discussions of "capture" as a central problem in the administra-
tive state because I know of no judicially articulated administrative law doctrine which explic-
itly considers issues of agency capture. Although a recognition of the captured character of the
administrative agency may well have influenced the level ofjudicial scrutiny in some cases, that
influence is basically left unarticulated in the decisions. See, e.g., Board of Governors, Fed.
Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361 (1986), where a unanimous Court over-
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An explicit substantive review for evidence of capture raises serious work-
ability problems. How is a court to know whether there has been an imper-
missible level of agency capture? Should the court be in the position of
assessing the different levels of capture of different agencies before it? Should
it undertake a capture analysis for each suit involving an agency, or should an
agency be deemed captured after once being so found? The former could in-
volve extraordinary complexity. The latter might be hard to square with judi-
cial practice, either as res judicata or estoppel. Moreover, focusing solely on
the extent to which agency action satisfies interest-group demands is not deter-
minative of the capture question because agencies can claim to have arrived at
conclusions favoring one set of interests over another as a result of their own
deliberations about the public interest rather than by mere acquiescence. The
procedural approach to capture is equally unavailing. Focusing on the ques-
tion of viewpoint representation in the administrative process as a proxy for
substantive capture determinations is problematic, if only for the reasons de-
scribed below in relation to the inadequacy of rule-making proceedings to ad-
dress fully the issue of indecency.
In addition, the traditional capture argument is not particularly apt in the
broadcasting context. The classic version of that argument rests on the con-
cern that, as a result of institutional incentives such as the revolving door of
employment between regulators and the regulated, administrative agencies
will become the handmaidens of the industries they regulate.5 29 The case of
broadcast indecency presents a different problem. Here, the argument rests on
turned the Federal Reserve Board's attempts to regulate "non-bank banks" under its authority
to regulate banks. The Court did not discuss, but might have had in mind as one relevant
factor, the reputation of the Federal Reserve Board as very sympathetic to money center banks
and hostile to upstart financial institutions. Of course, this is not to say that courts do not refer
to industry influence, see, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing) ("[Flederal agencies... are notoriously under the control of powerful interests who manip-
ulate them through advisory committees, or friendly working relations, or who have that
natural affinity with the agency which in time develops between the regulator and the regu-
lated."). Naturally, a demonstration that a regulation constituted nothing more than "an inter-
est-group deal serving no public purpose" would likely be considered "arbitrary and capricious"
under § 706(2)(4) of the APA. Sunstein, Neutrality, supra note 42, at 277. This is a very diffi-
cult standard to meet, however. Surely the FCC can make a straight-faced argument about the
public interest in indecency regulation, even if initiated at the behest of the social conservatives.
529. See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note 527, at 82; EDWARD S. GREENBERG, SERVING THE
FEW: CORPORATE CAPITALISM AND THE BIAS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY 75-76 (1974). With
regard to this argument in the FCC context, much of the administrative law commentary about
the Commission has focused on stories of apparently striking coziness between the FCC and
broadcast interests. See, e.g., ROBERT BRITT HORWITz, THE IRONY OF REGULATORY RE-
FORM: THE DEREGULATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 34-38 (1989); ERWIN G. KRASNOW,
LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY & HERBERT A. TERRY, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION
48-52 (1982); Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and the Administrative Process in Japan and the
United States, 39 BUFF. L. REv. 615 (1991). For example, many have claimed that the delay in
the development of cable as a clear competitor to broadcasting was due, in part, to protectionist
policies adopted by an agency too concerned with limiting competition for the over-the-air
broadcasters it was supposed to regulate. See, e.g., KRANSNOW, supra this note, at 51; Wein-
berg, supra this note, at 700-01.
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the FCC's adoption of policies contrary to the interests of large portions of the
regulated industry, assertedly at the behest of well-organized and reformist
conservative decency leagues. The particular concerns explicitly fueling the
objection to agency capture by regulated groups are not implicated when the
capturing agents are single-issue public interest groups.
For a time, interest-group pluralism held great scholarly allure as the
model for the direction of legislative and administrative organization. 530 Some
still believe in the affirmative and explicit recognition of politics in administra-
tive law.131 Yet many scholars have expressed doubts recently about the as-
sumptions of parity in interest group pluralist accounts and have articulated
serious reservations about a republic governed on the basis of interest-group
pluralism.532 An interest-group pluralist model might be even less palatable,
for those scholars, in the indecency context than in the ordinary industry cap-
ture scenario because it may be hard for countervailing forces to be organized
and brought to bear.133 Whatever the benefits and flaws of an interest group
model in general, it seems clear that a judicial review standard grounded on
notions of capture is far less administrable when applied to all interest groups
530. See, eg., EDLEY, supra note 526, at 147-48; Bruff, supra note 500, at 210, Elhauge,
supra note 526, at 36; Garland, supra note 500, at 510-11; Richard Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1669 (1975).
531. For example, using an approach that approves of administrative responsiveness to
political agendas of the executive branch, Justice Rehnquist opined in State Farm that "[a]
change in administration brought about by the people casting their votes is a perfectly reason-
able basis for an executive agency's reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and
regulations" and that "[a]s long as the agency remains within the bounds established by Con-
gress, it is entitled to assess administrative records and evaluate priorities in light of the philoso-
phy of the administration." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part),
see also EDLEY, supra note 526, at 9, 184-99 (describing strong and weak versions of this view).
According to the Rehnquist view, agency responsiveness to administration ideology is demo-
cratic because it responds to the majoritarian political mandate. This recalls arguments based
on democratic theory for a default rule of deference to agency interpretations of statutes rather
than independent judicial interpretations. See, ag., Merrill, supra note 503, at 978-80 (discuss-
ing the basis in democratic theory of the Court's move to executive deference in Chevron); see
also Scalia, supra note 503, at 512 (describing permissible policy shifts in response to changing
political pressures allowed under Chevron if Congress has given the agency interpretive
discretion).
532. See, eg., Bruff, supra note 500, at 211; Elhauge, supra note 526, at 37; William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as Postmodern Cul-
tural Form, 89 MICH. L. REv. 707, 738-40 (1991) and sources cited therein; Daniel A. Farber
& Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 Tx. L. REV. 873 (1987); Jerry
Mashaw, Pro-delegation. Why Administrators Should Make Political Decision, 1 J. L EcoN. &
ORG. 81, 91-99 (1985); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democ-
racy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. Rev. 2121,
2124-26 (1990) (collecting cites to Arrow-influenced social choice theorists who turn to admin-
istrative solutions in light of their concerns about the fairness and rationality of collective demo-
cratic decision-making processes) Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38
STAN. L. REv. 29 (1985).
533. On the relative advantages of small interest groups in organizing constituencies, see
Bruff, supra note 500, at 216, 244 (citing M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTIoN 22-
36 (1965)).
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than when applied to regulated interests only. Application of the pejorative
label of "capture" in these circumstances cannot silence the agency's argu-
ment that it arrived at the right public policy conclusion, regardless of
whether it was procedurally aided in doing so by well-organized public inter-
est groups. In turn, this leads back to the kind of substantive analysis called
for by the hard look doctrine and to the problems, detailed above, of that
approach. Particularly in light of the controversy, even within administrative
law scholarship, on the issue of how to deal with interest-group impact on
policy, no "answer" to our problem can be found in administrative law.
2. Procedural Defects
A different type of attack on the Commission's new approach to inde-
cency enforcement focuses on 'procedural' grounds, primarily arguing that the
agency's procedure in connection with indecency violated the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) in various particulars . 34 The core of the procedural
argument is that the Commission violated the APA by failing to undertake a
legislative rule-making process replete with notice, public debate, and com-
ment. 35 This is questionable, from the point of view both of current adminis-
trative law doctrine and of administrative law policy.
This Article will not engage the particulars of administrative procedure
or parse the text of the APA to address whether the FCC's Notice of Inquiry
procedure for the adoption of its indecency enforcement standards satisfied
procedural APA standards. Suffice it to say that there is a serious question as
to the persuasiveness of formal and hyper-technical arguments that it did not.
Supreme Court precedent suggests that, in the absence of a Congressional
command, it is usually up to the agency to decide the manner in which it seeks
to proceed in any given regulatory circumstance. In particular, an agency
does not have to proceed by rule making if it chooses to adjudicate instead.5 36
Moreover, agencies are granted almost complete discretion in their choice of
procedures for informal adjudications. 537 In addition, the Supreme Court has
warned courts not to impose extra procedural hurdles on agencies that choose
to operate by informal rule making.5 38
In warning three broadcasters and simultaneously issuing a Public Notice
of its new indecency policy in 1987, the FCC characterized its actions simply
as the issuance of declaratory rulings designed to reduce uncertainty in the
534. Reiss, supra note 208, at 248-51.
535. Id.
536. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
537. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1988); see also Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justifi-
cation for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1561 (1992); Paul R. Verkuil, A
Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 739 (1976).
538. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). Vermont Yankee led to a profusion of scholarly literature, including
Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978
Sup. CT. REV. 345 (1979).
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area.5 39 (The agency had used the declaratory ruling method in Pacifica previ-
ously.n') On review, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the
FCC had "employed the informal adjudication format to promulgate a rule of
general applicability." '41 The court found no procedural impediment to the
agency's actions.' 2
Formal adjudicatory-type hearings in connection with rule-making pro-
ceedings, with their attendant testimony and cross-examination, are now far
from the norm. 43 With regard to the procedural requirements for informal
rule-making proceedings, notably notice and comment periods, the actualities
of the FCC's proceedings on the issue of indecency since 1987 would seem to
satisfy the purposes of those incidents. As the D.C. Circuit pointed out, the
agency's Reconsideration Order, issued in response to multiple petitions for
clarification and reconsideration, 5" read like the result of a notice and com-
ment rule making rather than an adjudication." 5 The agency considered
many sets of comments in connection with its Reconsideration Order and,
539. New Indecency Enforcement Standards to be Employed to AlI Broadcast and Ama-
teur Radio Licensees, 2 F.C.C.R. 2726, 2727 (1987).
[A]Ithough [the Commission] was addressing the particular facts [in each of the cases
before it], the decisions will have a precedential effiect on all broadcast and amateur
licensees. The Commission also noted that there have been questions as to the Com-
mission's enforcement policy in this complicated area of the law and, through its au-
thority to issue declaratory rulings in order to remove uncertainty, see 5 USC Section
554(e), it has sought to resolve those questions in these proceedings.
Ia
Courts often will consider the agency's own characterization of a particular action in deter-
mining whether notice and comment procedures apply to the action. Telecommunications Re-
search & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 800 F.2d 1181, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (discussing the FCC's
policy statement repealing certain "underbrush" regulations as general statements of policy, not
subject to notice and comment). However, the agency's decision is not controlling. A legisla-
tive rule must conform to the APA's requirements in § 553, even if the agency had character-
ized it quite differently. See, eg., Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (holding that the FDA's "action levels" for contaminants in food were really legislative
rules requiring APA notice and comment).
540. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); see also ACT I, 852 F.2d 1332, 1334
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
541. ACTI, 852 F.2d at 1337.
542. The court could have arrived at the same result by characterizing the agency's action
either as a general statement of policy or an interpretive rule, both of which are explicitly ex-
empted from the notice and comment requirements under § 553(b)(A) of the APA.
543. See &g., GLENN 0. RoBINsoN, AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY: PUBLIC CHOICE AND
PUBLIC LAW 131 (1991). The Supreme Court effectively held in United States v. Allegheny-
Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972) and in United States v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co.,
410 U.S. 224 (1973) that formal hearings would not be required in rule making unless they are
required by the terms of the agency's governing statute. See Carl A. Auerbach, Informal Rule
Making: A Proposed Relationship Between Administrative Procedures and Judicial Review, 72
Nw. U. L. REv. 15, 59 (1977); Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Probing the Mind of the Administrator
Hearing Variations and Standards of Judicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act
and Other Federal Statutes, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 721, 725-26 (1975).
544. ACTI, 852 F.2d at 1336.
545. d at 1337. It was by virtue of that finding that the court was able to reach various
constitutional and administrative law arguments about the generic indecency standard on the
merits and as a whole, rather than as applied in the individual case. Id
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subsequently, in connection with its Notices of Inquiry about the adoption of a
total ban on indecency.5 46 Thus, as the agency's overall procedures appear to
have been consistent with the deliberative goals of the APA, the determination
of the procedural acceptability of the agency's actions should not be based on
technical readings of the statute, even if such arguments could be made under
the operative legislation.
Of course, this is not to say that the agency's public comment procedure
constituted the kind of open-minded and free-ranging inquiry we might prefer
in administrative agency review. Indeed, the various FCC documents describ-
ing the agency's approach to time-channeling might be read to suggest that the
Commission effectively had made up its mind with regard to the issue and was
simply seeking some additional public support for its position. 47 Barring an
explicit, applicable requirement of such open-minded public discussion in the
current law, however, it is questionable whether faulting the FCC on a purely
technical, doctrinal basis is likely either to be successful or to promote "real"
deliberation.
C. Toward a Regrounding for Constitutional and Administrative
Approaches
Having suggested that there is potential uncertainty and manipulability in
the application of existing rubrics of constitutional and administrative law to
the question of broadcast indecency does not end the inquiry or suggest that
such doctrines are in fact useless in deciding cases.548 Legal doctrine does not
fail simply because it does not satisfy some aspirational ideal of certitude and
ineluctability in application. To the contrary, as a practical matter, doctrines
like vagueness, hard look, and administrative due process often serve as effec-
tive and substantial constraints on administrative action, both on remand in
particular cases and prospectively, by setting standards for future cases.
Moreover - and most importantly - the permeability and uncertainty of
such doctrines allow for new interpretations. The point, then, is not that con-
stitutional and administrative law doctrines should be dispensed with in the
area of indecency. It is, rather, that further doctrinal argument about broad-
cast indecency is likely to prove fruitless if it fails to take into account the
ambiguous and multivalent meanings of sex talk in our cultures.
546. The latest Total Ban Report, 5 F.C.C.R. 5297 (1990), indicates that the agency con-
sidered numerous comments regarding the definition of indecency. In an earlier Notice of In-
quiry issued to compile a record for a total ban, the agency stated that the definition was not in
issue, yet asked challengers of its definition to articulate their own proposals and explain why
they should be adopted in lieu of the agency's approach. 4 F.C.C.R. 8358 (1989).
547. See, eg., Passler, supra note 356, at 150-52.
548. For critiques of critical analyses relying on the indeterminacy of doctrine, see, e.g.,
Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminancy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHh L.
REv. 462 (1987); John Stick, Can Nihilism be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. RE.v. 332 (1986).
Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning and the Cognitive Stakes for
Law, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1105 (1989); cf. Joan C. Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death
of Transcendence and the Rise of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429 (1987).
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A full engagement with the underlying dilemma described in Part I of
this Article would make possible a new and much richer form of vagueness
argument; a brief sketch of its outlines would be in order. Having recognized
that there is a spectrum of vagueness in language and that a contrast between
vagueness and clarity per se is not a particularly useful basis on which to apply
legal doctrine, we might nevertheless recharacterize the important questions
as why we think that something is more or less vague and whether we think
that the vagueness is inevitable.
The D.C. Circuit's way of positing the substantive choice in the applica-
tion of vagueness doctrine does not adequately address the nature of what is
inherently vague in the FCC's standard for broadcast indecency. At some
level, indecency is amorphous because, in our heterogeneous culture, it is cur-
rently unrealistic to seek an overall consensus as to what is indecent. More-
over, meaning, as noted above, is rooted in cultural practices and
understandings. In our culture, sex talk implicates countervailing practices.
It thus has different and often inconsistent social meanings. Because sexual
statements will likely have multiple meanings, their fundamental ambiguity in
today's social conditions suggests that any attempt to regulate will necessarily
lack clarity and fairness. We might conclude, then, that the FCC's definition
of indecency is subject to attack for vagueness in a far deeper sense than the
glib argument that, after all, everything is vague. The FCC's approach to
indecency is problematically vague precisely because it attempts to regulate a
social form that is itself deeply equivocal and ambiguous in today's social con-
ditions. Once we see the underlying dilemma, a truly "hard look" is likely to
produce even more ambiguity, rather than some reasoned basis for the mean-
ingful control of administrative actions.
The issue of Howard Stern is a case in point. Stem's programming is
puerile in its anatomical and scatological references. Yet it is also virtually
always political and tied to some commentary on current events. 49 I have
heard respectable and progressive academics say that the program's political
commentary often rivals and sometimes even exceeds in acuity and sophistica-
tion the coverage of National Public Radio. This is not to deny that the pro-
gramming is also often sexist, racist, and homophobic. Although Stern seems
to pride himself on being an "equal-opportunity insulter," some groups do
seem to have more such opportunities than others."' 0 Nevertheless, in more
serious moments, Stern can publicly say about Colorado's anti-gay referen-
dum, for example, that he finds the voters' refusal to accept homosexuals as
people to be "frightening." 551 Stern sends a multiplicity of messages.
To some extent, in expressing cynicism, mocking authority, and display-
ing what is taken for independence of mind, Stem may express many people's
sense of disengagement from, and even opposition to, governmental, social,
549. See discussion supra text accompanying note 403.
550. Pareles, supra note 45.
551. Id.
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and political forces to which they feel subject. As one journalist puts it, Stem
is "our collective high-frequency id. '552 In the abstract, this embodiment of
resistance may seem empowering. Yet Stem's program is likely to be under-
stood differently by different audiences. For example, he ties his manifestos of
cynicism and aggression to comments that are threatening for some (such as
women, gays and lesbians, and Blacks) and comforting for others who rely on
them to confirm their prejudices. Lesbian Dial-a-Date and Guess Who's the
Jew are subject to different interpretations and effects, depending on the audi-
ence culture. And while one newspaper editorial can salute Stem for airing an
interview with a Marge Schott impersonator who salted her comments with
"vile racial epithets and insults" precisely because the mock interview "made a
point about racism in a way no nice respectable news story could," ' 3 another
can question the extent to which we can expect true reevaluation from people
living in a culture still rife with prejudices, subtext or otherwise.
Admittedly, contradiction and complexity plague all sorts of social issues
subject to regulatory oversight. It would be a strong stance indeed - and one
that I am not prepared to take - to suggest that there should therefore never
by any regulation in areas involving polyvalence and contradiction. If that is
the case, why should broadcast indecency be exempt from regulation because
it too is ambiguous? One possibility is that our culture treats sex and gender
as implicating such fundamental and constitutive matters that the multiplicity
of meanings constructed in talk about them is more intense and contradictory
than in many other areas of social life. Yet another (not mutually exclusive)
possibility rests on the presumption of press- and speech-protectiveness that is
already deeply a part of our First Amendment tradition. A simple reliance on
a First Amendment tradition should not lead us to embrace deregulation by
reflex, however. The whole point of revealing the ambiguity of the social role
of sex talk is to demonstrate the necessarily imperfect character of any regula-
tory solution in current times.
Professor Post has suggested that, through negotiation in the sphere of
public discourse, a heterogeneous society dedicated to democratic structures
can arrive at the proper boundary between robust and challenging public dis-
course and the ground norms of civility that will permit such discourse to
flourish.5"4 The question, then, is whether the ground norms of administrative
law can be mined and reinterpreted to provide a forum for such structured
public discourse with respect to sex talk.
We could attempt a reclamation of administrative law by arguing that the
552. Andrea Sachs, In Defense of Bad Taste: It's a Relief in Grim Times, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 27, 1992, at B5.
553. Howard Stern and the FCC, WASH. PosT, Dec. 19, 1992, at A18 (editorial).
554. Post, The Constitutional Concept, supra note 41. While I do not take Professor Post
to be suggesting a single, unchanging boundary, he does seem to believe that some accommoda-
tion is possible if we clearly articulate what is at stake in public discourse. Id. at 683; see also
Post, Racist Speech, supra note 490, at 288 ("[T]he boundary is inherently uncertain and subject
to perennial reevaluation.").
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FCC should have conducted full-fledged hearings on the subject of indecency
before deciding to adopt a stringent enforcement mode, not because of the
need to comply technically with the APA but, rather, in order to understand
the full scope of what is at stake in the indecency issue and to allow for debate
reflecting all points of view. This kind of an argument for rulemakings effec-
tively rests on a two-pronged goal: to promote both the ventilation of a wide
spectrum of viewpoints and the achievement of better, more informed and
expert truth-finding.
While there is much to recommend public debate on issues of social im-
portance, the argument for debate in the current administrative agency con-
text is problematic. Others have already described the deep flaws in the
operation of notice and comment rule-making processes for the development
of civic discourse."' 5 The actual processes of informal rule making, depending
as they frequently do on "insider" input, can crystallize agency positions
before the process is even opened up for public comment.5 5 6 Indeed, perhaps
the fact that rule-making proceedings are necessarily "adversarial" in nature,
with pro forma written comments commonly ignored by the agencies, in fact
promotes absolutist ground-claiming rather than open-minded debate or a will
to reach consensus." 7 History provides numerous examples of situations in
which administrative agencies, after soliciting public input, fail to consider the
resulting comments.55 8
In addition, most people do not get involved in the debate at the Commis-
sion level. In light of the fact that administrative hearings often are not tele-
vised, it is equally unlikely that large segments of the population would
become engaged in the debate indirectly, through television viewing.559 These
social realities should make us wonder about the extent to which proposals of
in-depth administrative inquiry into indecency would really result in wide-
spread debate in any socially consensus-building sense.
Even if such debate were possible as a practical matter, how would we
555. See, eg., Seidenfeld, supra note 537, at 1560-61.
556. Id at 1560.
557. See id at 1560-61 ("[I]nformal rulemaking often does not generate true discourse but
rather encourages participants to pursue their private interests single-mindedly."); Philip Har-
ter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEo. L.J. 1 (1982) (criticizing rule making
as a political and overly adversarial enterprise).
558. Mary C. Dollarhyde, Surrogate Rulemaking: Problems and Possibilities Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1017, 1019 & n.17 (1988) (describing both the
general issue and a specific instance in which the FCC called for two days of hearings in 1972
with regard to the adoption of cable rules, ultimately only to rubberstamp an industry compro-
mise); cf Garland, supra note 500, at 583 (describing efficiency problems of agency
proceduralism).
559. Network news programs are notoriously skimpy in their coverage of events at the
administrative agency level. Cable sources, such as C-SPAN, have many other Congressional
matters to cover and, in any event, only reach areas where cable is available and subscribers pay
the cost of the service. Cf STEPHEN HESS, THE GOVERNMENT/PRESS CONNECTION: PRESS
OFFICERS AND THEIR OFFICES 106 (1984) (discussing administrative agencies and departments
with little press contact).
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decide which issues merited a thorough public debate before new rules could
be adopted? Clearly not all rules would. Some rules implicate fundamental
civil and political rights. Others can have profound effects on the health and
safety of the public. Yet others may have multi-billion-dollar impacts. Still
others, while important, do not merit national soul-searching. Who should
make that decision? By what standards? At the very least, a substantial revi-
sion of the APA would be needed before such a doctrine could be applied,
even if we think the idea has merit.
Most importantly, it is likely that "real" debate about indecency would
not have led to a resolution grounded on expertise-based directives. Rather,
such open discussion probably would have exposed starkly the ambiguities
and social contradictions posed by the problem of broadcast sex talk. Indeed,
FCC regulation of broadcast indecency may well be a striking counter-exam-
ple to the recent scholarly suggestion of the administrative agency as the possi-
ble locus for a civic republican revival, with an invigorated public debate
achieved through the reclaimed bureaucratic state." °
It is sometimes true that talking about problems aggrandizes and ossifies
them and increases the difficulty of negotiating around them. Compromise is
only possible when the parties to the negotiation believe that they hold certain
values and norms in common and assume that they can arrive at a consensus
in which each side will leave the table with something. It may well be that
sometimes, and on some subjects, public debate is counter-productive, or, at
least wholly non-productive.5 6' Is indecency one of those subjects? At the
very least, we are sure to remain unsatisfied if we relegate the decision to a
flawed administrative process. After all, the institutional context of the FCC's
indecency policy after 1987 appears to suggest a set of decisions about the
extent of tolerance for uncivil speech derived by an administrative agency in
cooperation with a community for whom civility norms trump virtually all
democratic arguments for critical interaction.
CONCLUSION
After nearly a decade of regulatory quiescence undergirded by a narrow
proscription on the broadcast of seven specified dirty words, the FCC of the
560. See generally Seidenfeld, supra note 537; see also Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate
Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 801, 834-47 (1993) (articulating a general
critique of civic republicanism theory, including skepticism about its call for dialogue and con-
sensus); Pildes & Anderson, supra note 532, at 2163 (describing political incommensurability
and noting that "[s]ocially shared norms of rational argument might exist, but they do not
suffice to narrow the disagreements among the public or to indict one of the contending view-
points with irrationality").
561. A strategist might argue that because of the difficulties involved in calling for such
open public debate on the issue, a requirement to proceed by formal rule making would prompt
the agency to forgo such action in favor of regulation by the market. This would promote a
great deal of speech-protectiveness by default. However, this level of unevaluated indecency-
protectiveness might actually be worrisome. At the very least, it would seem to be too indirect a
way of arriving at the decision not to regulate.
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past five years quietly has been applying a sweeping definition of indecency in
order to "clean up" the broadcast airwaves. Citing the "inherent vagueness"
of any responsible generic definition of indecency, the Commission has at-
tempted to forestall any constitutional critique of its generic standard by rely-
ing on a tailored, case-by-case, assertedly contextual method of analysis and
neutral decision making.
The reality, however, is that the Commission applies its policy con-
clusorily, acontextually, and even inconsistently, in an ambivalent practice
suggesting that it simply knows indecency "when it sees it." When the
agency's decisional factors are examined at face value, they reveal themselves
to have characteristics easily amenable to conservative tilt.
Of even greater importance is the fact that a purely doctrinal assessment
of the Commission's claim to contextual "common-law" decisionmaking is in-
complete in ignoring the far more complex problems raised by indecency en-
forcement. The question of broadcast indecency is part of a larger social
debate between pluralists and social conservatives over conflicting conceptions
of the social and individual good, particularly as they relate to sexuality, pri-
vacy, and social diversity. To call certain speech indecent, then, is to engage
fundamental questions as to the liberating character of talk about sex and the
connection between sexual expression and diversity, pluralism, and the inclu-
sion of minority voices.
A richly contextualist consideration of the social settings of broadcast sex
talk makes evident the contradictory, ambiguous, changeable, and complex
role of sex talk in social life - a complexity that the extreme pluralist and
social conservative arguments fail to capture. To further complicate matters,
a searching contextualist approach reveals the extent to which the FCC's own
processes lend themselves to use by organized and intolerant groups anxious
to foreclose debate on sexual self-expression.
An attempt fully to describe the contexts of broadcast indecency would
undermine the effectiveness of the FCC's claims to contextuality. By stub-
bornly refusing to look beyond platitudes about the fear of indecency's harm-
ful effects on children, the Commission fails to recognize the difficult issues
about individual empowerment, cultural meaning, and social heterogeneity
that are often raised by its amorphous rules on sexual expression. It also fails
to acknowledge the dangers of the particular political and institutional con-
texts of its increasingly stringent enforcement of indecency rules. Available
doctrine, whether in constitutional or administrative law, provides neither a
satisfactory description of the problem of indecency nor a clear direction to
the FCC on how to solve it.
Where does that leave us? To start, we must recognize that indecency is a
particularly hard social question. This Article has sought to show that sex
talk can have a multiplicity of social meanings and both liberating and oppres-
sive characteristics, often simultaneously. Sexual statements accrue meaning
from cultural practices and will therefore have multiple (and sometimes incon-
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sistent) meanings to the extent that they reflect different cultural customs and
norms. So, by definition, any single socio-legal response will be only half-
satisfactory; no legal regime is indisputably "right" in its approach to this kind
of problem. In a world in which many of us no longer believe in the availabil-
ity of true moral consensus on contested issues relating to matters like sex, we
must be satisfied with troubled, partial, and ultimately contestable answers.
This does not close the inquiry, however. We are still left with the ques-
tion of what, if anything, should be done about indecency on the air. Because
sex talk is not an unambiguous phenomenon and there cannot be a "right"
approach to it, both regulation and governmental non-intervention can be ra-
tionalized in the indecency area. Thus, the real-life effect of this can be an
uncomfortable toleration of the status quo, whether it be regulatory or deregu-
latory in character. While the pro-speech presumption of our First Amend-
ment tradition would suggest leaning toward non-intervention in the rough
and tumble of broadcast speech, there are good reasons to be troubled by that
response. Or, put more optimistically, the recognition of complexity and con-
tingency can allow the troubled but resolute activity of governmental experi-
mentation, fully cognizant of the uncertainty of things. In either case,
however, both regulating or refusing to regulate amount to the regime of the
third-best, always unsatisfactory but hopefully open to reexamination and
change as circumstances warrant.
Yet we could say that the contradiction pointed out in this Article is in
fact more localized and less intractable than at first appears. It is not in every
instance that broadcast sex talk will have both empowering and subordinating
characteristics, after all. It may be the case in some rap, for example, but is
not necessarily so in other contexts. Moreover, that a song like Penis Envy can
receive airplay on a shock radio program does not mean that it will be under-
stood by the largely male listening audience as the feminist challenge I hear.
Perhaps, then, the answer is to require the FCC to enter into a far more
seriously contextual analysis of the problem and really do the kind of case-by-
case assessment that might reveal where the contradictions and intractabilities
really lie. The FCC could then regulate in situations in which meaning is not
so contested, on the basis of some open articulation of what practices and
meanings it is seeking to regulate. Even if such a role for the Commission
were not rendered hopeless by the culturally contingent meanings of sex talk,
and even if it did not undermine many of our most deeply held modem beliefs
about the state's role in the regulation of speech under the First Amendment,
it would nevertheless present insuperable problems of application in the cur-
rent FCC context. After all, the likely pattern of this FCC's enforcement can
be seen in the extensive description above, both of the Commission's cases and
of the institutional context in which the issue of indecency enforcement arises
in the first place. Thus, I propose a troubled deregulation in this area, not
because that is the ideal solution, but because it arises in the context of a non-
ideal administrative world.
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My rationale for that position is neither the common, market-oriented
justification for deregulation - the notion that people should be given their
preferences in broadcasting, whatever they may be - nor the other arguments
explored above about the potentially political character of talk about sex, the
culturally skewing effects of the current regulatory regime, or the overall bene-
fits of social diversity. Rather, the change in the institutional context of inde-
cency regulation - the growing influence of socially conservative pressure
groups - enhances my concern about the influence on administrative agencies
of a single interest group's viewpoint on a matter of such social controversy
and importance. Any hope that the administrative agency context could serve
as the groundwork for a self-conscious, rational, and deliberative process of
discussion and consensus-building on important issues is cast into question
when the administrative review process becomes deeply infused with a partic-
ular viewpoint and agenda. This is all the more worrisome when that view-
point is intolerant of the self-expressive potential that broadcast "indecency"
might afford for some. Yet, because of the potentially harmful characteristics
of much broadcast sex talk, my proposed deregulatory approach should con-
stantly be open to debate and revision, depending on what happens to sex talk
and the FCC.
It is possible that, in the absence of governmental steering, the content of
some of the currently indecency-laden aesthetic forms will change over time.
Thus, the misogyny of rap may well recede into the background as the form
evolves and more rappers focus self-reflexively on some of the music's early
sexism. As the talk show potentially becomes a new vehicle for more direct
democracy, real public discourse, and an empowered electorate,5 6 we might
hope to see a change - a less conservative political development - in the
shock radio format. Or perhaps a technological solution, like those available
for cable, could take the sting out of broadcast indecency by limiting its availa-
bility to children without imposing too high a general cost.
However, these beneficial results are far from predictions; we cannot fore-
tell the effects either of FCC deregulation of indecency, or of its regulation.
Nor is history per se a satisfactory guide. One reading of the history of inde-
cency regulation is that indecency of an increasingly problematic sort flour-
ishes when the FCC has specifically committed itself to a narrow and
effectively laissez-faire regulatory regime. If history is any guide, then, this
reading would suggest that a deregulatory experiment might lead to an in-
562. For discussions of such changes in the use of media formats in the most recent presi-
dential campaign, see, e.g., Tom Fiedler, Nomination by Talk Show Startles Pundits, MiAmi
HERALD, June 7, 1992, at C5; Carl. M. Gannon & Mark Gunther, Hopefuls Turn Up on TV
Talk Shows, MIAMI HERALD, June 10, 1992, at Al; Elizabeth Kolbert, Political Candidates and
Call-In Shows. When the People Want to be Heard, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1992, at A20, Eliza-
beth Kolbert, Technology Brought in To Personal Touch, N.Y. TIMEs, June 9, 1992, at A25;
Elizabeth Kolbert, Whistle-Stops a la 1992: Arsenio, Larry and Phil, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1992,
at A18;. For a less optimistic view of the phenomenon, see, e.g., Lili Levi, Book Review. Chal-
lenging the Autonomous Press, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 501, 538-41 (1993).
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crease in the amount and explicitness of indecency. Yet, alternative causal
readings of the history are available. The bottom line is that developments in
broadcasting, popular taste, and mass culture are part of complex interactions
with legal rules and administrative enforcement policies. No one element
holds constant while the others change.
This should not leave us unduly dissatisfied, however. The search for
fully comfortable and unambiguous prescriptions is fruitless in hard cases. At
the very least, a stance conscious of the deeply problematic character of broad-
cast indecency and self-conscious about its own adequacy is greatly preferable
to the kind of question-begging, child-protective arguments reflexively mar-
shalled by the Commission in support of its approach to indecency on the air.
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